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PARTIES 
The Petitioner before the Utah Public Service Commission ("Commission" or 
"PSC") and the Appellant in the immediate appeal is Level 3 Communications, LLC 
("Level 3"). Qwest Corporation ("Qwest") was Respondent before the Commission and 
is one of the Appellees in the immediate appeal The Commission is also an Appellee in 
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JURISDICTION 
The Supreme Court has jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to Utah Code 
Annotated § 78-2-2(3)(e)(i) (2005). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
1. Whether the Commission erred in applying a just and reasonable standard 
under the Telecommunications Act of 1996, 47 U.S.C.A. § 251, et seq. to interpret the 
Parties' Old Agreement. 
Whether a statute was correctly interpreted is a question of law reviewed for 
correctness. State v. MacGuire, 84 P.3d 1171, 1173 (Utah 2004). This issue was 
preserved in the Commission proceeding by the Motion for Reconsideration and 
Rehearing, Record at 63; and Reply Brief of Level 3, Record at 79; and in the Removal 
Action filed by Qwest and remanded to this Court, Order Remanding Action to Utah 
Supreme Court, Case No. 2:096CV132K (May 30, 2006). 
2. Whether state law applies to the interpretation of the relative use factor 
("RUF") clause in the parties' Old Agreement 
Whether state or federal law applies to interpret a contract is a question of law 
reviewed de novo. Bourke v. Dun & Bradstreet Corp., 159 F.3d 1032, 1036 (7th Cir. 
1998); Klamath Water Users Protective Ass'n v. Patterson, 204 F.3d 1206,4210 (9th Cir. 
1999). This issue was preserved in the Commission proceeding by the Position 
Statement of Level 3 Communications, LLC, Record at 28; Motion for Reconsideration 
and Rehearing, Record at 63; and Reply Brief of Level 3, Record at 79; and in the 
Removal Action filed by Qwest and remanded to this Court, Order Remanding Action to 
Utah Supreme Court, Case No. 2:096CV132K (May 30, 2006). 
3. Whether the Utah Commission erred in relying on the Federal 
Communications Commission's ISP Remand Order and the Utah Commission's own 
2004 Order in the arbitration of the New Agreement to interpret the RUF clause. 
Questions of contract interpretation not requiring resort to extrinsic evidence are 
matters of law reviewed for correctness. Fairbourn Commercial Inc. v. American 
Housing Partners, Inc., 94 P.3d 292, 295 (Utah 2004). Factual findings are reviewed 
under a clearly erroneous standard. R&R Energies v. Mother Earth Indus., Inc., 936 P.2d 
1068, 1074 (Utah 1997). This issue was preserved in the Commission proceeding by the 
Motion for Reconsideration and Rehearing, Record at 63; and Reply Brief of Level 3, 
Record at 79. 
4. Whether the Commission erred in failing to interpret the RUF clause by the 
plain meaning of the Old Agreement. 
Questions of contract interpretation not requiring resort to extrinsic evidence are 
matters of law reviewed for correctness. Fairbourn Commercial, Inc. v. American 
Housing Partners, Inc., 94 P.3d 292, 295 (Utah 2004). Factual findings are reviewed 
under a clearly erroneous standard. R&R Energies v. Mother Earth Indus., Inc., 936 P.2d 
1068, 1074 (Utah 1997). This issue was preserved in the Commission proceeding by 
Level 3's Motion for ^Reconsideration and Rehearing, Record at 63-, and by the Reply 
Brief of Level 3, Record at 79. 
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PROVISIONS OF CENTRAL IMPORTANCE 
47 U.S.C.A. § 251 (2005) (See addendum for statute) 
47 U.S.C.A. § 252 (2005) (See addendum for statute) 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
L NATURE OF THE CASE 
This case arises from a Petition filed by Level 3 on June 23, 2005, seeking to 
enjoin Qwest from disconnecting service to Level 3, and seeking a declaratory order from 
the Commission that Level 3 was current on its payments to Qwest for the facilities in 
question. 
On June, 13, 2005, Qwest served demand upon Level 3 for payment of 
$563,616.99 for charges that Qwest claimed were in default, threatening to disconnect 
Level 3's service by June 28, 2005, unless payment was received. Record at 4. Level 3 
contended that all undisputed charges had been paid and that Qwest's attempt to impose 
additional charges was in contravention of the unambiguous language of the applicable 
contract between Level 3 and Qwest. Record at 2, p. 7. In response, Qwest brought a 
counterclaim against Level 3, seeking an order from the Commission declaring that 
payment was due based upon the Commission's 2004 Order in a previous docket (Docket 
02-2266-02) in which the Commission arbitrated similar language in a subsequent 
contract between the parties. Record at 24, p 8-1L 
The matter was heard by the Commission on July 26, 2005. Record at 55. In its 
Report and Order, issued August 1:8, 2005, the Commission concluded that it need not 
rely on the unambiguous language of the parties' Old Agreement (as defined below), but 
rather could rely on the reasoning of its 2004 Order in docket No. 02-2266-02 (arbitrating 
their New Agreement (as defined below)), and could instead apply federal standards 
(both past and current) to resolve the dispute. Record at 58, pp. 8-10. Thus, the 
Commission refused to enforce the Old Agreement by its plain terms. 
Level 3 moved the Commission for reconsideration of its Report and Order, 
contending that the Commission failed to correctly apply federal law, failed to apply state 
law, incorrectly relied on the reasoning of its order in Docket No. 02-2266-02, 
improperly ignored its own ruling that its findings in Docket No. 02-2266-02 would be 
applied prospectively only, and failed to give effect to the intention of the parties at the 
time they entered into the Old Agreement by enforcing the plain language of the Old 
Agreement. Record at 63. Level 3's request for reconsideration was subsequently 
deemed denied. Record at 74, p. 2 \ 2. 
EL COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS 
On June 23,2005, Level 3 filed its Petition for Enforcement of the Interconnection 
Agreement between Qwest and Level 3 and Motion for Expedited Relief. Record at 1, 2. 
Level 3 requested that the Commission enjoin Qwest from taking any actions with 
respect to Level 3's accounts with Qwest, including, but not limited to, the suspension of 
service order activity and disconnection of services. Record at 2, p. 3. 
Level 3 also requested that the Commission issue an order declaring that Level 3's 
payments to Qwest were current and that Qwest could not bill or collect from Level 3 for 
direct-trunked transport ("DTP') charges based on the exclusion of ISP-bound (as 
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defined below) traffic from Qwest's share of originating minutes of use during the 
disputed period. Record at 2, p. 8. 
The Commission issued a Notice of Prehearing Conference on June 24, 2005, 
setting the conference for June 30. Record at 8. In that Notice, the Commission noted 
that Qwest had given assurances that it would not take any action regarding Level 3's 
accounts until resolution of the matter. Id. A schedule for the expedited proceedings was 
set pursuant to the Commission's Scheduling Order issued June 30, 2005. Record at 16. 
On July 6, 2005, Qwest filed its Response and Counterclaim to Level 3's motion 
for enforcement, Record at 24, and on July 14, Level 3 filed its Reply to Qwest's 
Counterclaim, Record at 25, 26. Pursuant to the Commission's Scheduling Order, on 
July 15, 2005, both parties filed their Position Statements. Record at 27-53. 
Hearing was held on the matter on July 26, 2005, before administrative law judge 
("ALJ") Steven F. Goodwill. Record at 55. On August 18, 2005, the Commission 
approved and confirmed the ALJ's Report and Order, denying Level 3's Petition for 
Enforcement and granting in part Qwest's Counterclaim. Record at 58, p. 11 % 1. 
On September 19, 2005, Level 3 filed its timely Motion for Reconsideration and 
Rehearing. Record at 62, 63. Pursuant to an agreement between the parties, the 
Commission issued an Order Granting Limited Reconsideration on October 4, 2005, to 
allow die parties' time to conclude settlement discussions. Record at 66, 70. The 
Commission also set new time limits Tor Qwest's substantive response to Level 3's 
Request for Rehearing and Reconsideration and for the "deemed denied" date. Record at 
66,1f 2. 
The parties were unable to reach agreement, and therefore, Qwest filed its 
Opposition to Level 3's Request for Reconsideration and Rehearing on November 18, 
2005. Record at 71. Because the Order Granting Limited Reconsideration issued by the 
Commission did not allow time for Level 3 to file a reply brief or for the Commission to 
consider any such reply, on November 21, Level 3 filed a Request for Leave to File a 
Reply Brief, and a Motion for Extension of Schedule. Record at 72, 73. Level 3's 
request was granted, Record at 74, and on December 5, 2005, Level 3 filed its reply. 
Record at 78, 79. 
In its Order Granting Limited Reconsideration, the Commission had ordered that, 
in the absence of any further action on the Commission's part, Level 3's Motion for 
Reconsideration and Rehearing would be deemed denied as of December 16, 2005. 
Record at 74, p. 2 ^ f 2. The Commission took no further action and therefore, on January 
13, 2006, Level 3 filed its timely Petition for Review with this Court.1 See Petition for 
Review. 
Thereafter, on February 13, 2006, Qwest filed with this Court its Notice of Filing 
Notice of Removal in the United States District Court for the District of Utah, Central 
Division. See Notice of Filing Notice of Removal in the United States District Court for 
the District of Utah, Central Division. After briefing and a hearing on the matter, the 
Federal District €ourt remanded the case to this Court, finding that there was no federal 
1
 This document and ail subsequent documents filed with this Court are not included in 
the Commission^ record for transmittal to this Court. Nevertheless, they have been filed 
with this Court and are a part of the record on appeal of this matter. 
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question involved and the matter was one of state contract law. See Order Remanding 
Action to Utah Supreme Court, at 2, Case No. 2:06CV132K (May 30, 2006), a certified 
copy of which was forwarded to this Court by the Federal District Court on May 30, 
2006. 
III. DISPOSITION BELOW 
On August 18, 2005, the Commission denied Level 3's Petition for Enforcement 
of the Interconnection Agreement between Qwest and Level 3. Record at 58, p. 11 f 1. 
The Commission did not take any action on Level 3's Motion for Reconsideration and 
Rehearing and it was deemed denied as of December 16, 2005. Record at 74, p. 2 f^ 2. 
IV, STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. Level 3 is a local exchange carrier providing service in Utah. An important 
part of Level 3's service offerings are services to Internet service providers ("ISP"). 
Record at 2, p. 3; Record at 42 pp. 2-3. Qwest is an incumbent local exchange carrier in 
Utah. Record at 6, p. 1. 
2. Qwest and Level 3 interconnect at a single point of interconnection ("POI") 
located in Salt Lake City. Record at 6, p. 1; Record at 58, p. 3. Telecommunication 
traffic originating with Qwest's customers in the Utah local access and transport area 
("LATA") that is destined for Level 3 customers is carried by Qwest to the POI where it 
is handed off to Level 3. Record at 6, p. 1; Record at 42, p. 3. For example, if a Qwest 
customer in Cedar City calls a Level 3 customer in Cedar City, the call is carried by 
Qwest to the POI In Salt Lake City where it is transferred to Level 3, who then delivers 
the call to its customer. Record at 6, p. 1. 
3. On or about September 7, 2000, Level 3 and Qwest entered into an 
interconnection agreement ("Old Agreement") pursuant to the Telecommunications Act 
of 1996 ("FTA" or "Act"),2 47 U.S.C.A. § 251, et seq., and Utah Code Annotated § 54-
8b-2.2. The terms and conditions of the Old Agreement were not originally negotiated by 
Level 3 and Qwest, but by AT&T and U S West (the predecessor of Qwest). Record at 
55, p. 40, In. 9-22. Level 3, as permitted by federal law, adopted the same terms and 
conditions as had been negotiated between U S West and AT&T. 47 U.S.C.A. § 252(i); 
Record at 55, p. 40, In. 9-22. While portions of the AT&T - U S West Agreement were 
the subject of arbitration before a state public utilities commission, the Old Agreement 
itself, as between Level 3 and Qwest, is considered for the purposes of this proceeding to 
be a negotiated agreement. Record at 55, p. 40, In. 23-25, p. 41, In. 1-2; Record at 71, p. 
13. 
4. The Old Agreement was approved by the Commission in a Report and 
Order dated January 10, 2001 ("2001 Order"). Record at 30. In the 2001 Order, the 
Commission determined that the Old Agreement was nondiscriminatory, and that it 
comported with Section 251 of the Act and then current Federal Communications 
Commission ("FCC") regulations. Record at 30, p. 2_ffl 1-4. The Commission also 
concluded that the Old Agreement complied with Utah laws and the Commission's rules, 
and was in the public interest. Id. 
2
 References to sections of the Act are to the section numbers as codified in Title 47 of 
the United States Code. 
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5. Under the Old Agreement, Qwest and Level 3 agreed that when the traffic 
between the two carriers reached a certain level, DTT facilities would be used to carry the 
traffic to the POL Record at 6, p. 1; Record at 58, p. 4. Accordingly, when the traffic 
reached the requisite level, Level 3 requested that Qwest establish DTT facilities to carry 
this Qwest originated traffic to the POI with Level 3. Id. at pp. 2-3. The Old Agreement 
provides that the cost of those facilities would be shared according to the relative use of 
the facilities by each carrier. Id. It states: 
If the Parties' elect to establish two-way direct trunks, the 
compensation for such jointly used 'shared' facilities shall be 
adjusted as follows. The nominal compensation shall be 
pursuant to the rates for direct trunk transport in Appendix A. 
The actual rate paid to the provider of the direct trunk facility 
shall be reduced to reflect the provider's use of that facility. 
The adjustment in the direct trunk transport rate shall be a 
percentage that reflects the provider's relative use (i.e. 
originating minutes of use) of the facility in the busy hour. 
Old Agreement, Section 5.1.2.4 (emphasis added). Record at 44, p. 4; Record at 58, pp. 
3-4. Under this provision, the relative use factor ("RUF"), which is based on originating 
minutes of use, dictates the percentage of the cost that each party will pay for the DTT 
facilities. There is no other provision in the Old Agreement that addresses cost sharing 
for-such facilities, or that mentions "relative use." Record at 58, p. 4. 
6. Because Level 3's customers that exchange traffic with Qwest's customers 
were ISPs during the period at issue in this dispute, and because ISPs do not ordinarily 
originate calls, Qwest was the responsible carrier for alt of the originating traffic to be 
carried over the DTTs. Record at 6, "p. 1. Qwest has alleged that Level 3 "was at alt 
times relevant to this dispute . . . providing services exclusively to [ISPs]," and knew that 
virtually all of the traffic that was exchanged on those facilities originated with Qwest. 
Record at 42, p. 3. The Old Agreement required Qwest to bear the cost of bringing its 
traffic to the POL Record at 6, p. 2, n J . This was consistent with long-standing FCC 
Rules and orders that established the originating carrier is responsible for the cost of 
carriage of traffic originated by their end users.3 
7, The parties amended the Old Agreement twice. On November 14, 2002, 
they jointly filed an amendment to the Old Agreement pursuant to the change-in-law 
provision, to implement the FCC's recent ISP Remand Order, which amendment was 
approved January 8, 2003. Record at 42, p. 2 n.2. The ISP Remand Order, issued in 
April 2001 by the FCC, determined that ISP-bound traffic was not to be included in the 
calculation of reciprocal compensation for the exchange of traffic for local area calls 
("LAC").4 Because the DTT facilities at issue here are not related to reciprocal 
compensation for LAC, the Parties and the Commission acknowledge that the ISP 
Remand Order is not directly applicable to this case. Qwest stated: 
The FCC's ISP Remand Order dealt with the proper treatment 
of local ISP-bound traffic for reciprocal compensation 
purposes. It did not deal directly with the application of the 
RUF to the assignment of financial responsibility for facilities 
on the ILEC's side of the POL 
3
 Implementation of the Local ^ Competition Provisions in the Telecommunications Act of 
1996; Intercarrier Compensation for ISP-Bound Traffic, Order on Remand and Report 
and Order, 16 FCC Red 9151^20 (2001) ("ISP Remand Order"), remanded WorldCom 
v. FCC, 288 F.3d 429 (D.C. Cir. 2002).; The Internet Service Provider Bound Traffic 
Amendment to the Interconnection Agreement between Qwest Corporation and Level 3 
Communications, LLC, for the State of Utah, was filed with the Utah Commission on 
November 14,2002. 
4
 ISP Remand Order at ffi[ 1, 14,46, 52. 
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Record at 42, p. 18. The parties' amendment, therefore, did nothing to affect the RUF 
calculation for determining shared costs of DTT facilities. 
8. On or about June 28, 2002, the parties amended the Old Agreement a 
second time, again invoking the change-in-law provision to add terms and conditions for 
the establishment of a Single Point of Presence ("SPOP") in the Utah LATA. Record at 
42, p. 2, n.2; Record at 45. ("SPOP Amendment") Although the SPOP Amendment 
generally deals with Level 3's point of presence in Utah, nothing in the SPOP 
Amendment addressed or affected the manner in which the RUF calculation would be 
applied for determining the shared cost of DTTs. Record at 34-39; Record at 45-50. 
9. Despite the plain language of the Old Agreement, Qwest billed Level 3 for 
DTTs, applying the RUF, but excluding Qwest's minutes of originating use from the 
calculation because the traffic was bound for Level 3's ISP customers. Rather than 
bearing the cost of the facilities that carried their originating minutes themselves. Qwest 
billed Level 3 for the full amount of the trunks. Record at 58, pp. 7-8. In October 2002, 
the parties settled a past dispute about Qwest's invoices for amounts in dispute through 
June 30, 2002. Record at 58, p. 6, n.3. 
10. The Old Agreement expired on June 26, 200L Record at 58, p. 4. But, the 
effective expiration date was governed by the following provision: 
This Agreement shall be effective upon Commission approval 
and shall remain in effect until June 26, 2001 and thereafter 
shall continue in force and effect unless and until a new 
agreement addressing all of the terms of this Agreement, 
becomes effective between the Parties. Either Party may 
request resolution of open issues in accordance with the 
provisions of Section 27 of this Part A of this Agreement, 
Dispute Resolution, beginning nine (9) months prior to the 
expiration of this Agreement. Any disputes regarding the 
terms and conditions of the new interconnection agreement 
shall be resolved in accordance with said Section 27 and the 
resulting agreement shall be submitted to the Commission. 
This Agreement shall remain in effect until a newr 
interconnection agreement approved by the Commission has 
become effective. 
Old Agreement, Part A, Section 20.1 (emphasis added). Record at 58, p. 4. Thus, the 
terms of the Old Agreement were to apply until a new interconnection agreement could 
be approved by the Commission. Id. 
11. In anticipation of the expiration of the Old Agreement, Level 3 and Qwest 
began negotiations for a new interconnection agreement ("New Agreement''). Record 
at 58, p. 4. The Parties were able to agree to all of the terms except the issue of whether 
ISP-bound traffic should be excluded from the RUF calculation. Record at 6; Record at 
58, p.4. Qwest proposed that ISP-bound traffic should be excluded from the relative use 
calculation. Record at 6; Record at 58, p.4. Level 3, consistent with the relative use 
treatment under the Old Agreement, proposed that the relative use calculation should 
include all of the originating minutes of use on the trunks without exception. Record at 6, 
p. 2; Record at 58, p. 5. To resolve that single issue in the New Agreement, on August 7, 
2002, Level 3 filed a Petition for Arbitration with the Public Service Commission. 
Record at 58, p. 4. 
12. The parties also arbitrated a related sub-issue concerning whether the new 
RUF should be applied prospectively only, or whether there should be a retroactive "true-
up" to the beginning of the then-current billing quarter using the calculation adopted in 
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the New Agreement. Record at 6, p. 4. Qwest proposed that the new RUF should be 
used to apply retroactively to the beginning of the billing quarter. Id. Level 3 argued that 
any new RUF should be used prospectively only from the effective date of the 
Commission's Order. Id. 
13. On December 10, 2002, a hearing was held and testimony was received in 
the Arbitration proceeding in connection with the New Agreement. Record at 6. Qwest 
argued that adoption of an RUF calculation that included ISP-bound traffic would 
"violate the same policy considerations" that caused the FCC in its ISP Remand Order to 
exclude ISP-bound traffic from payment of reciprocal compensation for LAC traffic. 
Record at 6, p. 2. Level 3, on the other hand, argued that the obligation to inter-connect 
through DTT facilities, as in this case, is entirely different from the obligation to pay 
reciprocal compensation for LAC traffic. Id. at p. 3. It contended that the ISP Remand 
Order only modified reciprocal compensation obligations, not interconnection 
obligations. Id 
14. The Commission issued its Report and Order in the Arbitration proceeding, 
Docket No. 02-2266-02, on February 20, 2004 ("2004 Order"). Record at 6. The 
Commission considered language proposed by the Parties and ultimately adopted 
Qwest's version, which excluded ISP-bound traffic from the 4ninutes-of-use calculation 
in the RUF. Record at 6, p.4; Record at 58, p. 5.5 
5
 The precise language of the RUF clause from the New Agreement is not in the record. 
14. In its 2004 Order, the Commission noted that an RUF calculation that 
included ISP-bound traffic would result in Qwest bearing all the cost of the 
interconnection facilities. It stated: 
We agree with Qwest's assertion that such a result would 
violate the requirements under the act; that ILECs receive just 
and reasonable compensation for interconnection. Level 3 
paying nothing toward the interconnection facilities is not a 
just and reasonable rate. 
Record at 6, p. 4. The Commission further noted that, although the ISP Remand Order 
was not directly applicable to the RUF calculation, "many of the same policy 
considerations" were applicable in arbitrating the party's dispute over the RUF 
calculation. Id. The Commission stated: 
Just as these considerations caused the FCC to declare that 
Internet traffic is not subject to reciprocal compensation 
payments, they strongly favor the exclusion of ISP traffic 
from the relative use calculations at issue in this matter. 
Id. The Commission thus ordered that Qwest5 s proposed language regarding the relative 
use calculation be adopted. Id. at p. 5. 
15. The Commission set the effective date of the new relative use calculation to 
be the end of the first billing quarter. It stated: 
Qwest proposes that when a new factor is established that 
bills should be retroactively adjusted for the initial billing 
quarter. Level 3 argues that any new relative use factor 
should be used prospectively only. We will adopt Level 3's 
position and order that the contract language be modified so 
that no true up will be made and new relative use factors will 
apply prospectively only. 
Record at 6, p. 4 (emphasis added). No appeal was taken from the 2004 Order. 
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16. The New Agreement became effective on the same date as the 
Commission's 2004 Order, February 10, 2004. Record at 58, p.6, n.3. 
17. During the time that the parties were negotiating and arbitrating the New 
Agreement they continued to exchange traffic under the terms of the Old Agreement. 
While operating under the Old Agreement, Qwest billed Level 3 for DTT charges, 
including the dispute period from June 30, 2002, the effective date of the Parties' 
previous settlement, until February 10, 2004 ("Dispute Period"). Record at 58, p. 6, n.3. 
Level 3 continued to withhold payment of the disputed amount as there was no basis for 
the charges under the Old Agreement. Record at 2, p.7 f^ 11; Record at 4. 
18. On June 13, 2005, Qwest made demand upon Level 3 for payment in the 
amount of $563,616.99 for charges allegedly accrued during the Dispute Period, 
threatening to discontinue Level 3's service if payment was not made by June 28, 2005. 
Record at 4; Record at 58, pp. 1-2. 
19. On June 23, 2005, Level 3 commenced the present action by filing its 
Petition for Enforcement of the [Old] Interconnection Agreement Between Qwest and 
Level 3 and Motion for Expedited Relief ("Petition")- Record at 1, 2; Record at 58, p. L 
In its Petition, LeveL3 sought an order enjoining Qwest from disconnecting its service, 
and a declaration from the Commission that, during the Dispute Period, Qwest could not 
bill or collect charges for DTT facilities provided to Level 3 based on the RUF clause in 
the New Agreement, but must apply the RUF from the Old Agreement. Record at 2, p. 8. 
20. After briefing by the parties and a hearing on the merits, the Commission 
issued its Report and Order on August 18, 2005 ("2005 Order"). Record at 5S. The 
Commission declined to enforce the plain language of the Old Agreement (which the 
Commission had previously approved (Record at 30)), or to apply accepted principles of 
contract interpretation to determine the meaning of the relative use clause of the Old 
Agreement. Record at 58, pp. 8-11. Instead, the Commission stated: 
We do not agree with Level 3's characterization that it would 
be improper for this Commission to "add language" to the 
Old Agreement by excluding ISP-bound traffic from the RUF 
[Relative Use Factor] calculation. This Commission is 
routinely asked to interpret disputed terms between parties in 
order to produce a just and reasonable result in accordance 
with applicable law and regulation. This case is no different. 
Record at 58, pp. 8-9. 
21. The Commission further concluded: 
[A]ny interpretation of Section 5.1.2.4 of Attachment 1, 
whether in the New Agreement or the Old Agreement, must 
accord with Section 251(d)(1) [sic][6] requirement of the Act 
that rates for interconnection of facilities be just and 
reasonable. 
Record at 58, p. 10. 
22. The Commission also ignored its 2004 Order that the new RUF would 
apply prospectively only and concluded that, although the 2004 Order was not 
"controlling precedent/' 
[We] recognize that the rationale behind our 2004 Order 
[arbitrating Ae New-Agreement] is equally applicable to the 
parties' current dispute both because the issue now before us 
is identical to the issue in docket No. 02-2266-02 [New 
Agreement Arbitration] and because the release ofjhe ISP 
6
 This citation is a typographical error. The correct section is 252(d)(1). 
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Remand Order predates the start of the Dispute Period by 
more than a year. 
Record at 58, p. 9. Thus, the Commission interpreted Section 5.1.2.4 to exclude ISP-
bound traffic from the RUF calculation. Record at 58, p. 10. 
23. On September 19, 2005, Level 3 filed its Motion for Reconsideration and 
Rehearing. Record at 62, 63. The Commission did not take any action on Level 3's 
Motion for Reconsideration and Rehearing, and thus, it was deemed denied as of 
December 16, 2005. Record at 74. 
24. On January 13, 2006, Level 3 filed its timely Petition for Review with this 
Court. See Petition for Review, S. Ct. No. 20060042, Agency Decision No. 05-2266-01 
(Jan. 13, 2006). 
25. On February 13, 2006, Qwest removed this appeal to Federal District 
Court, alleging that the Commission was acting pursuant to federal law in interpreting the 
Old Agreement, that it expressly relied on federal law in making its determination, and 
that any claims by Level 3 necessarily arise under federal law. See Exhibit A, p. 2 f^ 3 of 
Notice of Filing Notice of Removal in the United States District Court for the District of 
Utah, Central Division, S. Ct. No. 20060042, Agency Decision N a 05-2266-01 (Feb. 13, 
2006). 
26. After briefing by the parties and oral argument before the court, the Federal 
District Court remanded the matter to this Court, finding: 
[T]here is no federal question on the face of Level 3's 
Petition, its claims were not created by federal law, ^ nd also 
that Level 3's right to relief does not depend on resolution of 
a substantial question of federal law. Rather, the resolution 
of this dispute depends upon state contract law. For the 
reasons stated in Level 3's memorandum in support and in its 
reply memorandum,[7] the court agrees that it does not have 
subject matter jurisdiction over this action. 
See Order Remanding Action to Utah Supreme Court, at 2, Case No. 2:06CV132K (May 
30, 2006) (emphasis added), a certified copy of which has been forwarded to this Court. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
1. The Commission Erred in Applying a "Just and Reasonable5' Standard 
to Interpret the Old Agreement. 
The "just and reasonable" standard applies to provisions in interconnection 
agreements ("ICAs") that are brought to state commissions for arbitration and approval. 
For provisions that are negotiated, the standard for state commission approval is whether 
the provision is non-discriminatory and in the public interest, convenience and necessity. 
The Commission approved the Old Agreement in 2001, finding it to be non-
discriminatory, in the public interest and in compliance with the FTA. Because the Old 
Agreement was negotiated, rather than arbitrated, this was the correct standard. 
However, in the instant action, the Commission "interpreted" the RUF clause of the Old 
Agreement to produce what it believed was a just and reasonable result—that is, to 
exclude ISP-bound traffic from the RUF calculation. The Commission thus erred in 
applying the standard for approving arbitrated ICA terms to the interpretation of the 
negotiated Old Agreement. 
7
 The briefs of both parties submitted to federal court are included in the Addendum. 
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2. The Commission Erred in Applying Federal Law of Any Kind to the 
Interpretation of the RUF Clause. 
The issue presented in this case required the interpretation and enforcement, not 
approval, of the RUF clause of the Old Agreement. While the interpretation and 
enforcement of provisions addressing federally mandated or essential duties under the 
FTA, such as the duty to pay reciprocal compensation, may be subject to the FTA, the 
interpretation of other contract terms is a matter of state contract law. 
The cost mechanism for DTT facilities, unlike the reciprocal compensation 
mechanism, is not required by or subject to the FTA. Consistent with the standard for 
approval of negotiated terms in an ICA, parties may agree about whether or not to share 
the cost of DTT facilities, and if they are shared, how they should be priced. The 
interpretation and enforcement of the RUF is thus governed by state contract law. 
The federal district court remanded this case to the Utah Supreme Court because it 
concluded, among other things, that the resolution of this case does not raise a question of 
federal law, but "depends upon state contract law." Remand Order at 2. 
3, The Commission Erred in Relying on the ISP Remand Order and the 
Commission's 2004 Order, 
The ISP Remand Order established a separate intercarrier compensation regime 
for the exchange of ISP-bound traffic, ruling that ISP-bound traffic should not be given 
the same reciprocal compensation treatment as traditional LAC. The parties and the 
Commission acknowledge that the ISP Remand Order is not directly applicable because 
the facilities at issue in this case were not contemplated by the FCC when it established a 
new intercarrier compensation structure, on a per-minute-of-use basis, for ISP-bound 
traffic in the ISP Remand Order. 
Further, even if the ISP Remand Order were somehow considered relevant to the 
issues in this case, the ISP Remand Order itself states that it does not apply to ICAs 
entered into before the effective date of the ISP Remand Order. Unless parties invoke a 
change-of-law provision under their ICA, any contractual term relating to reciprocal 
compensation was to remain undisturbed for the term of the ICA. Because the Old 
Agreement pre-dates the ISP Remand Order, and because neither party invoked the 
change-of-law provision to amend the RUF clause, the RUF clause as written controls for 
the term of the Old Agreement. The Commission thus erred in applying the "rationale" 
of the ISP Remand Order to the DTT facilities. 
The Commission also erred in applying the rationale behind its 2004 Order 
arbitrating the RUF clause in the parties' New Agreement. As discussed above, the 
standard for the Commission to approve the RUF in the New Agreement was a "just and 
reasonable" standard. That standard does not apply to interpreting the RUT in the Old 
Agreement because it was a negotiated agreement and because in interpreting (as 
opposed to approving) ICAs, state law generally applies. 
In addition, the Commission's own 2004 Order provided that the RUF in the New 
Agreement, which excluded ISP-bound traffic from the RUF calculation, was to apply 
prospectively only. Thus, the application of the 2004 Order to the Old Agreement is 
directly contrary to the 2004 Order. 
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4. The Commission Erred by Failing to Enforce the Plain Meaning of the 
Old Agreement 
For the reasons discussed above, principles of Utah state contract law govern the 
interpretation of the RUF clause in the Old Agreement. Under Utah law, a contract must 
be interpreted giving effect to the intention of the parties and applying the law that was in 
effect at the time they entered into the agreement. If contract language is unambiguous, it 
must be given its plain meaning. A court may not reform a contract simply because it 
believes the contract is not fair to one of the parties. The Commission erred by failing to 
enforce the clear, unambiguous language of the RUF. 
ARGUMENT 
L THE COMMISSION ERRED IN APPLYING A "JUST AND 
REASONABLE" STANDARD TO THE RELATIVE USE FACTOR 
CLAUSE OF THE OLD AGREEMENT. 
In its 2005 Order, the Commission stated that it would not be improper to 
effectively add language to the Old Agreement by imposing an interpretation of the 
contract that excludes Qwest originated ISP-bound traffic from the RUF calculation to 
produce what it characterized as a just and reasonable result. Record at 58, pp. 8-9. 
Drawing an analogy between the relative use of DTT facilities and the reciprocal 
compensation obligation of carriers under the Act, the Commission relied on the 
reasoning of the ISP Remand Order to "illuminat[e] the proper meaning of Section 
5.1.2.4" of the Old Agreement. Id. at 9-H). The Commission incorrectly concluded that 
"any interpretation of Section 5.1.2.4 ... must accord with the Section 251(d)(1) [sic][8] 
o 
This citation is a typographical error. The correct section is Section 252(d)(1). 
requirement of the Act that rates for interconnection of facilities be just and reasonable." 
Id. Because the calculation of relative use as written in the Old Agreement would require 
Qwest to bear the cost of the DDT facilities, the Commission ruled that it "could not 
conclude that such a result would equate to just and reasonable compensation for Qwest/5 
and instead imposed the entire cost on Level 3. Id. at p. 10. The Commission thus 
concluded that Section 5.1.2.4 must be interpreted to exclude ISP-bound traffic from the 
RUF calculation. Id. 
The Commission's conclusion is error. The Act does not require that every 
provision of an interconnection agreement ("ICA") produce a "just and reasonable" 
result. In fact, it specifically provides that carriers may agree otherwise. 47 U.S.C. 
§ 252(a)(1). 
A* The Federal Act Allows Parties to Agree to the RUF Calculation 
Without Regard to Whether It Is "Just and Reasonable." 
The Act requires incumbent local exchange carriers to interconnect with a 
requesting competitive carrier's facilities and equipment and to exchange traffic with 
competitive carriers. 47 U.S.C. § 251(c). The specific duties of telecommunications 
carriers are enumerated in Sections 251(b) and (c). Among other things, all 
telecommunications carriers must "establish reciprocal compensation arrangements for 
the transport and termination >^f telecommunications." Id. § 251(b)(5). Incumbent 
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carriers, but not others, must offer access to network elements "on rates terms and 
conditions that are just, reasonable and non-discriminatory." Id. § 251(c)(3). 
To achieve interconnection and fulfill their duties under the Act, the incumbent 
and the requesting carrier must enter into an ICA. Id. § 251(c). ICAs may be arrived at 
through negotiation or mediation or, if the parties are unable to agree, through arbitration 
conducted by a state commission. Id. § 252(a)-(b). In practice, most agreements are a 
combination of provisions reached through negotiation and a few provisions taken to 
state commissions for arbitration (e.g., the New Agreement). Once a local exchange 
carrier has agreed through negotiation, or is compelled by an order after arbitration to 
make available any interconnection service or network element, it must make the same 
service or element available to any requesting carrier on the same terms and conditions as 
those stated in the ICA. Id. § 252(i). 
All ICAs must receive approval from state commissions.10 However, the 
standards for approving the terms ofTCAs are different depending on whether the terms 
Encumbent local exchange carriers have the duty: 
to provide ... interconnection with the local exchange carrier's network ... 
on rates, terms and conditions that are just, reasonable, and non-
discriminatory, in accordance with the terms and conditions of the 
[interconnection] agreement and the requirements of this section and 
section 252 of this title. 
47 U.S.C. § 251(c)(2). 
ro
 The Act provides: 
Any interconnection agreement adopted by negotiation or arbitration shall 
be submitted for approval to the State commission, A State commission to 
which an agreement is submitted shall approve or reject the agreement, 
with written findings as to any deficiencies. 
are negotiated or the result of a state commission order following arbitration. For ICAs 
that are arbitrated by state commissions, the Act provides: 
In resolving by arbitration ... any open issues and imposing 
conditions upon the parties to the agreement, a State 
commission shall: 
(1) ensure that such resolution and conditions meet the 
requirements of section 251 of this title, including the 
regulations prescribed by the [Federal Communications] 
Commission pursuant to section 251 of this title. 
Id. § 252(c). Section 251 provides, among other things, that the rates, terms and 
conditions for interconnection be "just, reasonable and non-discriminatory." Id. § 
251(c)(2)(D). A state commission may reject an arbitrated agreement (or portion 
thereof), "if it finds that the agreement does not meet the requirements of section 251." 
Id. § 252(e)(2)(B). 
For negotiated agreements, however, the Act prescribes different standards: 
Upon receiving a request for interconnection, services, or 
network elements pursuant to section 251 of this title, an 
incumbent local exchange carrier may negotiate and enter 
into a binding agreement with the requesting 
telecommunications carrier or carriers without regard to the 
standards set forth in subsections (b) and (c) of section 251 of 
this title. 
Id. £252(a)(l) (emphasis added). Thus, the parties to a negotiated ICA can 
voluntarily =agree to terms and conditions different from those required under Section 
251, including the requirement in Section 251(c)(2)(D) that rates for interconnection 
facilities such as DTTs be "just and reasonable." They are free to make their own 
47 U.S.C.§ 252(e)(1). 
866001 14 
bargain. For negotiated provisions, there are only two grounds on which a commission 
may reject the parties' adopted language: 
The State commission may only reject 
an agreement (or portion thereof) adopted by negotiation ... if 
it finds that: (i) the agreement (or portion thereof) 
discriminates against a telecommunications carrier not a party 
to the agreement; or (ii) the implementation of such 
agreement or portion is not consistent with the public interest, 
convenience and necessity. 
Id. § 252(e)(2)(A). 
B. The Old Agreement Was Approved by the Utah Commission in 
Accordance with the Standards of the Act 
The Old Agreement between Level 3 and Qwest was not arbitrated before the 
Commission. Level 3 and Qwest (as successor to U S West) entered into the Old 
Agreement by adopting the same terms and conditions as had been negotiated between 
U.S. West and AT&T. Record at 55, p. 40, In. 9-22. While some of the terms of that 
agreement, in turn, had been arrived at through arbitration between U S West and AT&T, 
there is no evidence that the relative use clause In the Old Agreement was ever the 
subject of arbitration. Record at 55, p. 40, -fai. 23-25, p. 41, In. 1-2. For the purposes of 
this proceeding, Qwest has acknowledged that the Old Agreement was a negotiated 
agreement. See Record at 71, p. 13 ("sinceJhe docket was not an arbitration proceeding, 
the ICA was a negotiated agreement"). 
Qwest and Level 3 presented their Old Agreement to the Commission in October, 
2000 for review and approval in accordance with Section 252(e)(1). Record at 30, p. L 
The Utah Commission approved and confirmed the findings and conclusions of the 
Administrative Law Judge who, "having reviewed said agreement and having been fully 
advised in the matter," found that it did "not discriminate against any telecommunications 
carrier not a party to it," and that it was "in the public interest" Id. at pp. 1-2. At the 
same time, the Commission concluded that "the Agreement comports with the Act's § 
251, and with currently effective [FCC] regulations." Id. at p. 2.11 
Therefore, the 2001 Order concluded that the Old Agreement, including the RUF 
clause, did not discriminate against any third party carrier and was in the public interest. 
Also, because the clause was not arbitrated, the parties were free to agree upon the RUF 
without regard to whether that specific clause necessarily produced a result the 
Commission might consider just and reasonable. 47 U.S.C. § 252(a)(1). 
In the present petition to interpret and enforce the Old Agreement, the 
Commission reached the opposite conclusion, in essence reversing its earlier approval. 
Contrary to the provisions of the Act, and contrary to its previous findings, the 
Commission stated that any interpretation of Section 5.1.2.4 must accord with the Section 
252(d)(1) requirement of the Act that rates for interconnection of facilities be just and 
reasonable. Record at 58, p. 10. This conclusion is error. It retroactively imposes on the 
Old Agreement the standard for approving-arbitrated terms and condition^ instead of 
recognizing its prior approval and following the standard for negotiated terms and 
11
 While the Commission stated that the Old, Agreement was approved in conformance 
with Section-252(e)(1) of the Act, it did-not state whether it relied on Section 
252(e)(2)(A) for negotiated agreements, or Section 252(e)(2)(B) for arbitrated 
agreements. Instead, the Commission recited the requirements of both subsections (A) 
and (B), and found that they had been met. Record at 30, p. 1-2. 
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conditions. As the Commission had previously noted in its 2001 Order approving the 
Old Agreement, that standard had been met because the Old Agreement did not 
discriminate against other carriers, and because it was in the public interest. Further, by 
reversing its previous ruling, the Commission not only applied the wrong standard, it 
violated the correct standard by discriminating against Level 3 relative to other providers, 
like AT&T, who were allowed to operate pursuant to ICA terms like those in the Old 
Agreement without improper Commission interference. 
The Commission's 2005 Order is error because it imposes upon the RUF clause in 
the Old Agreement a just and reasonable standard that is not required under the FTA for 
approving ICAs, and because the Commission had already approved the Old Agreement 
as being in accordance with the FTA and state law. 
n. THE COMMISSION ERRED IN APPLYING FEDERAL LAW OF 
ANY KIND TO THE INTERPRETATION OF THE RUF CLAUSE. 
Even if the Commission had used the correct standard for approving the Old 
Agreement, it still would have erred, because this is a petition to interpret and enforce, 
not to approve an ICA. The interpretation of the RUF clause is governed by state law, 
not federal law. 
A state commission's authority to interpret and enforce ICAs is not express in 
Section 252. The leading case that considered whether the authority to enforce and 
interpret ICAs arises under federal law, declined to hold that it does. Tn Verizon 
Maryland, Inc. v. Public Service Commission of Maryland, 535 U.S. 635 (2002), the 
United States Supreme Court considered the argument that Section 252 implicitly 
encompassed the authority for state commissions to interpret and enforce ICAs. The case 
arose in the context of whether the federal district court had jurisdiction to hear an appeal 
from a state commission's decision interpreting and enforcing a reciprocal compensation 
provision in the parties' ICA. The court declined to find that Section 252 provided a 
basis for federal jurisdiction. Id. at 642. 
In the same case, on remand from the Supreme Court, the Fourth Circuit found 
that federal jurisdiction existed to interpret and enforce the ICA under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 
(federal question jurisdiction), in part because of "how important reciprocal 
compensation is to the Act's central purpose of promoting competition in local telephone 
markets." Verizon Maryland, Inc. v. Global Naps, Inc., 377 F.3d 355, 365 (4th Cir. 
2004). It noted that "[bjecause the [interconnection] agreement and the specific duty it 
incorporates (reciprocal compensation) have a direct connection to the Act, the purpose 
of the Act is best served by subjecting the PSC's contract interpretation decision to 
federal review in the district court." Id. (emphasis added). "The fulfillment of this duty 
[reciprocal compensation] is essential to the Act's pro-competitive design." Id. The 
court hastened to add, however, that not every term in an ICA raises issues essential to 
the purposes^f the Act. It stated: 
[Federally mandated duties, including the duty to pay 
reciprocal compensation, are the backbone of the new 
[regulatory] program. As a result, when there is a claim that a 
state utility commission has misinterpreted an interconnection 
agreement provision that implements a duty imposed by the 
Act, review should be available under § 1331 in district court. 
We are not saying that every dispute about a term in an 
interconnection agreement belongs in federal court, but when 
the contractual dispute (like the one here) involves one of the 
1996 Act's essential duties, there is a federal question. 
Id. at 366 (emphasis added). 
When the contractual provision is not one of the essential duties mandated by the 
Act, courts have found that the interpretation is not a question of federal law, but one of 
state law. In Nuvox Communications, Inc. v. North Carolina Utilities Commission, 409 
F. Supp. 2d 660 (E.D.N.C 2006), for example, the federal court considered whether a 
dispute involving an audit provision in an ICA raised an issue of federal law sufficient to 
confer jurisdiction on the court. The court stated: 
The Act expressly provides for carriers to negotiate terms 
different from those set forth in the Act See Global Naps, 
111 F.3d at 391 (Niemeyer, J., dissenting) ("given [carriers'] 
... authority to negotiate terms without regard to federal law, 
the terms [at issue] do not raise an issue of federal law in any 
meaningful way.") 
409 F. Supp. 2d at 665. Similarly, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh 
Circuit has stated^ 
A decision "interpreting" an agreement contrary to its own 
terms creates a different kind of problem - one under the law 
of contracts, and therefore one for which a state forum can 
supply a remedy. 
Illinois Bell Tele. Co. v. Worldcom Techs., Inc., 179 F.3d 566, 574 (7th Cir. 2000). The 
application of state law to the interpretation and enforcement of non-essential duties is 
consistent with the declaration in Section 252 that the parties may agree to terms of an 
ICA "without regard to the standards set forth in subsections (b) and (c) of section 251." 
47 U.S.C. § 252(a)(1). 
When Level 3 appealed the Commission's decision in the present case, Qwest 
removed the case to federal court, claiming that the Commission's application of Section 
252 to interpret the meaning of the RUF clause must be decided through the application 
of federal law and that it turned on an interpretation of the Act. See Order Remanding 
Action to Utah Supreme Court, Case No, 2:06CV132K (May 30, 2006) (summarizing 
positions of parties). The federal court, however, after considering the briefs and 
argument of the parties, rejected Qwest's argument. It found that there was no federal 
question on the face of Level 3's Petition, its claims were not created by federal law, and 
also that "Level 3's right to relief ... depends upon state contract law" Id. at 2 
(emphasis added). The federal court, finding no federal question here, concluded that 
state contract law should apply. Id. 
The DTT facilities at issue are not the kind of facilities to which reciprocal 
compensation duties apply. The duty of all carriers to pay reciprocal compensation is 
express in the Act. 47 U.S.C. § 252(b)(5). When a customer of local carrier A places a 
call to a customer of local carrier B, A must pay B for terminating the call on B's 
network. When the direction of the call is reversed, carrier B must pay carrier A. See 
Global Naps, 377 F.3d at 359 (explaining the duty to pay reciprocal compensation). The 
duty to pay reciprocal compensation applies only to the exchange of traffic between end 
users in the same local calling area ("LCA"), It would, for example, apply to customers 
of different carriers calling each other in Salt Lake Valley, but it would not apply to calls 
made between the Salt Lake and Utah valley because those are "long distance," not LCA 
calls. When calls are made within a LCA from a customer of A to an ISP who is a 
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customer of B, under the reciprocal compensation requirement, A must pay B to 
complete the call. However, if all of the customers of B are ISPs, there will never be an 
instance in which B must pay A because ISPs do not make calls, they only receive them. 
The DTT facilities at issue in the present case are not the same as facilities that are 
subject to the Act's reciprocal compensation requirements. Instead, they are 
connections on Qwest's side of the POI used for the parties to exchange traffic 
throughout the Utah LATA. Payment for the trunks is not required by, pursuant to, nor 
subject to the reciprocal compensation requirement of Section 251(b)(5). 
The Commission thus erred by applying federal law instead of state contract law. 
As the federal district court held in its order remanding this case to the Utah Supreme 
Court, "Level 3's right to relief does not depend on resolution of a substantial question of 
federal law. Rather, the resolution of this dispute depends upon state contract law." 
Order Remanding Action to Utah Supreme Court, at 2, Case No. 2:06CV132K (May 30, 
2006). 
Ill, THE COMMISSION ERRED IN RELYING ON THE ISP REMAND 
ORDER AND THE COMMISSION'S 2004 ORDER, 
In its 2005 Order, the Commission stated: 
[We] recognize that the rationale behind our 2004 Order 
[arbitrating the New Agreement] is equally applicable to the 
parties' current dispute both because the issue now before us 
is identical to the issue in docket No. 02-2266-02 [New 
Agreement Arbitration] and because the release of the ISP 
Remand Order predates the start of the Dispute Period by 
more than a year. 
The DTT facilities at issue here were provided under Section 251(c)(2) of the Act. 
Record at 58, p. 9. The Commission erred in applying the "rationale" of the 2004 Order 
and the ISP Remand Order to its interpretation of the plain, unambiguous language of 
Section 5.1.2.4. Under both state and federal law, and by the terms of the ISP Remand 
Order itself, that section should have been interpreted in light of the law that existed 
when the parties entered into their contract. 
A, The Commission's Reliance on the Rationale of the ISP Remand 
Order to Interpret the RUF Provision Was Error. 
In April 2001, the FCC issued its ISP Remand Order, one of a series of orders 
addressing the issue of reciprocal compensation payments between carriers exchanging 
ISP-bound traffic. Generally speaking, the ISP Remand Order was the FCC's attempt to 
correct perceived distortions to the traditional reciprocal compensation structure from 
locally dialed calls to ISPs. See ISP Remand Order at % 2. The solution to the perceived 
problem was to establish a new intercarrier compensation rate structure specifically for 
the exchange of ISP-bound traffic. Id. at ffi[ 1, 14, 46, 52. As discussed above, the ISP 
Remand Order is not applicable to the RUF clause because it deals only with reciprocal 
compensation, not with cost sharing for DTT facilities. Qwest acknowledged as much in 
its initial Position Statement. Record at 42, p. 18. But, assuming for the sake of 
argument that it did apply to DTT facilities, it would nothave had any effect on the 
parties' Old Agreement because the Old Agreementpre-dated the ISP Remand Order.u 
13
 The Old Agreement was signed by the parties on September ?, 2000, and approved by 
the Utah Commission on January 10, 2001. Record at 30; Record at 42, p. 2 n.2. It 
included the RUF clause. Thus, the Old Agreement, containing the RUF clause, was 
signed and approved before the ISP Remand Order was issued. 
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In order to avoid potential confusion about how the ISP Remand Order would 
affect carriers' current ICAs, the FCC stated: 
The interim compensation regime we establish here applies as 
carriers re-negotiate expired or expiring interconnection 
agreements. It does not alter existing contractual obligations, 
except to the extent that parties are entitled to invoke 
contractual change-of-law provisions. 
ISP Remand Order at % 82 (emphasis added).14 Thus, ICAs that included terms dealing 
with reciprocal compensation for ISP-bound traffic were to remain in place until their 
expiration or renegotiation. 
The Old Agreement between Level 3 and Qwest was approved on January 10, 
2001. Record at 30. It contained a change-of-law provision, which the parties invoked 
twice. Record at 42, p. 2 n.2. The first was on June 28, 2002, which put the SPOP 
Amendment in place. Id.; Record at 34. The second was on November 14, 2002, to 
conform the reciprocal compensation obligations of the Old Agreement to the interim 
rules set out in the ISP Remand Order. Record at 42, p. 2 n.2; Record at 71, p. 16. In 
response to the ISP Remand Order, Level 3 and Qwest negotiated and filed an 
amendment to the Old Agreement under to the change-in-law provision in the Old 
Agreement ("ISP Remand Order Amendment"). The Commission approved the ISP 
Remand Order Amendment on January 8, 2003^ Record at 42, p. 2, n.2; Record at 44, p. 
3. Nothing in either the SPOP Amendment or the ISP Remand Order Amendment 
The "interim compensation regime" referred to a "bill and keep" arrangement where 
end user customers x>f each carrier would be billed for reciprocal compensation charges^ 
but the revenue from such billings would be kept by the collecting carrier instead of paid 
over to the other. ISP Remand Order at ^ 2, n.6. 
changed the RUF clause in any way. The Commission's decision to effectively insert an 
exception for ISP-bound traffic in the RUF clause in the parties' negotiated agreement, 
therefore, was contrary not only to state contract law, the plain meaning of Section 
5.1.2.4, and the FCC's ISP Remand Order, but it also ignored the parties' agreement that 
changes to the contract would only be accomplished by following the agreed upon 
change-of-law process. 
While both of these amendments confronted issues dealing with the parties' cost 
responsibilities for ISP traffic exchanged under the Old Agreement, neither amendment 
changed Section 5.1.2.4 containing the RUF calculation, and neither party ever sought to 
invoke the change-of-law provision to amend Section 5.1.2.4. Qwest claims two reasons 
for not seeking an amendment. First, it claims it did not understand that the RUF 
calculation ever included ISP-bound traffic. This assertion, of course, is not supported by 
the unambiguous language in the RUF clause or any evidence in the record. Record at 
71, p. 16. Second, it claims that the ISP Remand Order "did not address the subject of 
RUF calculations for DTT facilities." Id. at p. 15. Thus, Qwest contends, while it is 
"conceivable" that Qwest could have sought an amendment to Section 5.1.2.4, it did not 
believe it was "necessary and worthwhile." Id. at 16. Hence, the language of Section 
5.1.2.4 was never amended—not by the effect of the ISP Remand Order or by invocation 
of the change-of-law provision of the Old Agreement. 
The Commission's reliance on the rationale of the ISP Remand Order was 
misplaced. It was not m effect when the Old Agreement was signed or when approved 
by the Commission. Even if it were relevant to the issue of relative use of DTT facilities, 
the ISP Remand Order could only have been applied to the RUF clause in the Old 
Agreement if the parties had amended it under the change-of-law provision, and that was 
not done in this case. 
B. The Commission's Reliance on the 2004 Order Was Error, 
The Commission applied the reasoning of its 2004 Order from the arbitration 
proceeding of the New Agreement to "interpret" the RUF clause of the Old Agreement. 
This was error for at least two reasons. First, as discussed above, the Commission 
confused the standards for approving interconnection agreements with the law that must 
be applied in the interpretation of those agreements. It failed to recognized that it must 
enforce the parties' negotiated terms "without regard to the standards set forth in 
subsections (b) and (c) of section 251." 47 U.S.C. § 252(a)(1). Second, it applied the 
rationale for its approval of the new RUF language in the 2004 Order retroactively to 
interpret the RUF in the Old Agreement. The 2004 Order specifically states that the new 
RUF clause shall not be applied retroactively. 
5. The Commission Erred in Applying the "Just and Reasonable" 
Rationale from the 2004 Order, 
In its 2004 Order from the Arbitration proceeding, noting the result that might 
obtain if the RUF were interpreted according to its plain language, the Commission 
stated: 
We agree with Qwest's assertion that such a result would 
violate the requirements under the act; thatlLECs receive just 
and reasonable compensation for interconnection. 
Record at 6, p. 4 (emphasis added). In the instant case, the Commission concluded that, 
although its 2004 Order was not "controlling precedent/5 the "rationale behind our 2004 
Order is equally applicable to the parties' current dispute" because the "issue now before 
us is identical to the issue in [that] docket." Record at 58, p. 9. The Commission stated 
in its 2005 Order: 
No one disputes that including ISP-bound traffic in the RUF 
calculation under the Old Agreement would result in Qwest 
bearing all of the cost of the DTT facilities. We cannot 
conclude that such a result would equate to just and 
reasonable compensation for Qwest. 
Record at 58, p. 10. The rationale of the 2004 Order, which was the result of arbitration, 
was that the Commission could not interpret the RUF clause in a way that did not result 
in "just and reasonable compensation for Qwest." Id.; Record at 6, p. 4. Thus, in 
applying the rationale of the 2004 Order to the Old Agreement, the Commission applied 
the just and reasonable arbitration standard to the interpretation of the negotiated RUF 
clause of the Old Agreement. 
As discussed above, for the Commission to approve the arbitrated RUF in the New 
Agreement it had to find it to be "just and reasonable." The negotiated Old Agreement 
could be approved as long as it was non-discriminatory and in the public interest. 
Because the reciprocal compensation mechanism is expressly required under Section 
251(b)(5), the FCC has been diligent in investigating and regulating the manner in which 
that statutory rate mechanism should be applied vis-a-vis ISP-bound traffic to achieve a 
just and reasonable rate. The RUF mechanism, on the other hand, is^  a device adopted by 
the parties as one of many of other negotiated, non-regulated terms that Congress left to 
the discretion of the contracting carriers. While the negotiated contracts must be non-
discriminatory, the statute assumes that sophisticated carriers like Qwest and Level 3 
would be able to negotiate for themselves fair contracts. Otherwise, state commission 
arbitration is available to ensure "just and reasonable" terms. 
The record does not indicate how the negotiations between Qwest and AT&T for 
the RUF occurred, such negotiations often involve incentives, trade-offs, or compromises 
that each party believes will ultimately be in its best interest. Qwest is an incumbent 
provider in fourteen states and has a multi-billion dollar enterprise that it has operated for 
a century, it must be assumed to be commercially capable to negotiate contractual terms 
to which it will be held. Certainly, there is a benefit to Qwest's customers in being able 
to connect to ISPs using a local dial-up number, especially in areas of Utah where there 
may be few choices for accessing locally-situated ISPs. In any event, the rate mechanism 
employed for DTTs was not a matter of regulation, but one of voluntary negotiation, 
approved by the Commission. 
The Old Agreement was jointly submitted to the Commission as a negotiated 
contract for approval. Record at 30. Shortly after the Old Agreement became effective, 
Level 3, pursuant to the Old Agreement, the parties established DTT facilities to carry 
Qwest's originated traffic. If Qwest=had thought at that time that the RUF would have 
operated unfairly, it could have taken the issue to the Commission. It did not Twice the 
parties amended the Old Agreement, but Qwest never raised an objection to the RUF. 
Even when the Old Agreement was amended to comply with the ISP Remand Order\ 
which Qwest contends raised an identical issue, Qwest did not seek to amend the RUF 
clause. In light of Qwest's failure to take advantage of the contractual opportunities to 
amend, the claim that the RUF does not result in "just and reasonable compensation for 
Qwest" rings hollow. Moreover, in light of the distinction between regulated rate 
mechanisms and negotiated ICA terms, it is easy to understand why the Commission 
should not reform the parties' contract to make it "more fair" to Qwest. 
The Old Agreement, approved by the Commission, allowed the parties a 
reasonable opportunity to negotiate cost recovery for DTTs and to amend the RUF. 
Qwest, having failed to avail itself of its negotiated contractual benefits, should not be the 
beneficiary of the Commission's misplaced benevolence in reforming the Old Agreement 
to be fair to Qwest. The rationale of the 2004 Order is inapplicable, and indeed inimical 
to the policy of the FTA that allows parties to negotiate their own contracts. 
6. The Commission Erred in Applying the Rationale of the 2004 Order 
Retroactively, in Contravention of the 2004 Order Itself, 
The Commission erred in applying the rationale of the 2004 Order to interpret the 
RUF in the Old Agreement because the 2004 Order expressly states that the new RUF 
was to apply prospectively only. The 2004 Order approving the New Agreement adopted 
Qwest's newly proposed language that expressly excludes FSP-bound traffic from 
calculation of the RUF. Record at 6, p. 2. The issue of when the new RUF should be 
deemed effective only arose because it was a new provision. If the cost of the DTT 
facilities had always been Level 3's sole responsibility, as Qwest contended, there would 
have been no point in even arguing this issue during the Arbitration. The Arbitration 
occurred because Qwest's proposed method for dealing with the shared costs for DTTs 
was entirely different from that agreed to in the Old Agreement. Record at 58, pp. 4-6. 
Thus, the New Agreement gave rise to a new RUF that the Commission specifically ruled 
should be applied "prospectively only." Record at 6, p.4. Yet, in relying on the 2004 
Order to interpret the RUF in the Old Agreement, the Commission applied the new RUF 
retroactively, in direct contravention of its ruling in the 2004 Order. 
IV, THE COMMISSION ERRED BY FAILING TO ENFORCE THE 
PLAIN MEANING OF THE OLD AGREEMENT. 
In interpreting contracts, the adjudicator must apply the law that was in effect at 
the time the contract was signed. Cache County v. Property Tax Div. of Utah State Tax 
Common, 922, P.2d 758, 766 (Utah 1996); Washington Nat'l Ins. Co. v. Sherwood 
Assocs., 795 P.2d 665, 669 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). This is true not just under principles of 
state contract law, but under federal law as well. Giustina v. United States, 190 F. Supp. 
303, 308 (D. Ore. 1960) (citing Connecticut Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Cushman, 108 U.S. 51 
(1883)). 
Under Utah law, a contract must also be interpreted to give effect to the intention 
of the parties at the time they entered into the agreement. Yeargin, Inc. v. Auditing Div. 
of Utah State Tax Common. 20 P.3d 287, 297 (Utah 2001). "'If the language within the 
four corners of the contract is unambiguous, the parties' intentions are determined from 
the plain meaning of the contractual language." Wagner v. Clifton, 62 P.3d 440, 442 
(Utah 2002) (quoting WebBank v. American Gen. Annuity Serv. Corp., 54 P.3d 1139 
(Utah 2002)). Only when the language is determined to be ambiguous is there need to 
consider extrinsic evidence. Yeargin, 20 P.3d at 297. "The plain meaning rule preserves 
the intent of the parties and protects the contract against judicial revisions." Plateau 
Mining Co. v. Utah Div. of State Lands & Forestry, 802 P.2d 720, 725 (Utah 1990). 
Furthermore, "[i]t is a long-standing rule in Utah that persons dealing at arm's 
length are entitled to contract on their own terms without the intervention of the courts to 
relieve either party from the effects of a bad bargain . . . [and the] Court will not rewrite a 
contract to supply terms which the parties omitted." Hal Taylor Assocs. v. 
UnionAmerica, Inc., 657 P.2d 743, 749 (Utah 1982); see also Bakowski v. Mountain 
States Steel, Inc., 52 P.3d 1179, (Utah 2002) (refusing to imply an intent not present in 
the contract and noting "We will not make a better contract for the parties than they have 
made for themselves. . . . Nor will we avoid the contract's plain language to achieve an 
'equitable' result"); Dalton v. Jerico Const. Co., 642 P.2d 748, 750 (Utah 1982) (refusing 
to imply an intent not present in the terms of the contract and noting "it is not for a court 
to rewrite a contract improvidently entered into at arm's length or to change the bargain 
indirectly on the basis of supposed equitable principles"); U.P.C., Inc. v. R.Q.A. Gen., 
Inc., 990 P.2d 945, 954 (Utah Ct. App. 1999) (ruling that "a court may not make a better 
contract for the parties than they have made for themselves . . . [and]... may not enforce 
asserted rights not supported by the contract itself). 
The only language in the entire Old Agreement relevant to relative use is Section 
5.2.1.4, which provides, in relevant part: 
If the Parties' elect to establish two-way direct trunks, the 
compensation for such jointly used 'shared' facilities shall be 
adjusted as follows. ... The actual rate paid to the provider of 
the direct trunk facility shall be reduced to reflect the 
provider's use of that facility. The adjustment in the direct 
trunk transport rate shall be a percentage that reflects the 
provider's relative use (i.e. originating minutes of use) of the 
facility in the busy hour. 
Record at 28, p. 4 f 9; Record at 58, pp. 3-4 (emphasis added). The plain meaning of 
this language is that the relative use of DTT facilities must reflect all of the originating 
minutes of use on the trunks, without exception. This term was to continue in force and 
effect until the New Agreement was made effective, which did not occur until February 
20, 2004. Record at 28, p. 2 f 4; Record at 58, p. 4; Record at 32. 
In contrast, under the New Agreement, Level 3 is to be billed for all the cost of the 
interconnection facilities at issue, and Qwest is to issue a credit for Level 3's portion of 
the relative use of the facilities. Therefore, if Internet-bound traffic is excluded from the 
calculation of relative use, Level 3 will receive no credit and will be responsible for the 
full cost of the facilities. Record at 6, n.l. Thus, the New Agreement specifically 
excludes ISP-bound traffic from the calculation of the RUF for DTT billing, whereas the 
Old Agreement did not. Record at 58, p. 6. 
Section 5.1.2.4 is unambiguous. It does not include any exception for ISP-bound 
traffic, and cannot reasonably be read to impose one. There is no language in any other 
part of the Old Agreement that allows Qwest to ignore the plain language of Section 
5.1.2.4. Therefore, the Commission erred when it failed to enforce the plain language of 
the contract and allowed Qwest to except ISP-bound traffic from the relative use 
calculation for the dispute period during which the Old Agreement was still in force and 
effect. 
The law is well established in Utah that neither Qwest nor the Commission can 
simply rewrite a contract to supply terms that the parties omitted, not even on the basis of 
supposed equitable principles. The contract must be interpreted based on the intentions 
of the parties and the state of the law at the time the parties executed the Old Agreement. 
Therefore, the Court should remand the case to the Commission and order that it 
apply Utah state contract law to the interpretation of Section 5.1.2.4 of the Old 
Agreement in resolving this dispute. 
CONCLUSION 
Level 3 filed its Petition with the Commission,, seeking enforcement of the plain 
language of the RUF clause in the Old Agreement to prevent Qwest from disconnecting 
its service and from billing and collecting improper charges for DTT facilities during the 
Dispute Period. The Petition required only that the Commission review and enforce the 
plain language of the RUF clause, which does not provide any exception for ISP-bound 
traffic. 
At the time the Petition was filed, the Commission had relatively recently issued 
its 2004 Order in arbitration, determining that the RUF in the New Agreement would 
only be fair to Qwest if ISP-bound traffic were excluded from the calculation. The 
Commission incorrectly assumed that Level 3's Petition in the present case raised the 
same questions it had previously decided. Its attention was thus diverted from the simple 
task of enforcing the plain language of the Old Agreement, to the impossible task of-
lawfitlly conforming its decision in-the present case with the rationale of its 2004 Order. 
For the reasons discussed above, the Commission need not interpret the Old 
Agreement in a way that produces "just and reasonable compensation for Qwest." 
Record at 58, p. 10. The FTA statute, Section 252(d)(1), relied on by the Commission as 
support for its proposition that it must help Qwest achieve a "just and reasonable" result, 
is simply not applicable. Indeed, apart from the analysis necessary to determine that 
enforcement of the RUF falls outside federal law, federal law itself does not apply to the 
resolution of this dispute. The federal district court, which examined the issue closely, 
expressly held that state contract law applies. Likewise, because the 2004 Order arose 
under and was governed by the federal arbitration statute, the 2004 Order was entirely 
inapplicable to the resolution of the present case. 
Under Utah law, the language of the RUF clause in the Commission-approved Old 
Agreement should be given its plain meaning, honoring the intention of the parties and 
applying the law at the time the contract was agreed upon. While this may result in 
Qwest having to bear the cost of the DTT facilities, the law does not allow the 
Commission to reform the Old Agreement to make a better bargain for Qwest than it 
made for itself To do so would^e contrary to state law, and would undermine the stated 
goal of the FTA to allow parties to negotiate the terms of their own ICAs to the greatest 
degree possible. 
For the foregoing reasons, Level 3 respectfully requests that the Court vacate the 
Report and Order of the Utah Public Service Commission, and remand this case to the 
Commission with instructions ta enter new findings and conclusions based upon the 
application of Utah state contract law to the interpretation of the unambiguous RUF 
clause. 
Level 3 requests the Court grant oral argument in this matter. 
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I I C O M M O N C A R R I E R S 47 §251 
a t t h e t e r m i n a t i o n o f t h e C o m m i s s i o n 
s h a l l b e r e t u r n e d t o t h e d o n o r o r g r a n t e e . 
" (7 ) [ s i c ] T e r m i n a t i o n , — T h e C o m m i s -
s i o n s h a l l t e r m i n a t e 3 0 d a y s a f t e r t h e 
s u b m i s s i o n of t h e r e p o r t u n d e r s u b s e c t i o n 
(d ) o r N o v e m b e r 3 0 , 2 0 0 0 , w h i c h e v e r o c -
c u r s e a r l i e r . 
" ( m ) [ s i e ] I n a p p l i c a b i l i t y o f F e d e r a l 
A d v i s o r y C o m m i t t e e A c t * — T h e F e d e r a l 
A d v i s o r y C o m m i t t e e A c t (5 U . S . C . A p p . ) 
s h a l l n o t a p p l y t o t h e C o m m i s s i o n . " 
W E S T L A W E L E C T R O N I C R E S E A R C H 
W E S T L A W g u i d e f o l l o w i n g t h e E x p l a n a t i o n p a g e s of t h i s v o l u m e . 
PART II—DEVELOPMENT OF COMPETITIVE MARKETS 
LIBRARY REFERENCES 
l e w a n d J o u r n a l C o m m e n t a r i e s 
[els o f c o o p e r a t i v e f e d e r a l i s m fo r t e l e c o m m u n i c a t i o n s . R a y m o n d W . L a w t o n 
& B o b B u r n s , 6 A l b . L . J . S c i . & T e c h . 7 1 ( 1 9 9 6 ) . 
k i n g t o g e t h e r : S u g g e s t i o n s for f e d e r a l a n d s t a t e c o o p e r a t i o n i n t e l e c o m m u n i -
c a t i o n s . R u t h M i l k m a n , 6 A l b . L . J . S c i . & T e c h . 141 ( 1 9 9 6 ) . 
1 • Interconnection 
neral duty of telecommunications carriers 
i telecommunications carrier has the duty— 
(1) to interconnect directly or indirectly with the facilities and 
uipment of other telecommunications carriers; and 
(2) not to install network features, functions, or capabilities 
at do not comply with the guidelines and standards established 
trsuant to section 255 or 256 of this title. 
•ligations of all local exchange carriers 
i local exchange carrier has the following duties: 
) Resale 
The duty not to prohibit, and not to impose unreasonable or 
^criminatory conditions or limitations on, the resale of its 
ecommunications services. 
:) Number portability 
The duty to provide, to the extent technically feasible, number 
•rtability in accordance with requirements prescribed by the 
>mmission. 
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r r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s o f t h e g e n e r a l 
t o tes t i fy . 
A d d i t i o n a l r u l e s . — T h e C o m m i s -
a y a d o p t o t h e r r u l e s a s n e c e s s a r y 
y o u t t h i s s e c t i o n . 
rifts, b e q u e s t s , a n d d e v i s e s . — T h e 
•ion m a y a c c e p t , u s e , a n d d i s p o s e 
>eques t s , o r d e v i s e s of s e r v i c e s o r 
, b o t h r e a l ( i n c l u d i n g t h e u s e of 
a c e ) a n d p e r s o n a l , fo r t h e p u r -
a id ing o r f a c i l i t a t i n g t h e w o r k of 
m i s s i o n . Gi f t s o r g r a n t s n o t u s e d 
4 7 § 251 WIRE OR RAPIO COMMUNICATION Ch. § 
(3) Dialing parity 
Tfre duty to provide diaWng painty "LO coxrapeiVxig providers o't 
telephone exchange service and telephone toll service, and the 
duty to permit all such providers to have nondiscriminatory 
access to telephone numbers, operator services, directory assis-
tance, and directory listing, with r*o unreasonable dialing delays-
(4) Access to rights-of-way 
The duty to afford access to tl*e poles, ducts, conduits, and 
rights-of-way of such carrier to competing providers of telecom-
munications services on rates, t^rms, and conditions that ar£ 
consistent with section 224 of this title. 
(5) Reciprocal compensation 
The duty to establish reciprocal compensation arrangement? 
for tfre transport and termination <?f telecommunications. 
(c) Additional obligations of incumbent local exchange carriers 
In addition to the duties contained iA subsection (b) of this section, 
each incumbent local exchange carrier has the following duties: 
(1) Duty to negotiate 
The duty to negotiate in good faith in accordance with section 
252 of this title the particular t^rms and conditions of agree-
ments to fulfill the duties described in paragraphs (1) through (5) 
of subsection (b) of this section and this subsection. The request-
ing telecommunications carrier also has the duty to negotiate if* 
good faith the terms and conditions of such agreements. 
(2) Interconnection 
The duty to provide, for the facilities and equipment of any 
requesting telecommunications carrier, interconnection with the 
local exchange carrier's network—' 
(A) for the transmission ^nd routing of telephone ex-
change service and exchange access; 
(B) at any technically feasible point within the carrier's 
network; 
(C) that is at least equal in quality to that provided by th^ 
local exchange carrier to itself or to any subsidiary, affiliate, 
or any other party to which the carrier provides interconnec-
tion; and 
(D) on rates, terms, and conditions that are just, reason-
able, and nondiscriminatory, in accordance with the terms 
and conditions of the agreement and the requirements o* 
this section and section 252 of this title. 
316 
II COMMON CARRIERS 47 §251 
J) Unbundled access 
The duty to provide, to any requesting telecommunications 
irrier for the provision of a telecommunications service, non-
scriminatory access to network elements on an unbundled 
isis at any technically feasible point on rates, terms, and 
>nditions that are just, reasonable, and nondiscriminatory in 
:cordance with the terms and conditions of the agreement and 
e requirements of this section and section 252 of this title. An 
cumbent local exchange carrier shall provide such unbundled 
*twork elements in a manner that allows requesting carriers to 




(A) to offer for resale at wholesale rates any telecommuni-
cations service that the carrier provides at retail to subscrib-
ers who are not telecommunications carriers; and 
(B) not to prohibit, and not to impose unreasonable or 
discriminatory conditions or limitations on, the resale of 
such telecommunications service, except that a State com-
mission may, consistent with regulations prescribed by the 
Commission under this section, prohibit a reseller that ob-
tains at wholesale rates a telecommunications service that is 
available at retail only to a category of subscribers from 
offering such service to a different category of subscribers. 
5) Notice of changes 
The duty to provide reasonable public notice of changes in the 
formation necessary for the transmission and routing of ser-
ces using that local exchange carrier's facilities or networks, as 
ell as of any other changes that would affect the interoperabili-
of those facilities and networks. 
i) Collocation 
The duty to provide, on rates, terms, and conditions that are 
st, reasonable, and nondiscriminatory, for physical collocation 
equipment necessary for interconnection or access to unbun-
ed network elements at the premises of the local exchange 
rrier, except that the carrier may provide for virtual colloca-
>n if the local exchange carrier demonstrates to the State 
•mmission that physical collocation is not practical for techni-
1 reasons or because of space limitations. 
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(d) Implementation 
(1) In general 
Within 6 months after February 8, 1996, the Commission shall 
complete all actions necessary to establish regulations to imple-
ment the requirements of this section. 
(2) Access standards 
In determining what network elements should be made avail-
able for purposes of subsection (c)(3) of this section, the Commis-
sion shall consider, at a minimum, whether— 
(A) access to such network elements as are proprietary in 
nature is necessary; and 
(B) the failure to provide access to such network elements 
would impair the ability of the telecommunications carrier 
seeking access to provide the services that it seeks to offer. 
(3) Preservation of State access regulations 
In prescribing and enforcing regulations to implement the 
requirements of this section, the Commission shall not preclude 
the enforcement of any regulation, order, or policy of a State 
commission that— 
(A) establishes access and interconnection obligations of 
local exchange carriers; 
(B») is consistent with the requirements of this section; 
and 
(C) does not substantially prevent implementation of the 
requirements of this section and the purposes of this part. 
(e) Numbering administration 
(1) Commission authority and jurisdiction 
The Commission shall create or designate one or more impar-
tial entities to adniinister telecommunications numbering and to 
make such numbers available on an equitable basis. The Com-
mission shall have exclusive jurisdiction over those portions of 
the North American Numbering Plan that pertain to the United 
States. Nothing in this paragraph shall preclude the Commis-
sion from delegating to State commissions or other entities all or 
any portion of such jurisdiction. 
(2) Costs 
The cost of establishing telecommunications numbering ad-
ministration arrangements and number portability shall be borne 
by all telecommunications carriers on a competitively neutral 
basis as determined by the Commission. 
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Universal emergency telephone number 
tie Commission and any agency or entity to which the Com-
sion has delegated authority under this subsection shall des-
ite 9—1 — 1 as the universal emergency telephone number with-
he United States for reporting an emergency to appropriate 
ix>rities and requesting assistance. The designation shall 
ly to both wireline and wireless telephone service. In mak-
the designation, the Commission (and any such agency or 
ty) shall provide appropriate transition periods for areas in 
ch 9—1—1 is not in use as an emergency telephone number on 
ober 26, 1999. 
nptions, suspensions, and modifications 
Exemption for certain rural telephone companies 
(A) Exemption 
Subsection (c) of this section shall not apply to a rural 
telephone company until (i) such company has received a 
bona fide request for interconnection, services, or network 
elements, and (ii) the State commission determines (under 
subparagraph (B)) that such request is not unduly economi-
cally burdensome, is technically feasible, and is consistent 
with section 254 of this title (other than subsections (b)(7) 
and (c)(1)(D) thereof). 
(B) State termination of exemption and implementation 
schedule 
The party making a bona fide request of a rural telephone 
company for interconnection, services, or network elements 
shall submit a notice of its request to the State commission. 
The State commission shall conduct an inquiry for the 
purpose of determining whether to terminate the exemption 
under subparagraph (A). Within 120 days after the State 
commission receives notice of the request, the State commis-
sion shall terminate the exemption if the request is not 
unduly economically burdensome, is technically feasible, 
and is consistent with section 254 of this title (other than 
subsections (b)(7) and (c)(1)(D) thereof). Upon termination 
of the exemption, a State commission shall establish an 
implementation schedule for compliance with the request 
that is consistent in time and manner with Commission 
regulations. 
(C). Limitation on exemption 
The exemption provided by this paragraph shall not apply 
with respect to a request under subsection (c) of this section, 
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from a cable operator providing video programming, and 
seeking to provide any telecommunications service, in the 
area in which the rural telephone company provides video 
programming. The limitation contained in this subpara-
graph shall not apply to a rural telephone company that is 
providing video programming on February 8, 1996. 
(2) Suspensions and modifications for rural carriers 
A local exchange carrier with fewer than 2 percent of the 
Nation's subscriber lines installed in the aggregate nationwide 
may petition a State commission for a suspension or modifica-
tion of the application of a requirement or requirements of 
subsection (b) or (c) of this section to telephone exchange service 
facilities specified in such petition. The State commission shall 
grant such petition to the extent that, and for such duration as, 
the State commission determines that such suspension or modifi-
cation— 
(A) is necessary— 
(i) to avoid a significant adverse economic impact on 
users of telecommunications services generally; 
(ii) to avoid imposing a requirement that is unduly 
economically burdensome; or 
(iii) to avoid imposing a requirement that is techni-
cally infeasible; and 
(B) is consistent with the public interest, convenience, 
and necessity. 
The State commission shall act upon any petition filed under this 
paragraph within 180 days after receiving such petition. Pend-
ing such action, the State commission may suspend enforcement 
of the requirement or requirements to which the petition applies 
with respect to the petitioning carrier or carriers. 
) Continued enforcement of exchange access and interconnection 
requirements 
On and after February 8, 1996, each local exchange carrier, to the 
tent that it provides wireline ^services, shall provide exchange 
cess, information access, and exchange services for such access to 
terexchange carriers and information service providers in accor-
tnce with the same equal access and nondiscriminatory intercon-
nection restrictions and obligations (including receipt of compensa-
>n) that apply to such carrier on the date immediately preceding 
>bruary 8, 1996 under any court order, consent decree, or regula-
>n, order, or policy of the Commission, until such restrictions and 
•ligations are explicitly superseded by regulations prescribed by the 
>mmission after February 8, 1996. During the period beginning on 
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r u a r y 8, 1 9 9 6 a n d u n t i l s u c h r e s t r i c t i o n s a n d o b l i g a t i o n s a r e s o 
e r s e d e d , s u c h r e s t r i c t i o n s a n d o b l i g a t i o n s s h a l l b e e n f o r c e a b l e i n 
s a m e m a n n e r a s r e g u l a t i o n s of t h e C o m m i s s i o n . 
D e f i n i t i o n o f i n c u m b e n t l o c a l e x c h a n g e c a r r i e r 
(1 ) D e f i n i t i o n 
F o r p u r p o s e s of t h i s s e c t i o n , t h e t e r m ' i n c u m b e n t l o c a l ex -
c h a n g e c a r r i e r ' m e a n s , w i t h r e s p e c t t o a n a r e a , t h e l o c a l ex -
c h a n g e c a r r i e r t h a t — 
(A) o n F e b r u a r y 8, 1 9 9 6 , p r o v i d e d t e l e p h o n e e x c h a n g e 
s e r v i c e i n s u c h a r e a ; a n d 
( B ) ( i ) o n F e b r u a r y 8, 1 9 9 6 e w a s d e e m e d t o b e a m e m b e r 
of t h e e x c h a n g e c a r r i e r a s s o c i a t i o n p u r s u a n t t o s e c t i o n 
6 9 . 6 0 1 ( b ) of t h e C o m m i s s i o n ' s r e g u l a t i o n s ( 4 7 C . F . R . 
6 9 . 6 0 1 ( b ) ) ; o r 
( i i ) is a p e r s o n o r e n t i t y t h a t , o n o r a f t e r F e b r u a r y 8, 1 9 9 6 , 
b e c a m e a s u c c e s s o r o r a s s i g n of a m e m b e r d e s c r i b e d i n 
c l a u s e (i) . 
(2 ) T r e a t m e n t o f c o m p a r a b l e c a r r i e r s a s i n c u m b e n t s 
T h e C o m m i s s i o n m a y , b y r u l e , p r o v i d e fo r t h e t r e a t m e n t of a 
l o c a l e x c h a n g e c a r r i e r ( o r c l a s s o r c a t e g o r y t h e r e o f ) a s a n i n c u m -
b e n t l o c a l e x c h a n g e c a r r i e r ' f o r p u r p o s e s of t h i s s e c t i o n if— 
(A) s u c h c a r r i e r o c c u p i e s a p o s i t i o n i n t h e m a r k e t fo r 
t e l e p h o n e e x c h a n g e s e r v i c e w i t h i n a n a r e a t h a t is c o m p a r a -
b l e t o t h e p o s i t i o n o c c u p i e d b y a c a r r i e r d e s c r i b e d i n p a r a -
g r a p h (1) ; 
( B ) s u c h c a r r i e r h a s s u b s t a n t i a l l y r e p l a c e d a n i n c u m b e n t 
l o c a l e x c h a n g e c a r r i e r d e s c r i b e d i n p a r a g r a p h (1) ; a n d 
( C ) s u c h t r e a t m e n t is c o n s i s t e n t w i t h t h e p u b l i c i n t e r e s t , 
c o n v e n i e n c e , a n d n e c e s s i t y a n d t h e p u r p o s e s of t h i s s e c t i o n . 
i av ings p r o v i s i o n 
>thing i n t h i s s e c t i o n s h a l l b e c o n s t r u e d t o l i m i t o r o t h e r w i s e 
t t h e C o m m i s s i o n ' s a u t h o r i t y u n d e r s e c t i o n 2 0 1 of t h i s t i t l e : 
s 19, 1934, c. 652, Title II , § 2 5 1 , a s a d d e d Feb . 8, 1996, Pub.L. 
104, Title I, § 101(a), 110 Sta t . 6 1 ; Oct . 26, 1999, Pub.L. 1 0 6 - 8 1 , § 3(a), 
>tat. 1287.) 
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1_ P u r p o s e 
The T e l e c o m m u n i c a t i o n s Act of 1996 is 
intended to introduce compet i t i on into 
the market and d o e s not guarantee all 
local t e lephone service providers a suffi-
c ient return o n investment . Alenco Com-
municat ions , Inc. v- F.C.C., C.A.5 2000, 
201 F.3d 6O8. 
Congress intended Te lecommunica t ions 
Act of 1996 to be nat ional in scope . TCG 
Detroit v. City of Dearborn, E.D.Mich. 
1997, 9 7 7 F .Supp. 836 , affirmed 2 0 6 F.3d 
618 , rehearing and sugges t ion for rehear-
ing e n b a n c denied . 
Congress enacted Te lecommunica t ions 
Act to foster compet i t i on in local tele-
p h o n e service . GTE N o r t h w e s t Inc. v. 
Hami l ton , D.Or.1997 , 971 F .Supp . 1350. 
T e l e c o m m u n i c a t i o n s Act w a s des igned 
to foster rapid d e v e l o p m e n t of te lecom-
m u n i c a t i o n s compet i t ion in local markets 
served by incumbent providers . GTE 
Northwest , Inc. v. Ne l son , W.D.Wash. 
1997, 9 6 9 F .Supp. 6 5 4 . 
T e l e c o m m u n i c a t i o n s Act of 1996 is in-
tended to foster compet i t i on in local tele-
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- i n t e l l e c t u a l p r o p e r t y o r c o n s t i - 8 6 7 , a f f i r m e d in part , r e v e r s e d in part 
r igh t s . I o w a Ut i l i t ies B d . v . 1 1 9 S .Ct . 7 2 1 , 5 2 5 U . S . 3 6 6 , 1 4 2 L . E d . 2 d 
.A.8 1 9 9 7 , 1 2 0 F . 3 d 7 5 3 , a m e n d - 835, o p i n i o n af ter r e m a n d , o n r e m a n d 
shear ing , c e r t i o r a r i g r a n t e d 1 1 8 2 1 9 F 3 d 7 4 4 
9, 5 2 2 U . S . 1 0 8 9 , 139 L . E d . 2 d 
2*. Procedures for negotiation, arbitration, and approval of 
agreements 
reements arrived at through negotiation 
) Voluntary negotiations 
Jpon receiving a request for interconnection, services, or 
twork elements pursuant to section 251 of this title, an incum-
nt local exchange carrier may negotiate and enter into a 
iding agreement with the requesting telecommunications car-
r or carriers without regard to the standards set forth in 
^sections (b) and (c) of section 251 of this title. The agree-
*nt shall include a detailed schedule of itemized charges for 
erconnection and each service or network element included in 
> agreement. The agreement, including any interconnection 
reement negotiated before February 8, 1996, shall be submit-
l to the State commission under subsection (e) of this section. 
) Mediation 
Vny party negotiating an agreement under this section may, at 
y point in the negotiation, ask a State commission to partici-
te in the negotiation and to mediate any differences arising in 
* course of the negotiation. 
reements arrived at through compulsory arbitration 
) Arbitration 
During the period from the 135th to the 160th day (inclusive) 
er the date on which an incumbent local exchange carrier 
:eives a request for negotiation under this section, the carrier 
any other party to the negotiation may petition a State 
mmission to arbitrate any open issues. 
) Duty of petitioner 
A) A party that petitions a State commission under paragraph 
shall, at the same time as it submits the petition, provide the 
ite commission all relevant documentation concerning— 
(i) the unresolved issues; 
(ii) the position of each of the parties with respect to those 
issues; and 
(iii) any other issue discussed and resolved by the parties. 
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(B) A party petitioning a State commission under paragraph 
(1) shall provide a copy of the petition and any documentation to 
the other party or parties not later than the day on which the 
State commission receives the petition. 
(3) Opportunity to respond 
A non-petitioning party to a negotiation under this section may 
respond to the other party's petition and provide such additional 
information as it wishes within 25 days after the State commis-
sion receives the petition. 
(4) Action by State commission 
(A} The State commission shall limit its consideration of any 
petition under paragraph (1) (and any response thereto) to the 
issues set forth in the petition and in the response, if any, filed 
under paragraph (3). 
(B) The State commission may require the petitioning party 
and the responding party to provide such information as may be 
necessary for the State commission to reach a decision on the 
unresolved issues. If any party refuses or fails unreasonably to 
respond on a timely basis to any reasonable request from the 
State commission, then the State commission may proceed on 
the basis of the best information available to it from whatever 
source derived. 
(C) The State commission shall resolve each issue set forth in 
the petition and the response, if any, by imposing appropriate 
conditions as required to implement subsection (c) of this section 
upon the parties to the agreement, and shall conclude the resolu-
tion of any unresolved issues not later than 9 months after the 
date on which the local exchange carrier received the request 
under this section. 
(5) Refusal to negotiate 
The refusal of any other party to the negotiation to participate 
further in the negotiations, to cooperate with the State commis-
sion in carrying out its function as an arbitrator, or to continue 
to negotiate in good faith in the presence, or with the assistance, 
of the State commission shall be considered a failure to negotiate 
in good faith. 
:) Standards for arbitration 
In resolving by arbitration under subsection (b) of this section any 
pen issues and imposing conditions upon the parties to the agree-
ment, a State commission shall— 
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(1) ensure that such resolution and conditions meet the re-
quirements of section 251 of this title, including the regulations 
prescribed by the Commission pursuant to section 251 of this 
itle; 
(2) establish any rates for interconnection, services, or net-
work elements according to subsection (d) of this section; and 
(3) provide a schedule for implementation of the terms and 
:onditions by the parties to the agreement. 
*ricing standards 
(1) Interconnection and network element charges 
Determinations by a State commission of the just and reason-
ible rate for the interconnection of facilities and eqtiipment for 
mrposes of subsection (c)(2) of section 251 of this title, and the 
ust and reasonable rate for network elements for purposes of 
ubsection (c)(3) of such section— 
(A) shall be— 
(i) based on the cost (determined without reference to 
a rate-of-return or other rate-based proceeding) of pro-
viding the interconnection or network element (which-
ever is applicable), and 
(ii) nondiscriminatory, and 
(B) may include a reasonable profit. 
2) Charges for transport and termination of traffic 
(A) In general 
For the purposes of compliance ,by an incumbent local 
exchange carrier with section 251(b)(5) of this title, a State 
commission shall not consider the terms and conditions for 
reciprocal compensation to be just and reasonable unless— 
(i) such terms and conditions provide for the mutual 
and reciprocal recovery by each carrter of cos t^s associ-
ated with the transport and termination on each carri-
er's network facilities -of calls that -originate on the 
network facilities of the other carrier; and 
(ii) such terms and conditions determine such costs 
on the basis of a reasonable approximation of the addi-
tional costs of terminating such calls. 
(B) Rules of construction 
This paragraph shall not be construed— 
(i) to preclude arrangements that afford the mutual 
recovery of costs through the offsetting of reciprocal 
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obligations, including arrangements that waive mutual 
recovery (such as bill-and-keep arrangements); or 
(ii) to authorize the Commission or any State com-
mission to engage in any rate regulation proceeding to 
establish with particularity the additional costs of trans-
porting or terminating calls, or to require carriers to 
maintain records with respect to the additional costs of 
such calls. 
(3) Wholesale prices for telecommunications services 
For the purposes of section 251(c)(4) of this title, a State 
commission shall determine wholesale rates on the basis of retail 
rates charged to subscribers for the telecommunications service 
requested, excluding the portion thereof attributable to any mar-
keting, billing, collection, and other costs that will be avoided by 
the local exchange carrier. 
0 Approval by State commission 
(1) Approval required 
Any interconnection agreement adopted by negotiation or arbi-
tration shall be submitted for approval to the State commission. 
A State commission to which an agreement is submitted shall 
approve or reject the agreement, with written findings as to any 
deficiencies. 
(2) Grounds for rejection 
The State commission may only reject 
(A) an agreement (or any portion thereof) adopted by 
negotiation under subsection (a) of this section if it finds 
that— 
(i) the agreement (or portion thereof) discriminates 
against a telecommunications carrier not a party to the 
agreement; or 
(ii) the implementation of such agreement or portion 
is not consistent with the public interest, convenience, 
and necessity; or 
(B) an agreement (or any portion thereof) adopted^ by 
arbitration under subsection (b) of this section if it finds that 
the agreement does not meet the requirements of section 251 
of this title, including the regulations prescribed by the 
Commission pursuant to section 2S1 of this title, or the 
standards set forth in subsection (d) of this section. 
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Preservat ion of authority 
o t w i t h s t a n d i n g p a r a g r a p h (2), b u t sub jec t to s ec t i on 2 5 3 of 
t i t le , n o t h i n g in th is s ec t ion sha l l p r o h i b i t a S t a t e c o m m i s -
f rom es t ab l i sh ing o r en fo rc ing o t h e r r e q u i r e m e n t s of S t a t e 
in its r e v i e w of a n a g r e e m e n t , i n c l u d i n g r e q u i r i n g compl i -
5 w i t h i n t r a s t a t e t e l e c o m m u n i c a t i o n s se rv ice qua l i ty s tan-
Is o r r e q u i r e m e n t s . 
S c h e d u l e for dec i s ion 
t h e S t a t e c o m m i s s i o n d o e s n o t a c t to a p p r o v e o r re jec t the 
j e m e n t w i t h i n 90 days after s u b m i s s i o n by t h e p a r t i e s of a n 
cement a d o p t e d by n e g o t i a t i o n u n d e r s u b s e c t i o n (a) of th is 
ion, o r w i t h i n 30 days af ter s u b m i s s i o n by t h e p a r t i e s of a n 
cement a d o p t e d by a r b i t r a t i o n u n d e r s u b s e c t i o n (b) of th is 
ion, t h e a g r e e m e n t sha l l b e d e e m e d a p p r o v e d . N o S ta t e 
rt sha l l h a v e j u r i s d i c t i o n to r e v i e w t h e a c t i o n of a S t a t e 
imiss ion in a p p r o v i n g o r re jec t ing a n a g r e e m e n t u n d e r this 
ion . 
C o m m i s s i o n to act if State wi l l not act 
a S t a t e c o m m i s s i o n fails to a c t t o c a r r y o u t its respons ib i l i ty 
e r th i s s ec t i on in any p r o c e e d i n g o r o t h e r m a t t e r u n d e r th i s 
ion, t h e n t h e C o m m i s s i o n sha l l i s sue a n o r d e r p r e e m p t i n g 
S t a t e c o m m i s s i o n ' s j u r i s d i c t i o n of t h a t p r o c e e d i n g o r m a t t e r 
r in 90 days af ter b e i n g not i f ied (or t a k i n g not ice) of s u c h 
are, a n d sha l l a s s u m e t he r e spons ib i l i t y of t h e S t a t e c o m m i s -
I u n d e r th is s ec t ion w i t h r e s p e c t to t h e p r o c e e d i n g o r m a t t e r 
a c t for t h e S t a t e c o m m i s s i o n . 
R e v i e w of State c o m m i s s i o n act ions 
r a c a s e in w h i c h a S t a t e fails to a c t a s d e s c r i b e d in p a r a -
ph (5), t h e p r o c e e d i n g by t h e C o m m i s s i o n u n d e r s u c h p a r a -
ph a n d a n y j u d i c i a l r e v i e w of t h e C o m m i s s i o n ' s a c t i o n s sha l l 
h e exclus ive r e m e d i e s for a S t a t e c o m m i s s i o n ' s fa i lure to ac t . 
m y c a s e in w h i c h a S t a t e c o m m i s s i o n m a k e s a d e t e r m i n a t i o n 
ler th i s sec t ion , a n y p a r t y a g g r i e v e d by s u c h d e t e r m i n a t i o n 
y b r i n g a n a c t i o n in a n a p p r o p r i a t e F e d e r a l d i s t r i c t c o u r t t o 
e r m i n e w h e t h e r t h e a g r e e m e n t o r s t a t e m e n t m e e t s t he re -
r e m e n t s of s e c t i o n 251 of th i s t i t le a n d th i s s ec t ion . 
ements o f general ly available t erms 
I n general 
Bell o p e r a t i n g c o m p a n y m a y p r e p a r e a n d file w i t h a S t a t e 
amis s ion a s t a t e m e n t of t h e t e r m s a n d c o n d i t i o n s t h a t s u c h 
ripany g e n e r a l l y offers w i t h i n t h a t S t a t e to c o m p l y w i t h t h e 
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requirements of section 251 of this title and the regulations 
thereunder and the standards applicable under this section. 
(2) State commission review 
A State commission may not approve such statement unless 
such statement complies with subsection (d) of this section and 
section 251 of this title and the regulations thereunder. Except 
as provided in section 253 of this title, nothing in this section 
shall prohibit a State commission from establishing or enforcing 
other requirements of State law in its review of such statement, 
including requiring compliance with intrastate telecommunica-
tions service quality standards or requirements. 
(3) Schedule for review 
The State commission to which a statement is submitted shall, 
not later than 60 days after the date of such submission— 
(A) complete the review of such statement under para-
graph (2) (including any reconsideration thereof)^ unless the 
submitting carrier agrees to an extension of the period for 
such review; or 
<B) permit such statement to take effect. 
(4) Authority to continue review 
Paragraph (3) shall not preclude the State commission from 
continuing to review a statement that has been permitted to take 
effect under subparagraph (B) of such paragraph or from ap-
proving or disapproving such statement under paragraph (2). 
(5) Duty to negotiate not affected 
The submission or approval of a statement under this subsec-
tion shall not relieve a Bell operating company of its duty to 
negotiate the terms and conditions of an agreement under sec-
tion 251 of this titte. 
g) Consolidation of State proceedings 
Where not inconsistent with the requirements of this chapter, a 
Jtate commission may, to the extent practical, consolidate proceed-
rigs under sections 214(e), 251(f), 253 of this title, and this section in 
>rder to reduce administrative burdens on telecommunications carri-
rs, other parties to the proceedings, andthe State commission in 
arrying out its responsibilities under this chapter. 
b) Filing required 
A State commission shall make a copy of each agreement approved 
nder subsection (e) of this section and each statement approved 
nder subsection (f) of this section available for public inspection and 
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ying within 10 days after the agreement or statement is approved. 
State commission may charge a reasonable and nondiscrimina-
fee to the parties to the agreement or to the party filing the 
ement to cover the costs of approving and filing such agreement 
tate merit. 
\vailability to other telecornmunicatioiis carriers 
local exchange carrier shall make available any interconnection, 
ice, or network element provided under an agreement approved 
er this section to which it is a party to any other requesting 
communications carrier upon the same terms and conditions as 
e provided in the agreement. 
Definition of incumbent local exchange carrier 
:>r purposes of this section, the term "incumbent local exchange 
ier" has the meaning provided in section 251(h) of this title. 
e 19, 1934, c. 652, Title II, § 252, as added Feb. 8, 1996, Pub.L. 
104, Title I, § 101(a), 110 Stat. 66.) 
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RATES and CHARGES 
1. General Principles 
1.1 All rates provided under this Agreement shall remain in effect for the term of this Agreement 
unless they are not in accordance with all applicable provisions of the Act, the rules and 
regulations of the FCC, or the Commission's rules^and regulations. 
1.2 Except as otherwise specified in this Agreement, as approved or ordered by the 
Commission, or as agreed to by the Parties through good faith negotiations, nothing in 
this Agreement shall prevent a Party through the dispute resolution process described in 
this Agreement from seeking to recover the costs and expenses, if any, it may incur in (a) 
complying with and implementing its obligations under this Agreement, the Ad , and the 
rules, regulations and orders of the FCC and the Commission, and (b) the development, 
modification, technical installation and maintenance of any systems or other infrastructure 
which it requires to comply with and to continue complying with its responsibilities and 
obligations under this Agreement. 
2. Resale Rates and Charges 
U S WEST shall make its retail Telecommunications Services available to CO-PROVIDER 
for resale at the interim wholesale rates specified in Appendix A to this Attachment 1. 
2.2 [Intentionally left blank for numbering consistency] 
2.3 If the resold services are purchased pursuant to tariffs and the tariff rates change, 
charges billed to CO-PROVIDER for such services will be based upon the new tariff rates 
less the applicable wholesale discount as agreed to herein. The new rate will be effective 
upon the tariff effective date. 
2.4 A Subscriber Line Charge (SLC) will continue to be paid by CO-PROVIDER without 
discount for each local exchange line resold under this Agreement. All federal and state 
rules and regulations associated with SLC or as found in the applicable tariffs also apply. 
2.5 CO-PROVIDER will pay to U S WEST the PIC change charge without discount 
associated with CO-PROVIDER end user changes of inter-exchange or intraLATA 
carriers. 
2.6 CO-PROVIDER agrees to pay U S WEST at the wholesale discount rate when its end 
user activates any services or features that are billed on a per use or per activation basis 
(e.g., continuous redial, last call return, call back calling, call trace, etc.). U S WEST shall 
provide CO-PROVIDER with detailed billing information per applicable OBF standards 
unless otherwise agreed to by the Parties as necessary to-permit CO-PROVIDER to bill 
its end users such charges. 
2.7 [Intentionally left blank for numbering consistency] 
2.8 Nonrecurring charges will be billed as approved by the Commission. 
2.9 [Intentionally left blank for numbering consistency] 
1
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2.10 [Intentionally left blank for numbering consistency] 
2.11 Resale prices shall be wholesale rates determined on the basis of retail rates charged to 
subscribers for the Telecommunications Service requested, excluding the portion thereof 
attributable to any marketing, billing, collection and other costs that will be avoided by 
U S WEST, as specified in the Act, by the FCC and/or the Commission. U S WEST shall 
be obligated to offer its volume and term discount service plans to CO-PROVIDER 
provided that CO-PROVIDER complies with the volume and term requirements 
contained therein. If selected by CO-PROVIDER, an appropriate wholesale 
discount shall also be applied to such plans. With the exception of the preceding, 
CO-PROVIDER shall not be required to agree to volume or term commitments as a 
condition for obtaining Local Service. 
2.12 U S WEST shall bill CO-PROVIDER and CO-PROVIDER is responsible for all applicable 
charges for Resale Services. CO-PROVIDER shall be responsible for all charges 
associated with services that CO-PROVIDER resells to an end user. 
3. Construction and Implementation Costs 
3.1 U S WEST shall perform construction for CO-PROVIDER for the services provided 
hereunder pursuant to and in accordance with the terms of U S WEST'S retail and 
wholesale construction charge tariffs, as appropriate for the type of service 
provided. Such construction charge tariffs shall be imposed only if U S WEST 
assesses its own end users such charges for similar construction and also 
demonstrates to the Commission that it is customary industry practice to charge 
end users for similar costs. If another CLEC or U S WEST receives a benefit from 
the construction or other activity for which CO-PROVIDER is charged, CO-
PROVIDER is entitled to recover contribution from the CLEC, or, if applicable, 
3 
U S WEST as a beneficiary, for a share of the costs. 
3.2 [Intentionally left blank for numbering consistency] 
3.3 [Intentionally left blank for numbering consistency] 
3.4 A quote for the CO-PROVIDER portion of a specific job will be provided to CO-
PROVIDER. The quote will be in writing and will be binding for ninety (90) days after the 
issue date. When accepted, CO-PROVIDER will be billed the quoted price and 
construction will commence after receipt of payment. If CO-PROVIDER chooses notlo 
have U S WEST construct the facilities, U S WEST reserves the right to bill CO-
PROVIDER for the expense incurred for producing the engineered job design. 
3.5 CO-PROVIDER shall make payment of fifty percent (50%) of the nonrecurring charges 
and fees upon acceptance of the quotation with the remainder due upon completion of ffie 
construction. In the event that CO-PROVIDER disputes the amount of U S WESTs 
proposed construction costs, CO-PROVIDER shall deposit fifty percent (50%) of 4he 
quoted construction costs into an interest bearing escrow account prior to the 
commencement of construction. The remainder of the quoted construction costs shalhbe 
deposited into the escrow account upon completion of the construction. Upon resolution 
of the dispute, the escrow agent shall distribute amounts in the account in accordance 
2
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with the resolution of such dispute, and any interest that has accrued with respect to 
amounts in the account shall be distributed proportionately to the Parties The pendency 
of any such dispute shall not affect the obligation of U S WEST to complete the requested 
construction 
4. Unbundled Loops - Conditioning Charge 
Transport and Termination - Interim Prices and Methodology 
5.1 Rate Structure 
5.1.1 Local Traffic 
5.1.1.1 Call Termination 
5.1.1.1.1 The Parties agree that call termination rates as 
described in Appendix A to this Attachment 1 will 
apply reciprocally for the termination of EAS/Local 
traffic per minute of use. If the exchange of 
EAS/Local traffic between the Parties is within +/- 5% 
of balance (as measured monthly), the Parties agree 
that their respective call termination charges will 
offset one another, and no compensation will be 
paid. The Parties agree to perform monthly joint 
traffic audits, based upon mutually agreeable 
measurement criteria and auditing standards. In the 
event that the exchange of traffic is not in balance as 
described above, the call termination charges in 
Appendix A will apply. 
5 1 1 1 2 For traffic terminated at an U S WEST or CO-
PROVIDER end office, the end office call termination 
rate in Appendix A shall apply. 
5 1 1 1 3 For traffic terminated at a U S WEST or CO-
PROVIDER tandem switch, the tandem switched rate 
and the tandem transport rate in Appendix A shall 
apply in addition to the end office call termination 
rate described above. 
c
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5.1.1.4 Switching shall be purchased on a per line basis with all 
functionality and features of such switch including, but not 
limited to call routing. 
5.1.1.5 All other unbundled network elements may be purchased 






If the Parties elect to each provision their own one-way 
trunks to the other Party's end office for the termination of 
local traffic, each Party will be responsible for its own 
expenses associated with the trunks and no transport 
charges will apply. 
If one Party desires to purchase direct trunk transport from 
the other Party, the following rate elements will apply. 
Transport rate elements include the direct trunk transport 
facilities between the POI and the terminating party's 
tandem or end office switches. The applicable rates are 
described in Appendix A. 
Direct-trunked transport facilities are provided as dedicated 
DS3 or DS1 facilities without the tandem switching 
functions, for the use of either Party between the Point of 
Interconnection and the terminating end office or tandem 
switch. 
5.1.2.4 If the Parties elect to establish two-way direct trunks, the 
compensation for such jointly used 'shared' facilities shall 
be adjusted as follows. The nominal compensation shall be 
pursuant to the rates for direct trunk transport in Appendix 
A. The actual rate paid to the provider of the direct trunk 
facility shall be reduced to reflect the provider's use of that 
facility. The adjustment in the direct trunk transport rate 
shall be a percentage that reflects the provider's relative use 
(i.e., originating minutes of use) of the facility in the busy 
hour. 
5.1.2.5 Multiplexing options are available at rates described in 
Appendix A. 
5.1.3 Toll Traffic. 
Applicable Switched Access Tariff rates, terms, and conditions apply to toll 
traffiorouted to an access tandem, or directly to an end office. 
5.1.4 TransitTraff ic. 
Applicable switched access, Type 2 or LIS transport rates apply for the use 
of U S WEST'S network to transport transit traffic, ^or transiting local 
traffic, the applicable local transit rate applies to the originating Party per 
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Appendix A. For transiting toll traffic, the Parties will charge the applicable 
Switched Access rates to the responsible carrier. For terminating transiting 
wireless traffic, the Parties will charge their applicable rates to the wireless 
provider. For transiting wireless traffic, the Parties will charge each other 
the applicable local transit rate. 
6. Number Portability 
6.1 CO-PROVIDER may request U S WEST to provide CO-PROVIDER call detail records 
identifying eaclrlXC which are sufficient to allow CO-PROVIDER to render bills to IXCs for 
calls IXCs place to ported numbers in the U S WEST network which U S WEST forwards 
to CO-PROVIDER for termination. To the extent U S WEST is unable to provide billing 
detail informatfen within a reasonable time frame, the Parties may agree on an interim 
method to share access revenues pursuant to a mutually agreed upon surrogate 
approach. 
7. Rate Structure 
The prices set forth in=Appendix A to this Attachment 1 which are designated as interim in nature 
are subject to true-up upon establishment of permanent rates by the Commission in Docket 94-
999-01. The prices set forth in Appendices A and B to this Attachment 1 which are designated as 
final in nature are subject to change if the Commission so orders in its pricing dockets 
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Gregory L. Rogers , . . , , . _ 
LEVEL 3 COMMUNICATldSs;'li££ 
1025 Eldorado Boulevard l ' " x™*™" 
Broomfield, CO 8Q021 „„, ^ _ 
Telephone: (720) sWlM ^ P * UU 
Facsimile: (720) 888-5134 
>-<•*"' ~ t V tz, 'J 
William J. Evans (5276) 
Vicki M. Baldwin (8532) 
PARSONS BEHLE & LATIMER 
One Utah Center 
:0)£$)iJtr5N£dn Street, Suite 1800 
Post Office Box 45898 
Salt Lake City, UT 84145-0898 
Telephone: (801) 532-1234 
Facsimile: (801) 536-6111 
Attorneys for 
Level 3 Communications, LLC 
BEFORE THE UTAH PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION 
In the Matter of the Petition of Level 3 
Communications, LLC for Enforcement of the 
Interconnection Agreement Between Qwest and 
Level 3 
PETITION OF LEVEL 3 
COMMUNICATIONS, LLC FOR 
ENFORECEMENT OF THE 
INTERCONNECTION AGREEMENT 
BETWEEN QWEST AND LEVEL 3 
AND 
MOTION FOR EXPEDITED RELIEF 
Docket No. 05-2266-
Level 3 Communications, LLC ("Level 3") through its undersigned counsel and pursuant 
to the provisions at Utah Code Annotated §§ 63-46b-3, 54-4-1, 54-8b-2.2(l)(e) and 54-8b-16 and 
R746-100-3 of the Utah Administrative Code, moves the Public Service Commission of Utah 
("Commission") for expedited and emergency relief and petitions for resolution of a dispute 
between Level 3 and Qwest Corporation ("Qwest") over the terms and conditions of the 
Interconnection Agreement between them. 
720151 t l 
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MOTION 
The Commission issued its Report and Order in Docket 02-2266-02 ("Order") on 
February 20, 2004. That Order resolved certain disputed matters that were litigated in front of 
the Commission in the replacement Interconnection Agreement between Qwest and Level 3. 
However, at approximately the same time that they commenced their arbitration proceeding, 
Qwest and Level 3 encountered a recurring billing dispute and Qwest has attempted to 
retroactively enforce the terms of the new Interconnection Agreement to resolve the billing 
dispute that arose under the Old Agreement. Qwest is attempting to collect from Level 3 for 
direct-trunked facilities that carried ISP-bound traffic from Qwest to Level 3 during a period of 
time before the Commission's Order was issued and before the new Interconnection Agreement 
that allowed the collection of such charges became effective. 
Level 3 has paid Qwest all undisputed charges. It has fully complied with the 
Commission's Order in that regard and is current on its accounts with Qwest under the new 
Interconnection Agreement. It has also engaged in discussions with Qwest to resolve the 
dispute, and although it remains unresolved, Qwest has never claimed that Level 3 is delinquent 
on the payment of any charges authorized under the current Interconnection Agreement or the 
Commission' Order. 
Despite Level 3's numerous attempts to informally resolve this matter that arose under 
the terms of the now^xpired agreement, Qwest has now threatened to suspend all of Level 3's 
service order activity and to disconnect Level 3's services by June 28,2005. (A copy of Qwest's 
letter is attached as- Exhibit "A.") Level 3 is principally a wholesale provider of 
communications services. Disconnection of its interconnection with Qwest in Utah would leave 
Level 3's customers and their end users throughout Utah without Internet access and the ability 
72015l.il 
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to complete voice communications as well. Such a result would adversely affect the health, 
safety and welfare of Level 3's Utah customers and their end users who rely on the services that 
Level 3 provides in Utah. The Commission has authority under its general statutes to protect 
against such harm to Utah residents. The Commission also has authority under Section 54-8b-
2.2(l)(e) to expedite resolution of disputes over the interconnection of essential facilities. 
Level 3, therefore, requests that the Commission consider this matter on an expedited 
basis and order that Qwest not disconnect or discontinue service to Level 3. Level 3 further 
requests that the Commission order that now and in the future, Qwest must follow the applicable 
terms of its Interconnection Agreement and may not terminate or disturb service to Level 3 until 
and unless the matter has been heard and resolved in favor of Qwest in accordance with those 
procedures. Further grounds for Level 3's Motion and for its Petition for Relief are set forth 
below. 
PETITION FOR RELIEF 
PARTIES 
1. Petitioner's full name and its official business address are as follows: 
Level 3 Communications, LLC 
1025 Eldorado Boulevard 
Broomfield, CO 80021 
Level 3 is a Delaware limited liability company, and it is authorized by the Commission to 
provide local exchange service in Utah.1 Level 3 is, and at all relevant times has been a "local 
exchange carrier" ("LEC") under the Act. 
In the Matter of the Application of LEVEL 3 COMMUNICATIONS, LLC for Authority to 
Operate as a Competitive Local Exchange Carrier Providing Resold Local Exchange Service, 
Docket No, 98-2266-01 (March 8, 1999). 
720151.11 
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2. Qwest is a corporation organized and formed under the laws of the State of 
Colorado, having an office at 1801 California Street, Denver, Colorado, 80202. Qwest provides 
local exchange and other services within its franchised areas in Utah. Qwest (in current name or 
as U S WEST Communications, Inc.) is, and at all relevant times has been, a "Bell Operating 
Company" and an "incumbent local exchange carrier" ("ILEC") under the terms of the 
Telecommunications Act of 1996 ("Act"). 
JURISDICTION 
3. The Commission has jurisdiction over Level 3's Petition pursuant to the 
provisions of the Act and Utah Code Ann. §§ 54-4-1, 54-8b-2.2 and 54-8b-16. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
4. On or about September 7, 2000, Level 3 and Qwest entered into an 
interconnection agreement ("Old Agreement") pursuant to the Act and Utah Code Annotated 
§ 54-8b-2.2, which was subsequently approved by the Commission on January 10, 2001. Before 
the Old Agreement expired, Level 3 and Qwest began negotiations for a new interconnection 
agreement ("New Agreement"). The parties were unable to reach agreement on all issues of the 
New Agreement before the Old Agreement expired on June 26, 2001 and ultimately needed to 
arbitrate outstanding issues before the Commission. 
5. The agreed upon Term of the Old Agreement was described as follows: 
This Agreement shall be effective upon Commission approval and 
shall remain in effect until June 26, 2001 and thereafter shall 
continue in force and effect unless and until a new agreement 
addressing all of the terms of this Agreement, becomes effective 
between the Parties. Either Party may request resolution of open 
issues in accordance with the provisions of Section 27 of this Part 
A of this Agreement, Dispute Resolution, beginning nine (9) 
months prior to the expiration of this Agreement. Any disputes 
regarding the terms and conditions of the new interconnection 
agreement shall be resolved in accordance with said Section 27 and 
the resulting agreement shall be submitted to the Commission. 
4 
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This Agreement shall remain in effect until a new interconnection 
agreement approved by the Commission has become effective. 
Part A, Section 20.1 (emphasis added). Thus, the terms of the Old Agreement were to apply 
until the New Agreement was approved by the Commission. 
6. The parties were able to agree to all the terms of the New Agreement except for 
one general issue. On August 6,2002, Level 3 filed its Petition for Arbitration to resolve that one 
outstanding issue in the New Agreement. The arbitrated issue was whether or not ISP-bound 
traffic should count as Qwest originating minutes of use for the calculation of "relative use" of 
direct-trunked transport on Qwest's side of the point of interconnection ("POI"). Docket No. 02-
2266-02. 
7. The only mention of a relative use factor in the Old Agreement was found in 
Section 5.1.2.4 of Attachment l.2 The relative use treatment in the Old Agreement was 
consistent with what Level 3 advocated be adopted in the New Agreement - that is, that the 
relative use of direct-trunked facilities reflect the originating minutes of use on the trunks. 
Because Qwest end-users originated all the traffic that was exchanged on the facilities in 
question and there was no exclusion of ISP-bound minutes^ the Old Agreement does not provide 
any basis for Qwest to charge Level 3 for direct-trunked facilities deployed by the parties. None 
of the amendments that were made to the Old Agreement during its term, including the 
2
 Section 5.1.2.4 of Attachment 1 states: 
If the Parties7 elect to establish two-way direct trunks, the compensation for such jointly used 'shared^ 
facilities shall be adjusted as follows. The nominal compensation shall rje pursuant to the rates for direct 
trunk transport in Appendix A. The actual rate paid to the provider of the direct trunk facility shall be 
reduced to reflect the provider's use of that facility. The adjustment in the direct trunk transport rate shall 
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amendment implementing the FCC's ISP Remand Order,3 changed the manner in which relative 
use would be determined. 
8. One of the sub-issues that arose during the course of the Arbitration proceeding 
was, once a relative use factor was determined pursuant to the terms of the New Agreement, 
should it be used on a prospective basis only or should there be a true-up that applied 
retroactively. Qwest proposed that the relative use factor should be used to retroactively adjust 
the initial billing quarter under the New Agreement. Level 3 argued that any new relative use 
factor should be used prospectively only. 
9- On December 10, 2002, a hearing was held and testimony was received in the 
Arbitration proceeding. 
10. On February 20, 2004, the Commission issued its Order, approving the New 
Agreement (a copy of the Order is attached hereto as Exhibit "B"). Although the Commission 
adopted Qwest's new proposed language that excludes ISP-bound traffic from the calculation of 
a relative use factor, it adopted Level 3's position prohibiting the retroactive application of the 
new factor that would be established by studying the traffic exchanged between the parties in the 
first three months of the term of the New Agreement The Commission ordered that tcthe 
contract language be modified so that no true-up will be made and the new relative use factors 
will apply prospectively only?'' (Emphasis added.) 
11. From July 2002 to February 2004 (^Dispute Period"), roughly the^same period 
of time that the parties arbitrated the question of whether the New Agreement should introduce 
language that excluded ISP-bound traffic from the calculation of originating minutes, Qwest 
3
 Implementation of the Local Competition Provisions in the Telecommunications Act of 1996± Intercarrier 
Compensation for ISP-Bound Traffic, Order on Remand and Report and Order, 16 FCC Red 9151, (2001) («ZSP 
Remand Ordef*\ remanded WorldCom v. FCC, 288 F.3d 429 (D.C. Cir. 2002); Internet Service Provider Bound 
Traffic Amendment to the Interconnection Agreement between ^ Qwest Corporation and Level 3 Communications, 
LLCf for the State of Utah, filed November 14,2002. 
6 
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billed Level 3 approximately $563,616.99 in charges for interconnection trunks in Utah. Level 3 
has consistently disputed such charges because there was no basis for them according to the 
terms of the Old Agreement Although the parties have held multiple discussions in an attempt 
to resolve the dispute, they have been unable to reach any agreement as a result of those 
discussions. 
12. On June 13, 2005, Qwest sent to Level 3 its demand letter denying Level 3's 
dispute, demanding payment of $563,616.99, and threatening suspension of all service order 
activity and disconnection of services, effective June 28,2005. See Exhibit "A". 
13. Level 3 has paid Qwest all undisputed charges during the Dispute Period and 
after the effective date of the New Agreement. 
14. In violation of the terms of the Old Agreement, which were in effect during the 
Dispute Period, and in violation of the Commission's Order, which prohibited retroactive 
application of the new relative use calculations, Qwest is attempting to exclude ISP-bound traffic 
from its originating minutes of use and impose direct-trunked transport charges on Level 3 
during the Dispute Period. As a result, Qwest claims that Level 3 is in default by $563,616.99. 
15. Also in violation of both the Old and the New Agreements, Qwest is 
threatening to disconnect services to Level 2, effective June 28,2005. Level 3 and its customers 
would be irreparably harmed by such action; Disconnection of Level 3's interconnection with 
Qwest would result in the elimination o&Internet access and voice telephony for Level 3's 
customers and for many Utah end users for whom Level 3 provides underlying services. The 
result would be to jeopardize the health, safety and welfare of a group of customers without just 
cause and without giving those customers a chance to make other arrangements for their 
communications services. Moreover, by disrupting Level 3's service, Qwest would cause 
720151.11 
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damage to Level 3's reputation among its customers as a reliable service provider, with 
accompanying economic harm to Level 3 that would be incalculable and irremediable. 
REQUEST FOR RELIEF 
WHEREFORE, Level 3 respectfully requests that the Commission grant the following 
relief: 
A. That on or before June 28, 2005, the Commission enjoin Qwest from taking any 
actions with respect to Level 3's accounts with Qwest, including, but not limited to, the 
suspension of service order activity and disconnection of services, and that (he Commission rule 
that Qwest may not in the future disconnect or terminate service to Level 3 without first 
complying with the procedures set forth in the applicable Interconnection Agreements. 
B. That the Commission issue an order declaring that Level 3's payments are current 
for the Disputed Period and that Qwest cannot bill or collect from Level direct-trunked transport 
charges based on the exclusion of ISP-bound traffic from Qwest originating minutes of use 
during the Disputed Period. 
C. That the Commission retain jurisdiction of this matter and the parties hereto until 
Qwest has complied with all relevant Commission orders. 
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DATED t h i s ^ "day of June, 2005. 
William J. Evins(5j»76) 
Vicki M. Baldwin(8532) 
PARSONS BEHLE & LATIMER 
One Utah Center 
201 South Main Street, Suite 1800 
Post Office Box 45898 
Salt Lake City, UT 84145-0898 
Telephone: (801) 532-1234 
Facsimile: (801) 536-6111 
Attorneys for 
Level 3 Communications, LLC 
and 
Gregory L. Rogers 
LEVEL 3 COMMUNICATIONS, LLC 
1025 Eldorado Boulevard 
Broomfield, CO 80021 
(720) 888-2512 (Tel) 
(720) 888-5134 (Fax) 
Attorneys for 
Level 3 Communications, LLC 
720151.11 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this J S day of June, 2005,1 caused a true and correct copy of 
the foregoing PETITION OF LEVEL 3 COMMUNICATIONS, LLC FOR 
ENFORCEMENT OF THE INTERCONNECTION AGREEMENT BETWEEN QWEST 
AND LEVEL 3 AND MOTION FOR EXPEDITED RELIEF to be sent in the following 
manner: 
Via Hand Delivery 
Ted D. Smith 
Stoel Rives 
201 South Main Street, Suite 1100 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Via Hand Delivery 
Michael Ginsberg 
Assistant Attorney General 
500 Heber M. Wells Building 
160 East 300 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
720151.!! 
M> 
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Spirit of Service* 
June 13,2005 
Level 3 Communications 
Director-Interconnection Services 
1025 Eldorado Blvd 
Broomfield, CO 80021 
Re: Dispute denied, balance due and payable 
Dear Level 3, 
This letter is to inform you that Level 3 is in default of payments on its Qwest accounts(s) 801L08-0008 008 
$563,616.99 as per the letter dated March 21,2005. The dispute you have filed against these charges has been 
denied and Qwest deems the charges due and payable. This letter constitutes further written notice of non-payment 
as may be required under applicable contract, tariff and/or state utility commission rules and regulations. Failure to 
respond to this letter or submit payment may result in additional collection actions (described below) being initiated 
ten (10) business days after the date of this letter. 
Therefore, if Qwest does not receive payment of $563,616.99 on or before June 27,2005 it will take action with 
respect to your accounts, without further notice, including but not limited to the suspension of all service order 
activity and eventual disconnection of services, effective June 28,2005. Furthermore, in accordance with applicable 
contract, and/or tariffs, during this 10 day period or thereafter Qwest may demand a security deposit as a condition 
of its continuing provision of services to Level 3. 
Please send payment to the following address: 
Qwest Corporation 
AttniAnne Duin 
900 Keo 4 South 
Des Moines, Iowa 50309 
Please be advised that if service order processing is interrupted or service is disconnected, alfoutstandingxharges 
will be due prior to restoration. If service disconnection occurs, other charges may also apply to re-establish the 
accounts). Late payment charges will be assessed to all past due balances in accordance with applicabletsontracts 
and/or tariffs. 
If you have paid in foil, please disregard this notice. If you have any questions regarding this4iotice or the status of 




900 Keo 4 South 
Des Moines, Iowa 50309 
Cc: Mami Fetters, Keiko Pettey, Dan Hurt, Steve Hanson, Doug Hsiao, Deb Quinby, 
Level 3-Ann Dixon 
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EXHIBIT B TO THE PETITION APPEARS AS EXHIBIT F TO 
THIS ADDENDUM 
EXHIBIT E 
- BEFORE THE PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION OF UTAH -
In fee Matter of the Negotiated ) DOCKET NO. 00-049-8S 
Resale; Interconnection Agreement ) 
betweea QWEST CORPORATION and ) 
LEVEL 3 COMMUNICATIONS, LLC ) REPORT AND ORDER 
ISSUED: January 10,2001 
SYNOPSIS 
The parties to the agreement which is the subject of this proceeding having 
submitted the same for Commission Approval; and the agreement appearing to conform to the 
requirements of § 252(e)(1) of the Federal Telecommunications Act of 1996 and applicable 
Federal Communications Commission regulations; and the agreement appearing to conform to 
applicatle Utah law and Commission Regulations; and approval of the agreement appearing to 
be in the public interest, the Commission approved fee agreement. 
By The Commission: 
PROCEDURAL HTSTORY 
QWEST CORPORATION and LEVEL 3 COMMUNICATIONS, LLC, entered 
into a resale agreement (hereafter "the Agreement**) dated Sqpteinber 7,2000. The parties filed 
fee Agreement with the Commission October 4,2000, for review and approval in accordance 
with 47 USC 229 § 252(e)(1), a part o£the Fedeial Telecommunications Act of 1996 (hereafter 
"the Ad "). The Administrative Law Judge, having reviewed said agreement and having been 
folly ad'dsed in the matter, now enters4he following Report, containing proposed findings of 
fact, conclusions of law, and the Order based thereon. 
DOCKET NO. 00-049-88 
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FINDINGSOFFACT 
1 „ The Agreement does not discriminate against any telecommunication carrier not a 
party to t 
/ . The Agreement comports with the Act's § 251, and with currently effective 
Federal Communications Commission (FCC) regulations, 
z. The Agreement comports with applicable Utah law and this Commission's rules, 
*-r The United States Congress and the Utah Legislature having established the 
fostering of competition in the telecommunications industry as sound public policy, the 
Agreement is in the public interest, since it comports with such policy-
:K The Division of Public Utilities, Utah Department of Commerce, recommends 
approval of the agreement, 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
The Agreement should be approved now as meeting the requirements of 
47 USC § 252(e)(1). 
ORDER 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED,, that: 
• The Interconnection agreement between QWEST CORPORATION and LEVEL 3 
COMMUNICATIONS, LLC, dated September 7,2000, be and ithereby is, approved in 
conforriance with 47 USC § 252(e)(1). 
# Any person aggrieved by this Order may petition the Commission for review 
within :J0 days of the date of this Order. Failure to do $o will forfeit the right to appeal to the 
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Utah Supreme Court. 
Dated at Salt Lake City, Utah, this lOthdayof January, 2001. 
hi A. Robert Thunrean 
Administrative Law Judge 
Approved and Confirmed this 10th day of January, 2001, as the Report and Order 
of the Pablk Service Commission of Utah. 
/s/ Stephen R Mecham. Chairman 
/s/ Constance B. White. Commissioner 
/s/ Clark D. Jones, Commissioner 
Attest: 
/$/Julie Orchard 
Commi >$ion Secretary 
EXHIBIT F 
- BEFORE THE PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION OF UTAH -
the Matter of Level 3 Communications, ) DOCKET NO. 02-2266-02 
,C for Arbitration Pursuant to Section 252 ) 
) of the Telecommunications Act of 1996 ) REPORT AND ORDER 
th Qwest Corporation Regarding Rates, ) 
rm% and Conditions for Interconnection ) 
ISSUED: February 20, 2004 
The Commission: 
BACKGROUND 
is matter was commenced by a petition of Level 3 Communications, LLC ("Level 3") for arbitration 
ier §251(b)(l) of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, 47 U.S.C. §151 etseq. (the "Act"). This 
ition presents one major issue for decision that the parties could not reach agreement on with respect 
in interconnection agreement between Level 3 and Qwest Corporation ("Qwest"). The parties 
•resented, and we find, that they have made good faith efforts to reach agreement on the terms of 
^connection. Hearings were held, and both parties fully briefed the issue. In addition, subsequent to 
hearing both parties have submitted numerous motions for leave to file additional authority, with 
visions from other jurisdictions attached. 
e facts are undisputed. Level 3 is a Competitive Local Exchange Carrier that provides service 
;lusively, at this time, to Internet Service Providers. Qwest is an incumbent local exchange carrier. 
e interconnection agreement provision at issue in this matter deals with the financial responsibility of 
'h party for direct trunk transport facilities ("DTTs") and related entrance facilities used to transport 
I exchange traffic between the companies. Level 3 and Qwest have agreed that when traffic reaches a 
tain level, DTTVwill be used to carry the traffic. They have further agreed that the cost of those 
ilities will be based on the "relative use" of the facilities. The parties disagree, however, on whether 
Abound traffic should be excluded from the relative use calculations. 
stated, Level 3Vcurrent business in Utah consists exclusively of servicing ISPs. Level 3 has a single 
at of interconnection ("POI") with Qwest servicing the entire state. The interconnection facilities in 
^stion are all on Qwest's side of the POL Level 3 provides its ISP customers with local telephone 
nbers in various parts of the state. For example, a Qwest customer in Cedar City may call a local 
dar City numberto reach an ISP serviced by Level 3. That call is then transported to the point of 
^connection in Salt Lake and there delivered to Level S. Unlike if this were a voice call to a Level 3 
;tomer, there is no return traffic to Cedar City, in this example. Thexall is terminated at the ISP's 
ilities in Salt Lake or elsewhere and no return traffic to Cedar City will occur. 
tee at the current time all traffic to Level 3 is ISP traffic, a decision on the issue of how relative use of 
facilities should T>e calculated will determine who pays all of the costs of the interconnection 
ilities. If ISP traffic is included in the calculation of relative use, Qwest will pay 100% of the costs 
:ause its customers originate all of the traffic to the ISPs served by Level 3. If ISP traffic is not 
nnnoofr 
included in relative use, Level 3 will pay all of the costs of these interconnection facilities.^ 
Accordingly, Qwest proposes language that excludes ISP traffic from the calculation, and Level 3's 
proposes language including ISP traffic. 
PARTY POSITIONS 
Qwest argues that its language and position should be adopted for five reasons: 
1. Adopting Level 3's position would result in Level 3 obtaining interconnection trunks for free. Such a 
result would violate requirements of the Telecommunications Act that Qwest receive just and reasonable 
compensation for providing interconnection to CLECs. 
2. The ISP demand Order^ determined that ISP traffic is interstate and not subject to reciprocal 
compensation under section 251(b)(5) of the Act. Level 3fs argument that it should obtain 
interconnection trunks without cost rests on reciprocal compensation rules. Qwest argues that for the 
same reason Internet traffic is excluded from reciprocal compensation, it should be excluded from 
relative use calculations for interconnection facilities. 
3. The ISP Remand Order determined that since Internet traffic is interstate, treatment of Internet traffic 
is exclusively within the jurisdiction of section 201 of the Act. Qwest therefore argues that this 
Commission is without authority to order the parties to include Internet traffic in relative use 
calculations. 
4. Qwest argues that including Internet traffic in relative use calculations would violate the same policy 
considerations that caused the FCC to reject payment of reciprocal compensation for Internet traffic. 
Qwest argues that including Internet traffic would (a) lead to improper subsidies and uneconomic 
pricing signals; (b) give Level 3 and other CLECs distorted incentives to serve ISP customers to the 
exclusion of other customers, and (c) improperly ignore the ability of Level 3 and other CLECs to 
collect the interconnection costs from their ISP customers. 
5. Qwest argues that this issue has already been addressed in the Statement of Generally Available 
Terms and Conditions, or SGAT, proceeding in which its proposed language was adopted, nothing has 
changed since that time, and the language should therefore be adopted here. 
In favor of the adoption of its language Level 3 argues: 
1. The ISP Remand Order did not address the issue in dispute here. 
2. FCC "rules of the road" permit Level 3 to interconnect with Qwest at a single point per LATA and 
require Qwest to deliver its traffic to that interconnection point Qwest is therefore obligated to deliver 
all traffic, voice and Internet, to the POI at no cost to Level 3. Terminating compensation issues are 
separate, and Qwest's position attempts to confuse the issues of interconnection rights and obligations 
with terminating compensation issues. Qwest also ignores the plain language of FCC rules. 
3. Qwest's argument that the adoption in the SGAT proceeding of the language Qwest proposes in this 
action should be rejected. Level 3 argues that no party challenged Qwest's SGAT language, and 
therefore this is the first opportunity for the Commission to address this issue. 
DISCUSSION 
is issue has been addressed in many other states, with conflicting results. Both parties have submitted 
visions from various jurisdictions supporting their positions. The best that can be said is that this is not 
sttled issue. There is no definite FCC pronouncement on this issue at this time. We are left to 
ermine which arguments are more persuasive and which outcome better promotes the public interest 
Utah. 
AT language: Qwest argues at some length that in the SGAT proceeding this Commission has 
eady accepted the language proposed by Qwest in this docket. Qwest argues that nothing has changed 
ce approval of the SGAT language, and therefore the Commission should adopt the same language 
*e. 
vel 3 states that this argument is meritless. Level 3 argues that the negotiation and arbitration process 
listinguishable from the SGAT process, and that this Commission has the jurisdiction to arbitrate 
erconnection disputes. Level 3 argues that the SGAT is like a tariff that it or other carriers may adopt, 
t that it is still entitled to negotiate and arbitrate its own interconnection agreement based on its 
lividual situation and priorites. Level 3 also argues that the Commission has not considered the 
vfulness of Qwest's proposed language because in the SGAT proceeding no CLEC advocated that the 
tguage be changed. 
e agree that the presence of Qwest's proposed language in its SGAT is not determinative. As Level 3 
ttes, such a result "would make the negotiation and arbitration provisions superfluous." The issue is 
}perly before the Commission for resolution at this time and based on the record in this proceeding, 
d that is how it will be decided. 
'C Jurisdiction: Qwest argues that in the ISP Remand Order the FCC ruled Internet traffic is within its 
elusive jurisdiction. As a result, Qwest argues, state commissions are without authority to include 
ternet traffic in relative use calculations, including in this matter. 
vel 3 makes a related, but more involved argument. Level 3 argues that there are two different 
ligations under the Telecommunications Act: the obligation to interconnect under Section 251(c)(2), 
d the obligation to pay terminating compensation under Section 251(b)(5). Level 3 argues that Qwest's 
erconnection obligation is to route and deliver traffic from Qwest customers to the POI, and absorb all 
sts in doing so. Level 3 further argues that the ISP Remand Order only modified compensation 
ligations, and not "other obligation[s]" such as interconnection. Level 3 therefore argues that unless 
$ Commission decides that the costs at issue are an "interconnection" obligation not changed by the 
P Remand Order then this Commission lacks jurisdiction to resolve this dispute. In other words, Level 
>tates that if this Commission does not agree with Level 3fs position, it does not have jurisdiction to 
ider any other decision. 
te issue presented in this arbitration is the calculation of "relative use" for transportation facilities. We 
not read the FCC's pronouncements about its jurisdiction over Internet traffic as barring this 
>mmission from addressing that issue. The issue here is the calculation of charges for transportation 
:ilities based on relative use, an issue that has not been addressed by the FCC. We will proceed to 
dress that issue. 
ligations under the Telecommunications Act: Having dealt with the parties1 jurisdictional and 
ecedential arguments, we now turn to the merits. Section 251(d)(1) of the Act requires that rates for 
terconnection facilities be "just and reasonable" and based on the cost of providing the 
terconnection. An incumbent LEC is to recoup the interconnection costs from the competing carriers 
iking the request. Iowa Utilities Board v. FCC, 120 F.3d 753, 810 (8 th Cir. 1997), affdinpart, rev'd 
inpart, remanded AT&T Corp. V. Iowa Utils. Bd, 525 U.S. 366 (1999). 
Level 3rs proposed language would result in Qwest bearing all of the costs of the interconnection 
facilities. We agree with Qwest's assertion that such a result would violate the requirements under the 
Act; that ILECs receive just and reasonable compensation for interconnection. Level 3 paying nothing 
toward the interconnection facilities is not a just and reasonable rate. 
In the LSP Remand Order decision, Internet-bound traffic was determined to be interstate access. As a 
result, the FCC has excluded Internet traffic from the reciprocal compensation requirements of section 
251 (b)(5). Level 3's argument relies on Rule 51.703(b), adopted pursuant to section 251 (b)(5) and 
dealing with reciprocal compensation, and the TSR Wireless®* decision applying that rule. That reliance 
is misplaced. The FCC has clearly stated on numerous occasions that the reciprocal compensation 
obligations of section 251(b)(5) do not apply to Internet traffic. The TSR Wireless decision, likewise, is 
not applicable. That decision dealt with local calls to one-way paging providers and the costs of facilities 
to carry those calls. The claims of TSR Wireless only dealt with local calls. The decision is not 
applicable to Internet-bound traffic. We agree with the reasoning of the U.S. District court in Level 3 
Communications, LLC vs. Public Utilities Commission of Colorado, Civil Action No. Ol-N-2455 (CBS), 
Colorado District, U.S. District Court, December 11,2003, that 47 C.F.R. § 51.703(b) does not apply. 
Many of the same policy considerations used in the reciprocal compensation are applicable to the issue 
presented here. In the ISP Remand Order the FCC found that the payment of reciprocal compensation 
for Internet traffic caused uneconomic subsidies and improperly created incentives for CLECs to 
specialize in serving ISPs to the exclusion of other customers.^ The FCC noted that these improper 
incentives and market distortions are most apparent in Internet traffic because of the one-way nature of 
the traffic. The same considerations apply to the issue at hand. If Internet-bound traffic is not excluded 
from the relative use calculations, Level 3 would be allowed to shift all of the costs of the 
interconnection trunks to Qwest. Level 3 would then have strong incentive to continue to focus on 
serving ISPs to the exclusion of other customers. Just as these considerations caused the FCC to declare 
that Internet traffic is not subject to reciprocal compensation payments, they strongly favor the exclusion 
of ISP traffic from the relative use calculations at issue in this matter. 
We will order the use of the language proposed by Qwest for the calculation of the relative use of the 
interconnection facilities. 
Sub-issues: There are two related sub-issues raised by Level 3 in this arbitration. The first is the relative 
use factor to be used for the initial quarterly billing period. The contract provides for a relative use factor 
of 50% to£e used until a new factor is agreed upon by the parties. Qwest proposes that when a new 
factor is established that bills should be retroactively adjusted for the initial billing quarter. Level 3 
argues that any new relative use factor should be used prospectively only. We will adopt Level 3fs 
position ami order that the contract language be modified so that no true up will be made and new 
relative use factors will apply prospectively only. 
The second sub-issue is whether the relative use factor should be used to apportion the nonrecurring 
installation,charges for the transportation and interconnection facilities at issue. Qwest's proposal would 
cause Level 3 to pay all of the installation charges. Level 3 proposes that the charges be apportioned 
according to relative use. Qwest did not address this issue in its brief. As a matter of policy, however, 
the just and reasonable approach to these costs weuld be to apportion them using the relative use factor. 
We will therefore require that the contract language be modified accordingly. 
ORDER 
W, THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, that 
J l motions for leave to file additional authority are granted. 
^west's proposed language regarding the calculation of relative use is adopted. The contract language 
arding the two sub-issues shall be modified as set forth above. 
Tie interconnection agreement, as modified herein, between Qwest Corporation and Level 3 
nmunications, LLC, is approved. 
"he parties shall submit an interconnection agreement reflecting the determinations in this order 
bin 30 days. 
,ed at Salt Lake City, Utah, this 20th day of February, 2004. 
Doug Tingey 
nainistrative Law Judge 
proved and Confirmed this 20th day of February, 2004, as the Report and Order of the Public Service 
mmission of Utah. 
Ric Campbell. Chairman 
Constance B. White, Commissioner 





Phe contract terms call for Level 3 to be billed for all of the cost of the interconnection facilities at 
ie, and for Qwest to issue Level 3 a credit for its portion of the relative use of the facilities, 
srefore, if Internet-bound traffic is excluded from the calculation of relative use, Level 3 will receive 
credit and will be responsible for the full cost of the facilities. 
r
n the Matter of Implementation of the Local Competition Provisions in the Telecommunications Act 
1996, Intercarrier Compensation for ISP-Bound Traffic, CC Dkt. Nos. 96-98 & 99-68, FCC 03-131, 
)1 FCC LEXIS 2340 (rel. Apr. 27,2001), remanded, WorldCom, Inc. V. FCC, 288 F.3d 429 HD.C. 
. 2002). 
VSR Wireless, LLC, v. US West Communications, Inc., 15 FCC Red 11166, % 3. 
rSP Remand Order, ffi 67-76. 
EXHIBIT G 
DOCKETED 
- BEFORE THE PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION OF UTAH -
In the Matter of the Petition of Level 3 ) DOCKET NO, 05-2266-01 
Communications, LLC for Enforcement of ) 
the Interconnection Agreement Between ) REPORT AND ORDER 
Qwest and Level 3 ) 
ISSUED: August 18.2005 
SYNOPSIS 
The Commission concludes the method of calculation of the relative use factor for 
direct trunk transport facilities under the parties' previous interconnection agreement for the 
period in dispute properly excludes Internet Service Provider-bound traffic. The Commission 
denies the Petition of Level 3 Communications, LLC, and grants Qwest Corporation's 
counterclaim while making no finding regarding the amount owed by Level 3 to Qwest. 
By The Commission: 
PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
On June 23,2005, Level 3 Communications, LLC ("Level 3"), filed a Petition for 
Enforcement of the Interconnection Agreement Between Qwest and Level 3 and Motion for 
Expedited Relief seeking Commission order finding that Level 3 is current in all payments owed 
to Qwest Corporation ("Qwest") for the period July 2002 through February 2004 (the "Dispute 
Period") and enjoining Qwest from taking various actions concerning Level 3fs accounts. This 
petition was generated by Level 3rs receipt of a letter from Qwest dated June 13, 2005, in which 
Qwest claimed Level 3 was in default of $563,616.79 in payments on its account and demanded 
payment on or before June 27, 2005. If payment was not received by this date, Qwest would take 
certain action with respect to Level 3rs accounts, without further notice, including but not limited 
00t)G58 
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to the suspension of all service order activity and eventual disconnection of services. 
On June 24,2004, pursuant to Utah Code Annotated' 54-8b-17, the Commission 
issued a Notice of Prehearing Conference setting said conference for June 30,2005. However, 
by agreement of the parties, the Commission canceled this conference by Notice issued on June 
29,2005, and issued a Scheduling Order on June 30,2005, setting a hearing date of July 26, 
2005. 
On July 6,2005, Qwest filed its Response to Level 3fs Petition for Enforcement of 
Interconnection Agreement and Motion for Expedited Relief and Counterclaim Against Level 3 
for Enforcement of Interconnection Agreement. By its Counterclaim, Qwest seeks Commission 
order declaring that, pursuant to the terms of the previous interconnection agreement between the 
parties, Level 3 owes Qwest the sum of $563,616.79, plus interest, for the provision of direct 
trunk transport ("DTT") facilities during the Dispute Period. 
On July 14,2005, Level 3 filed its Reply to Qwest Corporation's Counterclaim in 
which Level 3 denied Qwest's claim that the principal amount Level 3 might owe to Qwest for 
the use of DTT facilities during the Dispute Period is $563,616.99. 
On July 15, 2005, Level 3 and Qwest submitted Position Statements in support of 
their competing claims. In its Position Statement, Qwest indicated that Level 3fs R.eply of July 
14,2005, was the first time that Level 3 had challenged the rate in Qwest's DTT facility bilSngs 
as improper. 
This matter was heard by the Administrative Law Judge on July 26,2005. At 
hearing, Level 3 was represented by Gregory L. Rogers and William J. Evans. Qwest was 
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represented by Ted Smith and Robert Brown. Due to the nature of the parties' dispute, hearing 
was limited to oral argument, no evidence or testimony being offered by either party. 
BACKGROUND 
Level 3 is a certificated competitive local exchange carrier providing service 
primarily to Internet Service Providers ("ISPs") in Utah. Qwest is an incumbent local exchange 
carrier. On September 7, 2000, Level 3 and Qwest, pursuant to the Telecommunications Act of 
1996 (the "Act"), entered into an interconnection agreement ("Old Agreement") which was 
approved by the Commission in Docket No. 00-049-88 on January 10,2001. The record in that 
docket indicates the parties entered into this Old Agreement by virtue of Level 3 opting into an 
interconnection agreement between Qwest predecessor U.S. West Communications, Inc., and 
AT&T Communications of the Mountain States, Inc., approved by the Commission in Docket 
No. 96-087-03 on March 25, 1997. 
To provide its services, Level 3 established a single Point of Interconnection 
("POP) with Qwest in Salt Lake City, obtained local telephone numbers throughout the^tate of 
Utah through the North American Numbering Plan Administrator, and provided these numbers to 
its ISP customers. The ISP customers then provided these numbers to their dial-up customers 
(who were also Qwest local exchange service customers) so those customers could access the 
Internet. These locally dialed calls were then routed over Qwest's DTT facilities to Level 3's POI 
for delivery to Level 3's ISP customers. 
Section 5.1.2.4 of Attachment 1 to the Old Agreement states: 
If the Parties' elect to establish two-way direct trunks, the 
compensation for such jointly used 'shared' facilities shall be 
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adjusted as follows. The nominal compensation shall be pursuant to 
the rates for direct trunk transport in Appendix A. The actual rate 
paid to the provider of the direct trunk facility shall be reduced to 
reflect the provider's use of that facility. The adjustment in the direct 
trunk transport rate shall be a percentage that reflects the provider's 
relative use (i.e. originating minutes of use) of the facility in the busy 
hour. 
This section contains the Old Agreement's only mention of a relative use factor ("RUF") 
respecting the rates to be paid for direct trunk transport. The term of the Old Agreement was as 
follows: 
This Agreement shall be effective upon Commission approval and 
shall remain in effect until June 26,2001 and thereafter shall continue 
in force and effect unless and until anew agreement addressing all of 
the terms of this Agreement, becomes effective between the Parties. 
Either Party may request resolution of open issues in accordance with 
the provisions of Section 27 of this Part A of this Agreement, Dispute 
Resolution, beginning nine (9) months prior to the expiration of this 
Agreement. Any disputes regarding the terms and conditions of the 
new interconnection agreement shall be resolved in accordance with 
said Section 27 and the resulting agreement shall be submitted to the 
Commission. This Agreement shall remain in effect until a new 
interconnection agreement approved by the Commission has become 
effective. 
When the Old Agreement expired on June 26, 2001, Level 3 and Qwest had not 
yet finalized negotiations on a new agreement ("New Agreement") so the parties' relationship 
continued to be governed by the terms of the Old Agreement. On August 7, 2002, in Docket No. 
02-2266-02, Level 3 petitioned the Commission for arbitration of the New Agreement. 
The sole provision at issue in that arbitration was Section 5.1.2.4 of Attachment 1, 
the same provision in the Old Agreement referred to supra. Level 3 and Qwest agreed that when 
traffic reached a certain level, DTTs would be used to carry the traffic. They further agreed that 
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the cost of those facilities would be based on the "relative use" of the facilities, with Level 3 
being billed for all of the cost of the interconnection facilities at issue but Qwest issuing Level 3 
a credit for its portion of the relative use of the facilities. The parties disagreed, however^ on 
whether ISP-bound traffic should be excluded jfrom the relative use calculations. In its Order in 
Docket No. 02-2266-02 ("2004 Order"), the Commission noted: 
Level 3fs current business in Utah consists exclusively of servicing 
ISPs. Level 3 has a single point of interconnection ("POI") with 
Qwest servicing the entire state. The interconnection facilities in 
question are all on Qwesfs side of the POL Level 3 provides its ISP 
customers with local telephone numbers in various parts of the state. 
For example, a Qwest customer in Cedar City may call a local Cedar 
City number to reach an ISP serviced by Level 3. That call is then 
transported to the point of interconnection in Salt Lake and there 
delivered to Level 3. Unlike if this were a voice call to a Level 3 
customer, there is no return traffic to Cedar City, in this example. 
The call is terminated at the ISP's facilities in Salt Lake or elsewhere 
and no return traffic to Cedar City will occur. 
Since at the current time all traffic to Level 3 is ISP traffic, a decision 
on the issue of how relative use of the facilities should be calculated 
will determine who pays all of the costs of the interconnection 
facilities. If ISP traffic is included in the calculation of relative use, 
Qwest will pay 100% of the costs because its customers originate all 
of the traffic to the ISP's served by Level 3. If ISP traffic is not 
included in relative use, Level 3 will pay all of the costs of these 
interconnection facilities. Accordingly, Qwest proposes language that 
excludes ISP traffic from the calculation, and Level 3fs [sic] proposes 
language including ISP traffic.1 
The Commission ultimately resolved this issue in Qwest's favor, noting: 
2004 Order at 2-3 (footnote omitted). 
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Level 3's proposed language would result in Qwest bearing all of the 
costs of the interconnection facilities. We agree with Qwest's 
assertion th^ such a result would violate the requirements under the 
[Telecommunications Act of 1996,47 U.S.C f 151 etseq.] that ILECs 
receive just and reasonable compensation for interconnection. Level 
3 paying nothing toward the interconnection facilities is not a just and 
reasonable rate. 
Thus, while the Old Agreement was silent on the issue of whether ISP-bound traffic was 
included in the calculation of the relative use factor for DTT billing, the New Agreement 
specifically excludes such traffic from this calculation. Qwest, citing the 2004 Order, now seeks 
to exclude ISP-bound traffic from relative use calculations during the Dispute Period. 
DISCUSSION 
A. Level 3's Position 
Level 3 argues that the Commission's decision in Docket No. 02-2266-02 may not 
be applied retroactively to modify the relative use calculations provided for under the Old 
Id at 7. A sub-issue in Docket No. 02-2266-02 which Level 3 cites in support of its current position 
concerned which RUF should be used for the initial quarterly billing period under the New Agreement. Qwest 
proposed that when a new factor was established bills should be retroactively adjusted for the initial billing quarter. 
Level 3 argued that any new RUF should be used prospectively only. The Commission adopted Level 3's position, 
orderingianguage prohibiting true up and mandating that new relative use factors apply prospectively only. 
In October 2002, the parties reached a global settlement of a number of past billing issues for all amounts in dispute 
between the parties through June 30,2002. Hence, the Dispute Period begins on July 1, 2002, and continues through February 
2004 to the effective date of the New Agreement. 
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Agreement. In support of this position, Level 3 notes the Commission determined in Docket No. 
02-2266-02 that the new RUF calculated following the first quarter of activity under the New 
Agreement would not be applied retroactively to that quarter, i eve l 3 reads this decision as a 
determination that the method of calculating the RUF adopted in the New Agreement should 
only be applied prospectively. 
Level 3 also argues that the Old Agreement is a: contract, that the plain language 
of Section 5.1.2.4 of Attachment 1 to that contract makes no mention of excluding ISP-bound 
traffic from RUF calculations, and that it would now be improper for the Commission to add 
such exclusionary terms to this provision. In Level 3fs view, the plain meaning of this section is 
that the calculation of relative use under the Old Agreement was to reflect all of the originating 
minutes of use on the trunks without exception. Because Qwest end-users originated all of the 
traffic in question and because the Old Agreement provided for no exclusion of ISP-bound 
traffic, Qwest has no basis under the Old Agreement to charge Level 3 for DTT facilities. 
B. Qwest's Position 
Qwest, on the other hand, relies on the Commission's conclusion in Docket No. 
02-2264-02 that including ISP-bound traffic in RUF calculations would violate the requirements 
of the Act by precluding Qwest from receiving just and reasonable compensation for 
interconnection. Qwest argues the Commission must apply this same reasoning to the provision 
of DTT facilities during the Dispute Period; that to do otherwise would contradict the 
Commission's own conclusions in Docket No. 02-2266-02 and violate the Act by requiring 
Qwest to provide DTT facilities to Level 3 at its own expense. 
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In the alternative, Qwest attempts to redefine the traffic it carries on its DTT 
facilities for Level 3 by arguing that Qwest customers who place local calls on Qwest's network 
in order to connect to their ISP are not placing those calls as Qwest customers but as ISP 
customers and, by extension, Level 3 customers. Viewed in this light, the traffic on the DTT 
facility is attributable to Level 3 for purposes of relative use factor calculation^ resulting in the 
payments Qwest seeks in its counterclaim. 
Finally, Qwest notes the parties amended the Old Agreement several times, 
including the Single Point of Presence ("SPOP") Amendment approved August 21
 y 2002, which 
allowed Level 3 to connect to Qwest as a single POI in Salt Lake City, and the Internet Service 
Provider Amendment approved January 8, 2003
 y which was intended to deal with reciprocal 
compensation for ISP traffic after the FCC issued its ISP Remand Order4 on that issue. 
Paragraph 1.3.1 of the SPOP Amendment required Level 3 to order one or more direct trunk 
groups from Qwest when traffic volume reached a certain level. Level 3 r having placed such 
orders, Qwest began billing Level 3 on a monthlyiasis for the cost of these DTT facilities, 
resulting in the disputed bills at issue in this docket. 
FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
We do not agree with Level 3fs characterization that it would be improper for this 
Commission to "add language" to the Old Agreement by excluding ISP-bound traffic from the 
RUF calculation. This Commission is routinely asked to interpret disputed terms between parties 
Order on Remand, In the Matter of Implementation ofihe Local Competition Provisions in the Telecommunications 
Act of 1996, Intercarner Compensation for ISP Bound Traffic, \6FCCK 9151 (2001) 
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in order to produce a just and reasonable result in accordance with applicable law and regulation. 
This case is no different 
In Docket No. 02-2266-02, we recognized the applicability to the issue of relative 
use of the FCC's reasoning in its ISP Remand Order regarding reciprocal compensation: 
Many of the same policy considerations used in the reciprocal 
compensation [sic] are applicable to the issue presented here. In the 
ISP Remand Order the FCC found that the payment of reciprocal 
compensation for Internet traffic caused uneconomic subsidies and 
improperly created incentives for CLECs to specialize in serving ISPs 
to the exclusion of other customers. The FCC noted that these 
improper incentives and market distortions are most apparent in 
Internet traffic because of the one-way nature of the traffic. The same 
considerations apply to the issue at hand. If Internet-bound traffic is 
not excluded from the relative use calculations, Level 3 would be 
allowed to shift all of the costs of the interconnection trunks to 
Qwest. Level 3 would then have strong incentive to continue to focus 
on serving ISPs to the exclusion of other customers. Just as these 
considerations caused the FCC to declare that Internet traffic is not 
subject to reciprocal compensation payments, they strongly favor the 
exclusion of ISP traffic from the relative use calculations at issue in 
this matter.5 
We do not look to Docket No. 02-2266-02 as controlling precedent in deciding the matter now 
before us, but we do recognize that the rationale behind our 2004 Order is equally applicable to 
the parties' current dispute both because the issue now before us is identical to the issue in 
Docket No. 02-2266-02 and because the release of the ISP Remand Order predates the start of 
the Dispute Period by more than a year. We view the ISP Remand Order as illuminating the 
52004 Order at p. 8 (citing ISP Remand Order, && 67-76). 
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proper meaning of Section 5.1.2.4 of Attachment 1 to the Old Agreement. It would therefore be 
unreasonable for this Commission to ignore such guidance in rendering a decision. 
As we recognized in Docket No. 02-2266-02, any interpretation of Section 5.1.2.4 
of Attachment 1^  whether in the New Agreement or in the Old Agreement, must accord with the 
Section 251(d)(1) requirement of the Act that rates for interconnection of facilities be just and 
reasonable. No one disputes that including ISP-bound traffic in the RUF calculation under the 
Old Agreement would result in Qwest bearing all of the cost of the DTT facilities. We cannot 
conclude that such a result would equate to just and reasonable compensation for Qwest. We 
therefore conclude that the only proper reading of Section 5.1.2.4 of Attachment 1 to the Old 
Agreement excludes ISP-bound traffic from the RUF calculation in determining the parties' 
respective payment obligations for DTT facilities provided during the Dispute Period. 
We note, however, that the issue of how much Level 3 might owe Qwest if ISP-
bound traffic is excluded from relative use calculations was raised relatively late in these 
proceedings. Qwest appears to stand by the figure of $563,616.99 contained in its Counterclaim. 
Level 3 disputes this amount but offered no evidence concerning what it believes the correct 
amount to be. The Commission therefore makes no finding on this issue. 
Therefore, based upon the foregoing information, and for good cause appearing, 
the Administrative Law Judge enters the following proposed: 
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ORDER 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that: 
1. The Petition of LEVEL 3 COMMUNICATIONS, LLC, is denied. QWEST 
CORPORATION'S Counterclaim is granted in part to the extent that the Commission concludes 
ISF^bound traffic is properly excluded from calculation of the relative use factor for direct trunk 
transport facilities during the Dispute Period. The Commission enters no order respecting the 
amount owed to Qwest by Level 3 for direct trunk transport facilities provided by Qwest during 
the Dispute Period. 
2. Pursuant to Utah Code Annotated " 63-46b-12 and 54-7-15, agency review or 
rehearing of this order may be obtained by filing a request for review or rehearing with the 
Commission within 30 days after the issuance of the order. Responses to a request for agency 
review or rehearing must be filed within 15 days of the filing of the request for review or 
rehearing. If the Commission fails to grant a request for review or rehearing within 20 days after. 
the filing of a request for review or rehearing, it is deemed denied. Judicial review of the 
Commission's final agency action may be obtained by filing a Petition for Review with the Utah 
Supreme Court within 30 days after final agency action. Any Petition for Review must comply 
with the requirements of Utah Code Annotated n 63-46b-14, 63-46b-16 and the Utah Rules of 
Appellate Procedure. 
Dated at Salt Lake City, Utah, this 18* day of August, 2005. 
StevefffT Goodwill 
Administrative Law Judge 
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Approved and Confirmed this 18th day of August, 2005, as the Report and Order 
of the Public Service Commission of-Utah. 
Ric Campbe&l^  Chairman 
Ted Boyer, Commissioner 
Ron Allen, Commissioner 
Attest: 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
1. In this Order, we reconsider the proper treatment for purposes of intercarrier 
compensation of telecommunications traffic delivered to Internet service providers (ISPs). We 
previously found in the Declaratory Ruling1 that such traffic is interstate traffic subject to the 
jurisdiction of the Commission under section 201 of the Act2 and is not,^herefore, subject to the 
reciprocal compensation provisions of section 251(b)(5).3 The Court of Appeals for the District 
of Columbia Circuit held on appeal, however, that the Declaratory Ruling failed adequately to 
explain why our jurisdictional conclusion was relevant to the applicability of section 251(b)(5) and 
1
 Implementation of the Local Competition Provisions in the Telecommunications Act of 1996; Intercarrier 
Compensation for ISP-Bound Traffic, Declaratory Ruling in CC Docket No. 96-98 and Notice of Proposed 
Rulemaking in CC Docket No. 99-68,14 FCC Red 3689 (1999) (Declaratory Rulings Intercarrier Compensation 
NPRM). 
2
 See 47 U.S.C. § 201, Communications Act of 1934 (the Act), as amended by the Telecommunications Act of 
1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56 (1996 Act). Hereinafter, all citations to the Act and to the 1996 Act will 
be to the relevant section of the United States Code unless otherwise noted. 
3
 47 U.S.C § 251(b)(5). 
2 
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remanded the issue for further consideration As explained in more detail below, we modify the 
analysis that led to our determination that ISP-bound traffic falls outside the scope of section 
251(b)(5) and conclude that Congress excluded from the "telecommunications" traffic subject to 
reciprocal compensation the traffic identified in section 251(g), including traffic destined for ISPs. 
Having found, although for different reasons than before, that the provisions of section 251(b)(5) 
do not extend to ISP-bound traffic, we reaffirm our previous conclusion that traffic delivered to 
an ISP is predominantly interstate access traffic subject to section 201 of the Act, and we establish 
an appropriate cost recovery mechanism for the exchange of such traffic. 
2. We recognize that the existing intercarrier compensation mechanism for the 
delivery of this traffic, in which the originating carrier pays the carrier that serves the ISP, has 
created opportunities for regulatory arbitrage and distorted the economic incentives related to 
competitive entry into the local exchange and exchange access markets. As we discuss in the 
Unified Intercarrier Compensation NPRM, released in tandem with this Order, such market 
distortions relate not only to ISP-bound traffic, but may result from any intercarrier compensation 
regime that allows a service provider to recover some of its costs from other carriers rather than 
from its end-users. Thus, the NPRM initiates a proceeding to consider, among other things, 
whether the Commission should replace existing intercarrier compensation schemes with some 
form of what has come to be known as "bill and keep." The NPRM also considers modifications 
to existing payment regimes, in which the calling party's network pays the terminating network, 
that might limit the potential for market distortion. The regulatory arbitrage opportunities 
associated with intercarrier payments are particularly apparent with respect to ISP-bound traffic, 
however, because ISPs typically generate large volumes of traffic that is virtually all one-way -
that is, delivered to the ISP. Indeed, there is convincing evidence in the record that at least some 
carriers have targeted ISPs as customers merely to take advantage of these intercarrier payments. 
Accordingly, in this Order we also take interim steps to limit the regulatory arbitrage opportunity 
presented by ISP-bound traffic while we consider the broader issues of intercarrier compensation 
in the NPRM proceeding. 
4
 See Bell At! Tel Cos v FCC, 206 F 3d 1 (D C. Cir. 2000) {Bell Atlantic). 
5
 Developing a Unified Intercarrier Compensation Regime, CC Docket No 01-92, Notice of Proposed 
Rulemaking, FCC 01-132 (rel April 27, 2001) ("UnifiedIntercarrier Compensation NPRM" or "NPRM") 
"Rtll and keep" refers to an arrangement m which neither of two interconnecting networks charges the other for 
terminating traffic that originates on the other network Instead, each network recovers from its own end-users the 
cost^ of both originating traffic that it delivers to the other network and terminating traffic that it receives from the 
other network Implementation of the Local Competition Provisions in the Telecommunications Act of 1996, 
Interconnection between Local Exchange Carriers and Commercial Mobile Radio Service Providers, CC Docket 
Nos 96-98, 95-185^ First Report and Order, 11 FCC Red 15499, 16045 (1996) (Local Competition Order), off din 
part^and vacated in part sub nom Competitive Telecommunications Ass'nv FCC, 117 F 3d 106fr (8th Cir 1997) 
(CompTet), affd in part and vacated in part sub nom Iowa Utils Bd v FCC, 120 F 3d 753 (8th Cir 1997) (Iowa 
Utils Bd), offd in part and rev'd in part sub no'm, AT&T Corp v Iowa Utils Bd, 525 U S 366 (1999), Order on 
Reconsideration, 11 FCC Red 13042 (1996), Second Order on Reconsideration, 11 FCC Red 19738 (1996), Third 
Order on Reconsideration and Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 12 FCC Red 12460 (1997); further recon 
pending Bill and keep does not, however, preclude intercarrier charges for transport of traffic between carriers' 
networks Id 
3 
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II. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
3. As presaged above, we must wrestle with two difficult issues in this Order: first, 
whether intercarrier compensation for ISP-bound traffic is governed by section 251 or section 
201; and, if the latter, what sort of compensation mechanism should apply. The first question is 
difficult because we do not believe it is resolved by the plain language of section 251(b)(5) but, 
instead, requires us to consider the relationship of that section to other provisions of the statute. 
Moreover, we recognize the legitimate questions raised by the court with respect to the rationales 
underlying our regulatory treatment of ISPs and ISP traffic. We seek to respond to those 
questions in this Order. Ultimately, however, we conclude that Congress, through section 
251(g),7 expressly limited the reach of section 251(b)(5) to exclude ISP-bound traffic. 
Accordingly, we affirm our conclusion in the Declaratory Ruling that ISP-bound traffic is not 
subject to the reciprocal compensation obligations of section 251(b)(5). 
4. Because we determine that intercarrier compensation for ISP-bound traffic is 
within the jurisdiction of this Commission under section 201 of the Act, it is incumbent upon us to 
establish an appropriate cost recovery mechanism for delivery of this traffic. Based upon the 
record before us, it appears that the most efficient recovery mechanism for ISP-bound traffic may 
be bill and keep, whereby each carrier recovers costs from its own end-users. As we recognize in 
the NPRM, intercarrier compensation regimes that require carrier-to-carrier payments are likely to 
distort the development of competitive markets by divorcing cost recovery from the ultimate 
consumer of services. In a monopoly environment, permitting carriers to recover some of their 
costs from interconnecting carriers might serve certain public policy goals. In order to promote 
universal service, for example, this Commission historically has capped end-user common line 
charges and required local exchange carriers to recover any shortfall through per-minute charges 
assessed on interexchange carriers.8 These sorts of implicit subsidies cannot be sustained, 
however, in the competitive markets for telecommunications services envisioned by the 1996 Act 
In the NPRM, we suggest that, given the opportunity, carriers always will prefer to recover their 
costs from other carriers rather than their own end-users in order to gain competitive advantage. 
Thus carriers have every incentive to compete, not on basis of quality and efficiency, but on the 
basis of their ability to shift costs to other carriers, a troubling distortion that prevents market 
forces from distributing limited investment resources to their most efficient uses. 
5. We believe that this situation is particularly acute in the case of carriers delivering 
traffic to ISPs because these customers generate extremely high traffic volumes that are entirely 
one-directional. Indeed, the weight of the evidence in the current record indicates that precisely 
the types of market distortions identified above are taking place with respect to this traffic. For 
example, comments in the record indicate that competitive local exchange carriers (CLECs), on 
average, terminate eighteen times isore traffic than they originate, resulting in annual CLEC 
reciprocal compensation billings ofapproximately two billion dollars, ninety percent of which is 
-
1
 47 U.S.C.§ 251(g). 
8
 Access Charge Reform, CC Docket No. 96-262, First Report and Order, 12 FCC Red 15982, 15998-99 (1997) 
{Access Charge Reform Order), affd, Southwestern Bell Telephone Co. v. FCC, 153 F.3d 523 (8th Cir. 1998). 
4 
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for ISP-bound traffic.9 Moreover, the traffic imbalances for some competitive carriers are in fact 
much greater, with several carriers terminating more than forty times more traffic than they 
originate.10 There is nothing inherently wrong with carriers having substantial traffic imbalances 
arising from a business decision to target specific types of customers. In this case, however, we 
believe that such decisions are driven by regulatory opportunities that disconnect costs from end-
user market decisions. Thus, under the current carrier-to-carrier recovery mechanism, it is 
conceivable that a carrier could serve an ISP free of charge and recover all of its costs from 
originating carriers. This result distorts competition by subsidizing one type of service at the 
expense of others. 
6. Although we believe this arbitrage opportunity is particularly manifest with respect 
to ISP-bound traffic, we suggest in the NPRMthzt any compensation regime based on carrier-to-
carrier payments may create similar market distortions. Accordingly, we initiate an inquiry as to 
whether bill and keep is a more economically efficient compensation scheme than the existing 
carrier-to-carrier payment mechanisms. Alternatively, the record developed in that proceeding 
may suggest modifications to carrier-to-carrier cost recovery mechanisms that address the 
competitive concerns identified above. Based upon the current record, however, bill and keep 
appears the preferable cost recovery mechanism for ISP-bound traffic because it eliminates a 
substantial opportunity for regulatory arbitrage. We do not fully adopt a bill and keep regime in 
this Order, however, because there are specific questions regarding bill and keep that require 
further inquiry, and we believe that a more complete record on these issues is desirable before 
requiring carriers to recover most of their costs from end-users. Because these questions are 
equally relevant to our evaluation of a bill and keep approach for other types of traffic, we will 
consider them in the context of the NPRM. Moreover, we believe that there are significant 
advantages to a global evaluation of the intercarrier compensation mechanisms applicable to 
different types of traffic to ensure a more systematic, symmetrical treatment of these issues. 
7. Because the record indicates a need for immediate action with respect to ISP-
bound traffic, however, in this Order we will implement an interim recovery scheme that: (i) 
moves aggressively to eliminate arbitrage opportunities presented by the existing recovery 
mechanism for ISP-bound by lowering payments and capping growth; and (ii) initiates a 36-month 
transition towards a complete bill and keep recovery mechanism while retaining the ability to 
adopt an alternative mechanism based upon a more extensive evaluation in the NPRM proceeding. 
Specifically, we adopt a gradually declining cap on the amount that carriers may recover from 
9
 See, eg, Letter from Robert T. Blau, BellSouth, to Magalie Roman Salas, Secretary, FCC (November 6, 2000); 
see also Verizon Remand Comments at 2 (Verizon will be billed more than one billion dollars in 2000 for Internet-
bound calls); Letter from Richard J. Metzger, Focal, to Deena Shetler, Legal Advisor to Commissioner Gloria 
Tristani, FCC (Jan. 11, 2001)(ILECs owed $1.98 billion in reciprocal compensation to CLECs in 2000). On June 
23,2000, the Commission released a Public Notice seeking comment on the issues raised by the court's remand. 
See Comment Sought on Remand of the Commission's Reciprocal Compensation Declaratory Ruling by the U.S. 
Court of Appeals for the D.C Circuit, CC Docket Nos. 96-98,99-68, Public Notice, 15 FCC Red 11311 (2000) 
{Public Notice). Comments and reply comments filed in response to the Public Notice are identified herein as 
"Remand Comments" and "Remand Reply Comments," respectively. Comments and replies filed in response the 
1999 Intercarrier Compensation NPRM are identified as "Comments" and "Reply Comments," respectively. 
See, e g, Verizon Remand Comments at 11, 21. 
5 
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other carriers for delivering ISP-bound traffic. We also cap the amount of traffic for which any 
such compensation is owed, in order to eliminate incentives to pursue new arbitrage 
opportunities. In sum, our goal in this Order is decreased reliance by carriers upon carrier-to-
carrier payments and an increased reliance upon recovery of costs from end-users, consistent with 
the tentative conclusion in the NPRMthat bill and keep is the appropriate intercarrier 
compensation mechanism for ISP-bound traffic. In this regard, we emphasize that the rate caps 
we impose are not intended to reflect the costs incurred by each carrier that delivers ISP traffic. 
Some carriers' costs may be higher; some are probably lower. Rather, we conclude, based upon 
all of the evidence in this record, that these rates are appropriate limits on the amounts recovered 
from other carriers and provide a reasonable transition from rates that have (at least until recently) 
typically been much higher. Carriers whose costs exceed these rates are (and will continue to be) 
able to collect additional amounts from their ISP customers. As we note above, and explain in 
more detail below, we believe that such end-user recovery likely is the most efficient mechanism. 
8. The basic structure of this transition is as follows: 
* Beginning on the effective date of this Order, and continuing for six months, 
intercarrier compensation for ISP-bound traffic will be capped at a rate of $.0015/minute-of-
use (mou). Starting in the seventh month, and continuing for eighteen months, the rate will be 
capped at $.0010/mou. Starting in the twenty-fifth month, and continuing through the thirty-
sixth month or until further Commission action (whichever is later), the rate will be capped at 
$.0007/mou. Any additional costs incurred must be recovered from end-users. These rates 
reflect the downward trend in intercarrier compensation rates contained in recently negotiated 
interconnection agreements, suggesting that they are sufficient to provide a reasonable 
transition from dependence on intercarrier payments while ensuring cost recovery. 
* We also impose a cap on total ISP-bound minutes for which a local exchange carrier 
(LEC) may receive this compensation. For the year 2001, a LEC may receive compensation, 
pursuant to a particular interconnection agreement, for ISP-bound minutes up to a ceiling equal 
to, on an annualized basis, the number of ISP-bound minutes for which that LEC was entitled 
to compensation under that agreement during the first quarter of 2001, plus a ten percent 
growth factor. For 2002, a LEC may receive compensation for ISP-bound minutes up to a 
ceiling equal to the minutes for which it was entitled to compensation in 2001, plus another ten 
percent growth factor. In 2003, a LEC may receive compensation for ISP-bound minutes up 
to a ceiling equal to the 2002 ceiling. These caps are consistent with projections of the growth 
of dial-up Internet access for the first two years of the transition and are necessary to ensure 
that such growth does not undermine our goal of limiting intercarrier compensation and 
beginning a transition toward bill and keep. Growth above these caps should be based on a 
carrier's ability to provide efficient service, not on any incentive to collect intercarrier 
payments. 
* Because the transitional rates are caps on intercarrier compensation, they have no 
effect to the extent that states have ordered LECs to exchange ISP-bound traffic either at rates 
below the caps or on a bill and keep basis (or otherwise have not required payment of 
compensation for this traffic). The rate caps are designed to provide a transition toward bill 
and keep, and no transition is necessary for carriers already exchanging traffic at rates below 
the caps. 
6 
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* In order to limit disputes and costly measures to identify ISP-bound traffic, we adopt a 
rebuttable presumption that traffic exchanged between LECs that exceeds a 3:1 ratio of 
terminating to originating traffic is ISP-bound traffic subject to the compensation mechanism 
set forth in this Order. This ratio is consistent with those adopted by state commissions to 
identify ISP or other convergent traffic that is subject to lower intercarrier compensation rates. 
Carriers that seek to rebut this presumption, by showing that traffic above the ratio is not ISP-
bound traffic or, conversely, that traffic below the ratio is ISP-bound traffic, may seek 
appropriate relief from their state commissions pursuant to section 252 of the Act. 
* Finally, the rate caps for ISP-bound traffic (or such lower rates as have been imposed 
by states commissions for the exchange of ISP-bound traffic) apply only if an incumbent LEC 
offers to exchange all traffic subject to section 251(b)(5) at the same rate. An incumbent LEC 
that does not offer to exchange section 251(b)(5) traffic at these rates must exchange ISP-
bound traffic at the state-approved or state-negotiated reciprocal compensation rates reflected 
in their contracts. The record fails to demonstrate that there are inherent differences between 
the costs of delivering a voice call to a local end-user and a data call to an ISP, thus the 
"mirroring" rule we adopt here requires that incumbent LECs pay the same rates for ISP-
bound traffic that they receive for section 251(b)(5) traffic. 
IH. BACKGROUND 
9. In the Declaratory Ruling released on February 26, 1999, we addressed the 
regulatory treatment of ISP-bound traffic. In that order, we reached several conclusions 
regarding the jurisdictional nature of this traffic, and we proposed several approaches to 
intercarrier compensation for ISP-bound traffic in an accompanying Intercarrier Compensation 
NPRM. The order, however, was vacated and remanded on appeal. This Order, therefore, 
again focuses on the regulatory treatment of ISP-bound traffic and the appropriate intercarrier 
compensation regime for carriers that collaborate to deliver traffic to ISPs. 
10. As we noted in the Declaratory Ruling, an ISP's end-user customers typically 
access the Internet through an ISP server located in the same local calHng area. Customers 
generally pay their LEC a flat monthly fee for use of the local exchange network, including 
connections to their local ISP. They also generally pay their ISP a flat monthly fee for access to 
the Internet. ISPs then combine "computer processing, information storage, protocol 
11
 See Bell Atlantic, 206 F.3d 1. 
12
 Declaratory Ruling, 14 FCC Red at J691. 
13
 Declaratory Ruling, 14 FCC Red at 3691. 
14
 Declaratory Ruling, 14 FCC Red at 3691. 
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conversion, and routing with transmission to enable users to access Internet content and 
services." 
11. ISPs, one class of enhanced service providers (ESPs),16 also may utilize LEC 
services to provide their customers with access to the Internet. In the MTS/WATS Market 
Structure Order, the Commission acknowledged that ESPs were among a variety of users of LEC 
interstate access services.17 Since 1983, however, the Commission has exempted ESPs from the 
payment of certain interstate access charges.1 Consequently ESPs, including ISPs, are treated as 
end-users for the purpose of applying access charges and are, therefore, entitled to pay local 
business rates for their connections to LEC central offices and the public switched telephone 
network (PSTN). Thus, despite the Commission's understanding that ISPs use interstate access 
services, pursuant to the ESP exemption, the Commission has permitted ISPs to take service 
under local tariffs. 
12. The 1996 Act set standards for the introduction of competition into the market for 
local telephone service, including requirements for interconnection of competing 
telecommunications carriers.2 As a result of interconnection and growing local competition, 
more than one LEC may be involved in the delivery of telecommunications within a local service 
15
 Declaratory Ruling, 14 FCC Red at 3691 (citing Federal-State Joint Board on Universal Service, CC Docket No. 
96-45, Report to Congress, 13 FCC Red 11501,11531 (1998) (Universal Service Report to Congress)). 
The Commission defines "enhanced services" as "services, offered over common carrier transmission facilities 
used in interstate communications, which employ computer processing applications that act on the format, content, 
code, protocol or similar aspects of the subscriber's transmitted information; provide the subscriber additional, 
different, or restructured information; or involve subscriber interaction with stored information." 47 C.F.R. 
§ 64.702(a). The 1996 Act describes these services as "information services." See 47 U.S.C. § 153(20) 
("information service" refers to the "offering of a capability for generating, acquiring, storing, transforming, 
processing, retrieving, utilizing, or making available information via telecommunications."). See also Universal 
Service Report to Congress, 13 FCC Red at 11516 (the "1996 Act's definitions of telecommunications service and 
information service essentially correspond to the pre-existing categories of basic and enhanced services"). 
17
 MTS and WATS Market Structure, CC Docket No. 78-72, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 97 FCC 2d 682, 
711 (\9S3)(MTS/WATS Market Structure Order)(ES?s are "[a]mong the variety of users of access service" and 
"obtain[] local exchange services or facilities which are used, in part or in whole, for the purpose of completing 
interstate calls which transit [their] location and, commonly, another location."). 
,sThis policy is known as the "ESP exemption." See MTS/WATS Market Structure Order, 97 FCC 2d at 715 
(ESPs have been paying local business service rates for their interstate access and would experience rate shock that 
could affect their viability if full access charges were instead applied); see also Amendments of Part 69 of the 
Commission's Rules Relating to Enhanced Service Providers, CC Docket 87-215, Order, 3 FCC Red 2631, 2633 
(1988) (ESP Exemption Order) ("the imposition of access charges at this time is not appropriate and could cause 
such disruption in this industry segment that provision of enhanced services to the public might be impaired"); 
Access Charge Reform Order, 12 FCC Red at 1613 3 ("[maintaining the existing pricing structure ... avoids 
disrupting the still-evolving information services industry"). 
19
 ESP Exemption Order, 3 FCC Red at 2635 n.8,2637 n.53. See also Access Charge Reform Order, 12 FCC Red 
at 16133-35. 
20
 47 U.S.C.§§ 251-252. 
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area. Section 251(b)(5) of the Act addresses the need for LECs to agree to terms for the mutual 
exchange of traffic over their interconnecting networks. It specifically provides that LECs have 
the duty to "establish reciprocal compensation arrangements for the transport and termination of 
telecommunications."21 The Commission determined, in the Local Competition Order, that 
section 251(b)(5) reciprocal compensation obligations "apply only to traffic that originates and 
terminates within a local area," as defined by state commissions. 
13. As a result of this determination, the question arose whether reciprocal 
compensation obligations apply to the delivery of calls from one LECs end-user customer to an 
ISP in the same local calling area that is served by a competing LEC. The Commission 
determined at that time that resolution of this question turned on whether ISP-bound traffic 
"originates and terminates within a local area," as set forth in our rule. Many competitive LECs 
argued that ISP-bound traffic is local traffic that terminates at the ISP's local server, where a 
second, packet-switched "call" then begins. Thus, they argued, the reciprocal compensation 
obligations of section 251(b)(5) apply to this traffic. Incumbent LECs, on the other hand, argued 
that no reciprocal compensation is due because ISP-bound traffic is interstate telecommunications 
traffic that continues through the ISP server and terminates at the remote Internet sites accessed 
by ISP customers. 
14. The Commission concluded in the Declaratory Ruling that the jurisdictional nature 
of ISP-bound traffic should be determined, consistent with Commission precedent, by the end 
21
 47 U.S.C. § 251(b)(5). 
See Local Competition Order, 11 FCC Red at 16013 ("With the exception of traffic to or from a CMRS network, 
state commissions have the authority to determine what geographic areas should be considered iocal areas' for the 
purpose of applying reciprocal compensation obligations under section 251(b)(5), consistent with the state 
commissions' historical practice of defining local service areas for wireline LECs."); see also 47 C.F.R. 
§ 51.701(b)(l-2). For CMRS traffic, the Commission determined that reciprocal compensation applies to traffic 
that originates and terminates within the same Major Trading Area (MTA). See 47 C.F.R. § 51.701(b)(2). 
See, e.g, Petitions for Reconsideration and Clarification of Action in Rulemaking Proceedings, 61 Fed. Reg. 
53922 (1996); Petition for Partial Reconsideration and Clarification of MFS Communications Co., Inc. at 28; 
Letter from Richard J. Metzger, ALTS, to Regina M. Keeney, Chief, Common Carrier Bureau, FCC (June 20, 
1997); Pleading Cycle Established for Comments on Request by ALTS for Clarification of the Commission's Rules 
Regarding Reciprocal Compensation for Information Service Provider Traffic, CCB/CPD 97-30, DA 97-1399 (rel. 
July 2, 1997); Letter from Edward D. Young and Thomas J. Tauke, Bell Atlantic, to William E. Kennard, 
Chairman, FCC (July 1, 1998). The Commission later directed parties wishing to make ex parte presentations 
regarding the applicability of reciprocal compensation to ISP-bound traffic to make such filings in CC Docket No. 
96-98, the iocal competition proceeding. See Ex Parte Procedures Regarding Requests for Clarification of the 
Commission's Rules Regarding Reciprocal Compensation for Information Service Provider Traffic, CC Docket No. 
96-98, Public Notice, 13 FCC Red. 15568 (1998). 
24
 Declaratory Ruling, 14 FCCTRcd at 3693-94. 
25
 Declaratory Ruling, 14 FCC Red at 3694. 
26
 Declaratory Ruling 14 FCC Red at 3695. 
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points of the communication. Applying this "end-to-end" analysis, the Commission determined 
that Internet communications originate with the ISP's end-user customer and continue beyond the 
local ISP server to websites or other servers and routers that are often located outside of the 
state. The Commission found, therefore, that ISP-bound traffic is not local because it does not 
"originate[] and terminate[] within a local area."29 Instead, it is jurisdictional^ mixed and largely 
interstate, and, for that reason, the Commission found that the reciprocal compensation 
obligations of section 251(b)(5) do not apply to this traffic.30 
15. Despite finding that ISP-bound traffic is largely interstate, the Commission 
concluded that it had not yet established a federal rule to govern intercarrier compensation for this 
traffic. The Commission found that, in the absence of conflicting federal law, parties could 
voluntarily include ISP-bound traffic in their interconnection agreements under sections 251 and 
252 of the Act. It also found that, even though section 251 (b)(5) does not require reciprocal 
compensation for ISP-bound traffic, nothing in the statute or our rules prohibits state 
commissions from determining in their arbitrations that reciprocal compensation for this traffic is 
appropriate, so long as there is no conflict with governing federal law. Pending adoption of a 
federal rule, therefore, state commissions exercising their authority under section 252 to arbitrate, 
interpret, and enforce interconnection agreements would determine whether and how 
interconnecting carriers should be compensated for carrying ISP-bound traffic. In the 
Intercarrier Compensation NPRM accompanying the Declaratory Ruling, the Commission 
requested comment on the most appropriate intercarrier compensation mechanism for ISP-bound 
traffic. 
16. On March 24,2000, prior to release of a decision addressing these issues, the court of 
appeals vacated certain provisions of the Declaratory Ruling and remanded the matter to the 
27
 Declaratory Ruling, 14 FCC Red at 3695-3701; see also Petition for Emergency Relief and Declaratory Ruling 
Filed by BellSouth Corporation, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 7 FCC Red 1619 (1992) (BellSouth 
MemoryCall), affd, Georgia Pub. Serv. Comm 'n v FCC, 5 F.3d 1499 (11th Cir. 1993)(table); Teleconnect Co. v. 
Bell Telephone Co. of Penn., E-88-83, 10 FCC Red 1626 (1995) (Teleconnect), affdsub nom Southwestern Bell 
Tel Co. v. FCC, 116 F.3d 593 (D.C. Cir. 1997). 
28
 Declaratory Ruling, 14 FCCJtcd at 3695-97. 
29
 Declaratory Ruling, 14 FCC Red at 3697. 
30
 Declaratory Ruling, 14 FCCRcd at 3690,3695-3703. 
31
 Declaratory Ruling, 14 FCC Red at 3703. 
32
 Declaratory Ruling 14 FCCJRcd at 3703. 
33
 Declaratory Ruling 14 FCCftcd at 3706. 
34
 Declaratory Ruling, 14 FCC Red at 3703-06. The Commission did recognize, however, that its conclusion that 
ISP-bound traffic is largely interstate might cause some state commissions to re-examine their conclusions that 
reciprocal compensation is due to the extent that those conclusions were based on a finding that this traffic 
terminates at the ISP's server. Id. at 3706. 
35
 Declaratory Ruling 14 FCC Red at 3707-09. 
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Commission.36 The court observed that, although "[t]here is no dispute that the Commission has 
historically been justified in relying on this [end-to-endl method when determining whether a 
particular communication is jurisdictional^ interstate, the Commission had not adequately 
explained why the jurisdictional analysis was dispositive of, or indeed relevant to, the question 
whether a call to an ISP is subject to the reciprocal compensation requirements of section 
251(b)(5).38 The court noted that the Commission had not applied its definition of'termination" 
to its analysis of the scope of section 251(b)(5),39 and the court distinguished cases upon which 
the Commission relied in its end-to-end analysis because they involve continuous communications 
switched by interexchange carriers (IXCs), as opposed to ISPs, the latter of which are not 
telecommunications providers. As an "independent reason" to vacate, the court also held that 
the Commission had failed to address how its conclusions "fit . . . within the governing statute."41 
In particular, the court found that the Commission had failed to explain why ISP-bound traffic 
was not "telephone exchange service," as defined in the Act. 
17. In a public notice released June 23, 2000, the Commission sought comment on the 
issues raised by the court's remand. The Public Notice specifically requested that parties 
comment on the jurisdictional nature of ISP-bound traffic, the scope of the reciprocal 
compensation requirement of section 251(b)(5), and the relevance of the concepts of 
"termination," "telephone exchange service," "exchange access service," and "information 
access."44 It invited parties to update the record by responding to any ex parte presentations filed 
after the close of the reply period on April 27, 1999. It also sought comment on any new or 
innovative intercarrier compensation arrangements for ISP-bound traffic that parties may have 
considered or entered into during the pendency of the proceeding. 
IV. DISCUSSION 
A. Background 
18. The nature and character of communications change over time. Over the last 
decade communications services have been radically altered by the advent of the Internet and the 
See Bell Atlantic, 206 F.3d 1. 
37
 Bell Atlantic, 206 F.3d at 5. 
Bell Atlantic, 206 F.3d at 5; see also id. at 8 (the Commission had not "supplied a real explanation for its 
decision to treat end-to-end analysis as controlling" with respect to the application of section 251(b)(5)). 
39
 See Bell Atlantic, 206 F.3d at 6-7. 
40
 See Bell Atlantic, 206 F.3d at 6-7. 
41
 Bell Atlantic, 206 F.3d at 8. 
42
 Bell Atlantic, 206 F.3d at 8-9; 47 U.SX. § 153(47) (defining "telephone exchange service"). 
43
 Public Notice, 15 FCC Red 11311. 
44
 Id; see also 47 U.S.C. § 251(g); 47 ILS.C. § 153(20). 
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nature of Internet communications. Indeed, the Internet has given rise to new forms of 
communications such as e-mail, instant messaging, and other forms of digital, IP-based services. 
Many of these new services and formats have been layered over and integrated with the existing 
public telephone systems. Most notably, Internet service providers have come into existence in 
order to facilitate mass market access to the Internet. A consumer with access to a standard 
phone line is able to communicate with the Internet, because an ISP converts the analog signal to 
digital and converts the communication to the IP protocol. This allows the user to access the 
global Internet infrastructure and communicate with users and websites throughout the world. In 
a narrowband context, the ISP facilitates access to this global network. 
19. The Commission has struggled with how to treat Internet traffic for regulatory 
purposes, given the bevy of its rules premised on the architecture and characteristics of the mature 
public switched telephone network. For example, Internet consumers may stay on the network 
much longer than the design expectations of a network engineered primarily for voice 
communications. Additionally, the "bursty" nature of packet-switched communications skews the 
traditional assumptions of per minute pricing to which we are all accustomed. The regulatory 
challenges have become more acute as Internet usage has exploded. 
20. The issue of intercarrier compensation for Internet-bound traffic with which we are 
presently wrestling is a manifestation of this growing challenge. Traditionally, telephone carriers 
would interconnect with each other to deliver calls to each other's customers. It was generally 
assumed that traffic back and forth on these interconnected networks would be relatively 
balanced. Consequently, to compensate interconnecting carriers, mechanisms like reciprocal 
compensation were employed, whereby the carrier whose customer initiated the call would pay 
the other carrier the costs of using its network. 
21. Internet usage has distorted the traditional assumptions because traffic to an ISP 
flows exclusively in one direction, creating an opportunity for regulatory arbitrage and leading to 
uneconomical results. Because traffic to ISPs flows one way, so does money in a reciprocal 
compensation regime. It was not long before some LECs saw the opportunity to sign up ISPs as 
customers and collect, rather than pay, compensation because ISP modems do not generally call 
anyone in the exchange. In some instances, this led to classic regulatory arbitrage that had two 
troubling effects: (1) it created incentives^br inefficient entry of LECs intent on serving ISPs 
exclusively and not offering viable local telephone competition, as Congress had intended to 
facilitate with the 1996 Act; (2) the large one-way flows of cash made it possible for LECs 
serving ISPs to afford to pay their own customers to use their services, potentially driving ISP 
rates to consumers to uneconomical levels; These effects prompted the Commission to consider 
the nature of ISP-bound traffic and to examine whether there was any flexibility under the statute 
to modify and address the pricing mechanisms for this traffic, given that there is a federal statutory 
provision authorizing reciprocal compensation. In the Declaratory Ruling, the Commission 
45
 See digital Economy 2000, U.S. Department of Commerce (June 2000) ("Three hundred million people now use 
the Internet, compared to three million in 1994.") 
46
 47 U.S.C.§ 251(b)(5). 
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concluded that Internet-bound traffic was jurisdictional^ interstate and, thus, not subject to 
section 251(b)(5). 
22. In Bell Atlantic, the court of appeals vacated the Declaratory Ruling and 
remanded the case to the Commission to determine whether ISP-bound traffic is subject to 
statutory reciprocal compensation requirements. The court held that the Commission failed to 
explain adequately why LECs did not have a duty to pay reciprocal compensation under section 
251(b)(5) of the Act and remanded the case to the Commission. 
B. Statutory Analysis 
23. In this section, we reexamine our findings in the Declaratory Ruling and conclude 
that ISP-bound traffic is not subject to the reciprocal compensation requirement in section 251(b) 
because of the carve-out provision in section 251(g), which excludes several enumerated 
categories of traffic from the universe of "telecommunications" referred to in section 251(b)(5). 
We explain our rationale and the interrelationship between these two statutory provisions in more 
detail below. We further conclude that section 251(i) affirms the Commission's role in continuing 
to develop appropriate pricing and compensation mechanisms for traffic - such as Internet-bound 
traffic — that travels over convergent, mixed, and new types of network architectures. 
1. Introduction 
24. In the Local Competition Order, the Commission determined that the reciprocal 
compensation provisions of section 251(b)(5) applied only to what it termed "local" traffic rather 
than to the transport and termination of interexchange traffic. 7 In the subsequent Declaratory 
Ruling, the Commission focused its discussion on whether ISP-bound traffic terminated within a 
local calling area such as to be properly considered "local" traffic. To resolve that issue, the 
Commission focused predominantly on an end-to-end jurisdictional analysis. 
25. On review, the court accepted (without necessarily endorsing) the Commission's 
view that traffic was either "local" or "long distance" but faulted the Commission for failing to 
explain adequately why ISP-bound traffic was more properly categorized as long distance, rather 
than local. The Commission had attempted to do so by employing an end-to-end jurisdictional 
analysis of ISP traffic, rather than by evaluating the traffic under the statutory definitions of 
"telephone exchange service" and "exchange access." After acknowledging that the Commission 
"has historically been justified in relying on" end-to-end analysis for determining: whether a 
communication is jurisdictionally interstate, the court stated: "But [the Commission] has yet to 
provide an explanation of why this inquiry is relevant to discerning whether a call to an ISP 
should fit within the local call model of two collaborating LECs or the long-distance model of a 
long-distance carrier collaborating with two LECs."48 After reviewing the manner in which the 
Commission analyzed the parameters of section 251(b)(5) traffic in the Declaratory Ruling, the 
Local Competition Order, 11 FCC Red at 16012. 
Bell Atlantic, 206 F3d at 5. 
13 
Federal Communications Commission FCC 01-13! 
court found that the central issue was "whether a call to an ISP is local or long distance.' The 
court noted further that "[njeither category fits clearly." 
26. Upon further review, we find that the Commission erred in focusing on the nature 
of the service (/.e., local or long distance) and in stating that there were only two forms of 
telecommunications services — telephone exchange service and exchange access - for purposes of 
interpreting the relevant scope of section 251(b)(5). ' Those services are the only two expressly 
defined by the statute. The court found fault in the Commission's failure to analyze 
communications delivered by a LEC to an ISP in terms of these definitions.52 Moreover, it cited 
the Commission's own confusing treatment of ISP-bound traffic as local under the ESP 
exemption and interstate for jurisdictional purposes.53 
27. Part of the ambiguity identified by the court appears to arise from the ESP 
exemption, a long-standing Commission policy that affords one class of entities using interstate 
access — information service providers — the option of purchasing interstate access services on a 
flat-rated basis from intrastate local business tariffs, rather than from interstate access tariffs used 
by IXCs. Typically, information service providers have used this exemption to their advantage by 
choosing to pay local business rates, rather than the tariffed interstate access charges that other 
users of interstate access are required to pay.54 In fending off challenges from those who argued 
that information service providers must be subject to access charges because they provide 
interexchange service, the Commission has often tried to walk the subtle line of arguing that the 
service provided by the LEC to the information service provider is an access service, but can 
justifiably be treated as akin to local telephone exchange service for purposes of the rates the LEC 
may charge. This balancing act reflected the historical view that there were only two kinds of 
intercarrier compensation: one for local telephone exchange service, and a second (access 
charges) for long distance services. Attempting to describe a hybrid service (the nature being an 
access service, but subject to a compensation mechanism historically limited to local service) was 
always a bit of mental gymnastics. 
28. The court opinion underscores a tension between the jurisdictional nature of ISP-
bound traffic, which the Commission has long held to be interstate, and the alternative 
compensation mechanism that the ESP exemption has permitted for this traffic. The court seems 
to recognize that, if an end-to-end analysis were properly applied to this traffic, this traffic-would 






 Id at 8. 
52




 Significantly, however, the compensation mechanism effected for this predominantly interstate access traffic is 
the result of a federal mandate, which requires states to treat ISP-bound traffic for compensation purposesiirta 
manner similar to local traffic if ISPs so request. See infra note 105. 
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traffic should be considered "local" for purposes of section 251(b)(5) in light of the ESP 
exemption, by which the Commission has allowed information service providers at their option to 
be treated for compensation purposes (but not for jurisdictional purposes) as end-users. 
29. The court also expresses consternation over what it perceives as an inconsistency 
in the Commission's reasoning. On the one hand, the court observes, the Commission has argued 
that calls to ISPs are predominantly interstate for jurisdictional purposes because they terminate at 
the ultimate destination of the traffic in a distant website or e-mail server (i.e., the "one call 
theory"). On the other hand, the court notes, the Commission has defended the ESP exemption 
by analogizing an ISP to a high-volume business user, such as a pizza parlor or travel agent, that 
has different usage patterns and longer call holding times than the average customer. The court 
questioned whether any such differences should not, as some commenters argued, lend support to 
treating this traffic as "local" for purposes of section 251(b)(5). As discussed in further detail 
below, while we continue to believe that retaining the ESP exemption is important in order to 
facilitate growth of Internet services, we conclude in section IV.C.l, infra, that reciprocal 
compensation for ISP-bound traffic distorts the development of competitive markets. 
30. We respond to the court's concerns, and seek to resolve these tensions, by 
reexamining the grounds for our conclusion that ISP-bound traffic falls outside the scope of 
section 251(b)(5). A more comprehensive review of the statute reveals that Congress intended to 
exempt certain enumerated categories of service from section 251(b)(5) when the service was 
provided to interexchange carriers or information service providers. The exemption focuses not 
only on the nature of the service, but on to whom the service is provided. For services that 
qualify, compensation is based on rules, regulations, and policies that preceded the 1996 Act and 
not on section 251(b)(5), which was minted by the Act. As we explain more fully below, the 
service provided by LECs to deliver traffic to an ISP constitutes, at a minimum, "information 
access" under section 251(g) and, thus, compensation for this service is not governed by section 
251(b)(5), but instead by the Commission's policies for this traffic and the rules adopted under its 
section 201 authority.56 
Access Charge Reform Order, 12 FCC Red at 16134 ("Internet access does generate different usage patterns and 
longer call holding times than average voice usage."). 
Some critics of the Commission's order may contend that we rely here on the same reasoning that the court 
rejected in Bell Atlantic. We acknowledge that there is a superficial resemblance between the Commission's 
previous order and this one: Here, as before, the Commission finds that ISP-bound traffic falls outside the scope of 
section 251(b)(5)'s reciprocal compensation requirement and within the Commission's access charge jurisdiction 
under section 201(b). The rationale underlying the two orders, however, differs substantially. Here the 
Commission bases its conclusion that ISP-bound traffic falls outside section 251(b)(5) on its construction of 
sections 251(g) and (i) -- not, as in the previous order, on the theory that section 251(b)(5) applies only to "local" 
telecommunications traffic and that ISP-bound traffic is interstate. Furthermore, _to the extent the Commission 
continues to characterize ISP-bound traffic as interstate for purposes of its section 201 authority, it has sought in 
this Order to address in detail the Bell Atlantic court's concerns. 
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2. Section 251(g) Excludes Certain Categories of Traffic from the Scope 
of "Telecommunications" Subject to Section 251(b)(5) 
a. Background 
31. Section 251(b)(5) imposes a duty on all local exchange carriers to "establish 
reciprocal compensation arrangements for the transport and termination of 
telecommunications. On its face, local exchange carriers are required to establish reciprocal 
compensation arrangements for the transport and termination of all "telecommunications" they 
exchange with another telecommunications carrier, without exception. The Act separately defines 
"telecommunications" as the "transmission, between or among points specified by the user, of 
information of the user's choosing, without change in the form or content of the information as 
sent and received."5 
32. Unless subject to further limitation, section 251(b)(5) would require reciprocal 
compensation for transport and termination of all telecommunications traffic, — i.e., whenever a 
local exchange carrier exchanges telecommunications traffic with another carrier. Farther down in 
section 251, however, Congress explicitly exempts certain telecommunications services from the 
reciprocal compensation obligations. Section 251(g) provides: 
On or after the date of enactment of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, each 
local exchange carrier... shall provide exchange access, information access, and 
exchange services for such access to interexchange carriers and information service 
providers in accordance with the same equal access and nondiscriminatory 
interconnection restrictions and obligations (including receipt of compensation) 
that apply to such carrier on the date immediately preceding the date of enactment 
of the Telecommunications Act of 1996 under any court order, consent decree, or 
regulation, order, or policy of the [Federal Communications] Commission, until 
such restrictions and obligations are explicitly superseded by regulations prescribed 
by the Commission after such date of enactment 
33. The meaning of section 251 (g) is admittedly not transparent. Indeed, section 
251(g) clouds any plain reading of section 251(b)(5). Nevertheless, the Commission believes the 
two provisions caaie read together consistently and in a manner faithful to Congress's intent.60 
57
 47 U.S.G§ 251(b)(5)-. 
5847U.S.C.§153(43)r 
59
 47 U.S.C. § 251(g) (emphasis added). 
60
 See AT&T Corp. v. tewa Wis. Bd., 525 U.S. 366, 397 (1999)("It would be a gross understatement to say that the 
Telecommunications Act of 1996 is not a model of clarity. It is in many important respects a model of ambiguity 
or indeed evert self-contradiction But Congress is well aware that the ambiguities it chooses to produce in a 
statute will be resolvecTby the implementing agency We can only enforce the clear limits that the 1996 Act 
contains."). 
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b. Discussion 
34. We conclude that a reasonable reading of the statute is that Congress intended to 
exclude the traffic listed in subsection (g) from the reciprocal compensation requirements of 
subsection (b)(5). Thus, the statute does not mandate reciprocal compensation for "exchange 
access, information access, and exchange services for such access" provided to IXCs and 
information service providers. Because we interpret subsection (g) as a carve-out provision, the 
focus of our inquiry is on the universe of traffic that falls within subsection (g) and not the 
universe of traffic that falls within subsection (b)(5). This analysis differs from our analysis in the 
Local Competition Order, in which we attempted to describe the universe of traffic that falls 
within subsection (b)(5) as all "local" traffic. We also refrain from generically describing traffic as 
"local" traffic because the term "local," not being a statutorily defined category, is particularly 
susceptible to varying meanings and, significantly, is not a term used in section 251(b)(5) or 
section 251(g). 
35. We agree with the court that the issue before us requires more than just a 
jurisdictional analysis. Indeed, as the court recognized, the 1996 Act changed the historic 
relationship between the states and the federal government with respect to pricing matters." 
Instead, we focus upon the statutory language of section 251(b) as limited by 251(g). We believe 
this approach is not only consistent with the statute, but that it resolves the concerns expressed by 
the court in reviewing our previous analysis. Central to our modified analysis is the recognition 
that 251(g) is properly viewed as a limitation on the scope of section 251(b)(5) and that ISP-
bound traffic falls under one or more of the categories set forth in section 251(g). For that 
reason, we conclude that ISP-bound traffic is not subject to the reciprocal compensation 
provisions of section 251(b)(5). We reach that conclusion regardless of the compensation 
mechanism that may be in place for such traffic under the ESP exemption. 
36. We believe that the specific provisions of section 251(g) demonstrate that 
Congress did not intend to interfere with the Commission's pre-Act authority over 
"nondiscriminatory interconnection . . . obligations (including receipt of compensation)"63 with 
respect to "exchange access, information access, and exchange services for such access" provided 
to IXCs or information service providers. We conclude that Congress specifically exempted the 
In the Declaratory Ruling, the Commission did not explain the relevance of section 251(g) nor discuss the 
categories of traffic exempted from reciprocal compensation by that provision, at least until the Commission should 
act otherwise. Reflecting this omission in the underlying order, the Bell Atlantic court does not mention the 
relationship of sections 251(g) and 251(b)(5), nor-the enumerated categories of services referenced by subsection 
(g). Rather, the court focuses its review on the possible categorization of ISP-bound traffic as "local," terminology 
we now find inappropriate in light of the more express statutory language set forth in section 251(g). 
62
 Bell Atlantic, 206 F.3d at 6; see also AT&T Corp. v. Iowa Utils. Bd, 525 U.S. at 377-87. 
Authority over rates (or "receipt of compensation") is a core feature of "equal access and nondiscriminatory 
interconnection" obligations. Indeed, one of the Commission's primary goals when designing an access charge 
regime was to ensure that access users were treated in a nondiscriminatory manner when interconnecting with 
LEC networks in order to transport interstate communications. See National Ass yn of Regulatory Util Comm 'nrs 
v. FCC, 737 F.2d 1095, 1101-1108, 1130-34 (D.C. Cir. 1984), cert, denied, 469 U.S. 1227 (1%5)(NARUC v. 
FCC). 
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services enumerated under section 251(g) from the newly imposed reciprocal compensation 
requirement in order to ensure that section 251(b)(5) is not interpreted to override either existing 
or future regulations prescribed by the Commission.64 We also find that ISP-bound traffic falls 
within at least one of the three enumerated categories in subsection (g). 
37. This limitation in section 251(g) makes sense when viewed in the overall context 
of the statute. All of the services specified in section 251(g) have one thing in common: they are 
all access services or services associated with access. Before Congress enacted the 1996 Act, 
LECs provided access services to IXCs and to information service providers in order to connect 
calls that travel to points - both interstate and intrastate - beyond the local exchange. In turn, 
both the Commission and the states had in place access regimes applicable to this traffic, which 
they have continued to modify over time. It makes sense that Congress did not intend to disrupt 
these pre-existing relationships.66 Accordingly, Congress excluded all such access traffic from the 
purview of section 251(b)(5). 
64
 This view is consistent with previous Commission orders construing section 251(g). The Commission 
recognized in the Advanced Services Remand Order, for example, that section 251(g) preserves the requirements 
of the AT&T Consent Decree (see United States v AT&T, 552 F. Supp. 131 (D.D.C. I982)(hereinafter AT&T 
Consent Decree or Modification of Final Judgment ("MFJ"), but that order does not conclude that section 251(g) 
preserves only MFJ requirements. Deployment of Wireline Services Offering Advanced Telecommunications 
Capability, CC Docket No. 98-147 et al., Order on Remand, 15 FCC Red 385,407 (\999)(Advanced Services 
Remand Order). Indeed, the ultimate issue addressed in that part of the order was not the status or scope of section 
251(g) as a carve-out provision at all, but rather the question ~ irrelevant for our purposes here — whether 
"information access" is a category of service that is mutually exclusive of "exchange access," as the latter term is 
defined in section 3(16) of the Act. See id. at 407-08; see also infra para. 42 & note 76. By contrast, when the 
Commission first addressed the scope of the reciprocal compensation obligations of section 251(b)<5) in the Local 
Competition Order, it expressly cited section 251(g) in support of the decision to exempt from those obligations the 
tariffed interstate access services provided by all LECs (not just Bell companies subject to the MFJ) to 
interexchange carriers. 11 FCC Red at 16013. The Bell Atlantic court did not take issue with the Commission's 
earlier conclusion that section 251(b)(5) is so limited. 206 F3d at 4. The interpretation we adopt here ~ that 
section 251(g) exempts from section 251(b)(5) information access services provided to information service 
providers, as well as access provided to IXCs - thus is fully consistent with the Commission's initial construction 
of section 251(g), in the Local Competition Order, as extending beyond the MFJ to our own access rules and 
policies. 
65
 The term "exchange service" as used in section 251(g) is not defined in the Act or in the MFJ. Rather, the term 
"exchange service" is used in the MFJ as part of the definition of the term "exchange access," which the MFJ 
defines as "the provision of exchange services for the purpose of originating or terminating interexchange 
telecommunications." United States v. AT&T, 552 F. Supp. at 228. Thus, the term "exchange service" appears to 
mean, in context, the provision of services in connection with interexchange communications. Consistent with 
that, in section 251(g), the term is used as part of the longer phrase "exchange services for such [exchange] access 
to interexchange carriers and information service providers." The phrasing in section 251(g) thus parallels the 
MFJ. All of this indicates that the term "exchange service" is closely related to the provision of exchange access 
and information access. 
66
 Although section 251(g) does not itself compel this outcome with respect to intrastate access regimes (because it 
expressly preserves only the Commission's traditional policies and authority over interstate access services), it 
nevertheless highlights an ambiguity in the scope of "telecommunications" subject to section 251(b)(5) -
demonstrating that the term must be construed in light of other provisions in the statute. In this regard, we again 
conclude that it is reasonable to interpret section 251(b)(5) to exclude traffic subject to parallel intrastate access 
(continued....) 
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38. At least one court has already affirmed the principle that the standards and 
obligations set forth in section 251 are not intended automatically to supersede the Commission's 
authority over the services enumerated under section 251(g). This question arose in the Eighth 
Circuit Court of Appeals with respect to the access that LECs provide to IXCs to originate and 
terminate interstate long-distance calls. Citing section 251(g), the court concluded that the Act 
contemplates that "LECs will continue to provide exchange access to IXCs for long-distance 
service, and continue to receive payment, under the pre-Act regulations and rates." 7 In CompTel, 
the IXCs had argued that the interstate access services that LECs provide properly fell within the 
scope of "interconnection" under section 251(c)(2), and that, notwithstanding the carve-out of 
section 251(g), access charges therefore should be governed by the cost-based standard of section 
252(d)(1), rather than determined under the Commission's section 201 authority. The Eighth 
Circuit rejected that argument, holding that access service does not fall within the scope of section 
251(c)(2), and observing that "it is clear from the Act that Congress did not intend all access 
charges to move to cost-based pricing, at least not immediately."68 Neither the court nor the 
parties in CompTel distinguished between the situation in which one LEC provides access service 
(directly linking the end-user to the IXC) and the situation here in which two LECs collaborate to 
provide access to either an information service provider or IXC. In both circumstances, by its 
underlying rationale, CompTel serves as precedent for establishing that pre-existing regulatory 
treatment of the services enumerated under section 251(g) are carved out from the purview of 
section 251(b). 
39. Accordingly, unless and until the Commission by regulation should determine 
otherwise, Congress preserved the pre-Act regulatory treatment of all the access services 
enumerated under section 251(g). These services thus remain subject to Commission jurisdiction 
under section 201 (or, to the extent they are z>rtrastate services, they remain subject to the 
jurisdiction of state commissions), whether those obligations implicate pricing policies as in 
CompTel or reciprocal compensation. This analysis properly applies to the access services that 
incumbent LECs provide (either individually or jointly with other local carriers) to connect 
subscribers with ISPs for Internet-bound traffic. Section 251(g) expressly preserves the 
Commission's rules and policies governing "access . . . to information service providers" in the 
same manner as rules and policies governing access to IXCs.70 As we discuss in more detail 
(Continued from previous page) 
regulations, because "it would be incongruous to conclude that Congress was concerned about the effects of 
potential disruption to the interstate access charge system, but had no such concerns about the effects on analogous 
intrastate mechanisms." Local Competition Order, 11 FCC Red at 15869. 
CompTel, 117 F.3d at 1073 (emphasis added). The court continued that the Commission would be free under 
section_201 to alter its traditional regulatory treatment of interstate access service in the future, but that the 
standards set out in sections 251 and 252 would not be controlling. Id 
68
 CompTel, 117 FJd at 1072 (emphasis added). 
For further discussion of the jurisdictionally interstate nature of ISP-bound traffic, see infra paras. 55-64. See 
also NARUC v. FCC, 737 F.2d at 1136 (determining that traffic to ESPs may properly constitute interstate access 
traffic^ Access Billing Requirements for Joint Service Provision, CC Docket 87-579, Memorandum Opinion and 
Order, 4^FCC Red 7183 (1989). 
The Commission has historically dictated the pricing policies applicable to.services provided by LECs to 
information service providers, although those policies differ from those applicable to LEC provision of access 
(continued....) 
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below, ISP-bound traffic falls under the rubric of "information access/' a legacy term carried over 
from the MFJ.71 
40. By its express terms, of course, section 251(g) permits the Commission to 
supersede pre-Act requirements for interstate access services. Therefore the Commission may 
make an affirmative determination to adopt rules that subject such traffic to obligations different 
than those that existed pre-Act. For example, consistent with that authority, the Commission has 
previously made the affirmative determination that certain categories of interstate access traffic 
should be subject to section 251(c)(4).72 Similarly, in implementing section 251(c)(3), the 
Commission has required incumbent LECs to unbundle certain network elements used in the 
provision of xDSL-based services.73 In this instance, however, for the reasons set forth below,74 
we decline to modify the restraints imposed by section 251(g) and instead continue to regulate 
ISP-bound traffic under section 201. 
41. Some may argue that, although the Commission did not analyze subsection (g) in 
the Declaratory Ruling, a passing reference to section 251(g) in one paragraph of the 
Commission's brief filed with the court in that proceeding suggests that the argument we make 
here has been specifically rejected by the court. We disagree. Because our analysis of subsection 
(g) was not raised in the order, the court, under established precedent, probably did not consider 
(Continued from previous page) 
services to IXCs. Prior to the 1996 Act, it was the Commission that determined that ESPs either may purchase 
their interstate access services from interstate tariffs or (at their discretion) pay a combination of local business line 
rates, the federal subscriber line charges associated with those business lines, and, where appropriate, the federal 
special access surcharge. See note 105, infra. We conclude that section 251(g) preserves our ability to continue to 
dictate the pricing policies applicable to this category of traffic. We do not believe, moreover, that section 251(g) 
extends only to those specific carriers providing service on February 7,1996. At the very least, subsection (g) is 
ambiguous on this point. On the one hand, the first sentence of this provision states that its terms apply to "each 
local exchange carrier, to the extent that it provides wireline services," without regard to whether it may be a BOC 
or a competitive LEC. 47 U.S.C. § 251(g). On the other hand, that same sentence refers to restrictions and 
obligations applicable to "such carrier" prior to February 8, 1996. Id. We believe that the most reasonable 
interpretation of that sentence, in this context, is that subsection (g) was intended to preserve pre-existing 
regulatory treatment for the enumerated categories of carriers, rather than requiring disparate treatment depending 
upon whether the LEC involved came into existence before or after February 1996. 
71
 See UnitedStates v AT&T, 552 F. Supp. at 229; Advanced Services Remand Order, 15 FCC Red at 406-08. 
72
 See Deployment of Wireline Services Offering Advanced Telecommunications Capability, CC-Docket No. 98-
147, Second-Report and Order, 14 FCC Red 19237 (1997), petition for review pending, Ass 'n of Communications 
Enterprises v. K7C, D.C. Circuit No. 00-1144. In effect, we have provided for concurrent author^ under that 
provision an&section 201 by permitting a party to purchase the same service under filed tariffs or4o proceed under 
interconnection arrangements to secure resale services. 
73
 See Implementation of the Local Competition Provisions in the Telecommunications Act of 1996, CC Docket 
No. 96-98, Third Report and Order and Fourth Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 15 FCC Red 3696,3775 
(1999). See also Advanced Services Remand Order, 15 FCC Red at 385,386. We emphasize that these two 
examples are illustrative and may not be the only instances^vhere the Commission chooses to supersede pre-Act 
requirements for interstate access services. 
74
 See infra paras. 67-71. 
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the argument when rendering its decision. Indeed, subsection (g) is not mentioned in the court's 
opinion. 
3. ISP-Bound Traffic Falls within the Categories Enumerated in Section 
251(g) 
42. Having determined that section 251(g) serves as a limitation on the scope of 
"telecommunications" embraced by section 251(b)(5), the next step in our inquiry is to determine 
whether ISP-bound traffic falls within one or more of the categories specified in section 251(g): 
exchange access, information access, and exchange services for such access provided to IXCs and 
information service providers. Regardless of whether this traffic falls under the category of 
"exchange access" — an issue pending before the D.C. Circuit in a separate proceeding - - we 
conclude that this traffic, at a minimum, falls under the rubric of "information access," a legacy 
term imported into the 1996 Act from the MFJ, but not expressly defined in the Communications 
Act. 
a. Background 
43. Section 251(g) by its terms indicates that, in the provision of exchange access, 
information access, and exchange services for such access to IXCs and information service 
providers, various pre-existing requirements and obligations "including receipt of compensation" 
are preserved, whether these obligations stem from "any court order, consent decree, or 
regulation, order or policy of the Commission." (Emphasis added.) Similarly, in discussing this 
provision, the Joint Explanatory Statement of the Committee of Conference explicitly refers to 
preserving the obligations under the "AT&T Consent Decree," 
b. Discussion 
44. We conclude that Congress's reference to "information access" in section 251(g) 
was intended to incorporate the meaning of the phrase "information access" as used in the AT&T 
Consent Decree.78 The ISP-bound traffic at issue here falls within that category because it is 
0
 See, eg, SEC v. Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. 80, 88 (1943). 
See Worldcom, Inc. v. FCC, No. 00-1022 et al. (D.C. Cirr). In that proceeding, the Commission has argued that 
the category previously labeled "information access" undenthe MFJ is a subset of those services now falling under 
the category "exchange access" as set forth in section 3(16}jof the Act, 47 U.S.C. 153(16), while incumbent LECs 
and others have argued that the two categories are mutually-exclusive. We need not reargue here whether 
"information access" is a subset of "exchange access" or whether instead they are mutually exclusive categories. 
The only issue relevant to our section 251(g) inquiry in this=case is whether ISP-bound traffic falls, at a minimum, 
within the legacy category of "information access." Both the Commission and incumbent LECs have agreedthat 
the access provided toJSPs satisfies the definition of information access. 
7
 Joint Explanatory Statement of the Committee of Conference, S. Conf. Rep. No. 230, 104th Cong., 2d Session at 
123 (February 1, 1996). 
78
 United States v. AT&T, 552 F. Supp. at 196, 229. 
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traffic destined for an information service provider.79 Under the consent decree, "information 
access" was purchased by "information service providers" and was defined as "the provision of 
specialized exchange telecommunications services . . . in connection with the origination, 
termination, transmission, switching, forwarding or routing of telecommunications traffic to or 
from the facilities of a provider of information services."80 We conclude that this definition of 
"information access" was meant to include all access traffic that was routed by a LEC "to or 
from" providers of information services, of which ISPs are a subset.81 The record in this 
82 
proceeding also supports our interpretation. When Congress passed the 1996 Act, it adopted 
new terminology. The term "information access" is not, therefore, part of the new statutory 
framework. Because the legacy term "information access" in section 251(g) encompasses ISP-
bound traffic, however, this traffic is excepted from the scope of the "telecommunications" subject 
to reciprocal compensation under section 251(b)(5). 
45. We recognize, as noted earlier, that based on the rationale of the Declaratory 
Ruling, the court indicated that the question whether this traffic was "local or interstate" was 
critical to a determination of whether ISP-bound traffic should be subject to reciprocal 
compensation. We believe that the court's assessment was a result of our statement in 
See Letter from Gary L. Phillips, SBC, to Jon Nuechterlein, Deputy General Counsel, FCC, at 9 (Dec. 14, 
2000)(stating that section 251(g) applies by its very terms to "information access"). 
80
 United States v. AT&T, 552 F. Supp. at 196, 229. 
81
 This finding is consistent with our past statements on the issue. In the Non-Accounting Safeguards Order, we 
found that the access that LECs provide to enhanced service providers, including ISPs, constitutes "information 
access" as the MFJ defines that term. Implementation of the Non-Accounting Safeguards of Sections 271 and 272 
of the Communications Act, CC Docket No. 96-149, First Report and Order and Further Notice of Proposed 
Rulemaking, 11 FCC Red 21905, 22024 & n.621 (1996> Although we subsequently overruled our statement in 
that order that ISPs do not also purchase "exchange access" under section 3(16), we have not altered our finding 
that the access provided to enhanced service providers (including ISPs) is "information access." Advanced 
Services Remand Order, 15 FCC Red at 404-05. 
82
 See, e.g., Letter from Gary L. Phillips, SBC, to Jon Nuechterlein, Deputy General Counsel, FCC, at 9 (Dec. 14, 
2000). Some have argued that "information access" includes only certain specialized functions unique to the needs 
of enhanced service providers and does not include basic telecommunications links used to provide enhanced 
service providers with access to the LEC network. See, e.g., Brief of WorldCom, Inc., D.C. Circuit No. 00-1002, 
et al, filedLOct. 3, 2000, at 16 n.12. The MFJ definition of information-access, however, includes the 
telecommunications links used for the "origination, termination, [and] transmission" of information services, and 
"where necessary, the provision of network signalling" and other functions. United States v. AT&T, 552 F. Supp. 
at 229 (emphasis added). Others have argued that the "information access" definition engrafts a geographic 
limitation that renders this service category a subset of telephone exchange service. See Letter from Richard 
Rindler, Swindler, Berlin, to Magalie Roman Salas, Secretary, FCC, at3 (Apr. 12, 2001). We reject that strained 
interpretation. Although it is true that "information access" is necessarSy initiated "in an exchange area," the MFJ 
definition-states that the service is provided "in connection with the origination, termination, transmission, 
switching, forwarding or routing of telecommunications traffic to or from the facilities of a provider of information 
services" United States v. AT&T, 552 F. Supp. at 229 (emphasis added)^ Significantly, the definition does not 
further require that the transmission, once handed over to the information service provider, terminate within the 
same exchange area in which the information service provider first received the access traffic. 
83
 Bell Atlantic, 206 F.3d at 5. 
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paragraph nine of the Declaratory Ruling that "when two carriers collaborate to complete a local 
call, the originating carrier is compensated by its end user and the terminating carrier is entitled to 
reciprocal compensation pursuant to section 251(b)(5) of the Act."84 We were mistaken to have 
characterized the issue in that manner, rather than properly (and more naturally) interpreting the 
scope of "telecommunications" within section 251(b)(5) as being limited by section 251(g). By 
indicating that all "local calls," however defined, would be subject to reciprocal compensation 
obligations under the Act, we overlooked the interplay between these two inter-related provisions 
of section 251 — subsections (b) and (g). Further, we created unnecessary ambiguity for 
ourselves, and the court, because the statute does not define the term "local call," and thus that 
term could be interpreted as meaning either traffic subject to local rates or traffic that is 
jurisdictionally intrastate. In the context of ISP-bound traffic, as the court observed, our use of 
the term "local" created a tension that undermined the prior order because the ESP exemption 
permitted ISPs to purchase access through local business tariffs, yet the jurisdictional nature of 
this traffic has long been recognized as interstate. 
46. For similar reasons, we modify our analysis and conclusion in the Local 
Competition Order. There we held that "[transport and termination of local traffic for 
purposes of reciprocal compensation are governed by sections 251(b)(5) and 251(d)(2)." We 
now hold that the telecommunications subject to those provisions are all such telecommunications 
not excluded by section 251(g). In the Local Competition Order, as in the subsequent 
Declaratory Ruling, use of the phrase "local traffic" created unnecessary ambiguities, and we 
correct that mistake here. 
47. We note that the exchange of traffic between LECs and commercial mobile radio 
service (CMRS) providers is subject to a slightly different analysis. In the Local Competition 
Order, the Commission noted its jurisdiction to regulate LEC-CMRS interconnection under 
section 332 of the Act87 but decided, at its option, to apply sections 251 and 252 to LEC-CMRS 
interconnection.88 At that time, the Commission declined to delineate the precise contours of or 
the relationship between its jurisdiction over LEC-CMRS interconnection under sections 251 and 
332,89 but it made clear that it was not rejecting section 332 as an independent basis for 
jurisdiction.90 The Commission went on to conclude that section 251(b)(5) obligations extend to 
traffic transmitted between LECs and CMRS providers, because the latter are telecommurrications 
Declaratory Ruling, 14 FCC Red at 3695 (emphasis added). 
This is the compensation mechanism chosen by the ISPs. See note 105, infra. 
86
 Local Competition Order, 11 FCC Red at 1033-34. 
07 
47 US.C. § 332; Local Competition Order, 11 FCC Red at 16005-06. 
88
 Local Competition Order, 11 FCC Red at 16005-06; see also Iowa Wis. Bd v FCC, 120 F.3d at 800 n. 21 
(finding that the Commission had jurisdiction under section 332 to issue rules regarding LEC-CMRS 
interconnection, including reciprocal compensation rules). 
89 
We seek comment on these issues in the NPRM. 
90
 Local Competition Order, 11 FCC Red at 16005. 
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carriers.91 The Commission also held that reciprocal compensation, rather than interstate or 
intrastate access charges, applies to LEC-CMRS traffic that originates and terminates within the 
same Major Trading Area (MTA).92 In so holding, the Commission expressly relied on its 
"authority under section 251(g) to preserve the current interstate access charge regime" to ensure 
that interstate access charges would be assessed only for traffic "currently subject to interstate 
access charges,"93 although the Commission's section 332 jurisdiction could serve as an 
alternative basis to reach this result. Thus the analysis we adopt in this Order, that section 251(g) 
limits the scope of section 251(b)(5), does not affect either the application of the latter section to 
LEC-CMRS interconnection or our jurisdiction over LEC-CMRS interconnection under section 
332. 
4. Section 251(i) Preserves the Commission's Authority to Regulate 
Interstate Access Services 
48. Congress also included a "savings provision" - subpart (i) - in section 251, which 
provides that "[n]othing in this section shall be construed to limit or otherwise affect the 
Commission's authority under section 201." Under section 201, the Commission has the 
authority to regulate the interstate access services that LECs provide to connect end-users with 
IXCs or information service providers to originate and terminate calls that travel across state 
lines. 
49. We conclude that subpart (i) provides additional support for our finding that 
Congress has granted us the authority on a going-forward basis to establish a compensation 
regime for ISP-bound traffic.95 When read as a whole, the most natural reading of section 251 is 
as follows: subsection (b) sets forth reciprocal compensation requirements for the transport and 
termination of "telecommunications"; subsection (g) excludes certain access services (including 
ISP-bound traffic) from that requirement; and subsection (i) ensures that, on a going-forward 
basis, the Commission has the authority to establish pricing for, and otherwise to regulate, 
interstate access services. 
50. When viewed in the overall context of section 251, subsections (g) and (i) serve 
compatible, but different, purposes. Subsection (g) preserves rules and regulations that existed at 
the time Congress passed the 1996 Act, and thus functions primarily as a "backward-looking" 
provision (although it does grant the Commission the authority to supersede existing regulations). 
In contrast, we interpret section 25 l(i) to be a "forward-looking" provision. Thus, subsection (i) 
expressly affirms the Commission's role in an evolving telecommunications marketplace, in which 
Congress anticipates that the Commission will continue to develop appropriate pricing and 
91
 M a t 16016. 
92
 M a t 16016-17. 
93
 M a t 16017. 
9447U.S.C.§251(i). 
95
 See also Letter from Gary L. Phillips, SBC, to Jon Nuechterlein, Deputy General Counsel, FCC, at 8 (Dec. 14, 
2000). 
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compensation mechanisms for traffic that falls within the purview of section 201. This reading of 
section 251 is consistent with the notion that section 251 generally broadens the Commission's 
duties, particularly in the pricing context. 
51. We expect that, as new network architectures emerge, the nature of 
telecommunications traffic will continue to evolve. As we have already observed, since Congress 
passed the 1996 Act, customer usage patterns have changed dramatically; carriers are sending 
traffic over networks in new and different formats; and manufacturers are adding creative features 
and developing innovative network architectures. Although we cannot anticipate the direction 
that new technology will take us, we do expect the dramatic pace of change to continue. 
Congress clearly did not expect the dynamic, digital broadband driven telecommunications 
marketplace to be hindered by rules premised on legacy networks and technological assumptions 
that are no longer valid. Section 251(i), together with section 201, equips the Commission with 
the tools to ensure that the regulatory environment keeps pace with innovation. 
5. ISP-Bound Traffic Falls Within the Purview of the Commission's 
Section 201 Authority 
52. Having found that ISP-bound traffic is excluded from section 251(b)(5) by section 
251(g), we find that the Commission has the authority pursuant to section 201 to establish rules 
governing intercarrier compensation for such traffic. Under section 201, the Commission has long 
exercised its jurisdictional authority to regulate the interstate access services that LECs provide 
to connect callers with IXCs or ISPs to originate or terminate calls that travel across state lines. 
Access services to ISPs for Internet-bound traffic are no exception. The Commission has held, 
and the Eighth Circuit has recently concurred, that traffic bound for information service providers 
(including Internet access traffic) often has an interstate component.97 Indeed, that court 
observed that, although some traffic destined for information service providers (including ISPs) 
may be intrastate, the interstate and intrastate components cannot be reliably separated. Thus, 
ISP traffic is properly classified as interstate," and it falls under the Commission's section 201 
jurisdiction.100 
53. In its opinion remanding this proceeding, the court appeared to acknowledge that 
the end-to-end analysis was appropriate for determining the scope of the Commission's 
jurisdiction under section 20L, stating that "[tjhere is no dispute that the Commission has 
For example, section 251 has expanded upon our historic functions by providing us with the authority to set the 
framework for pricing rules applicable to unbundled network elements, purchased under interconnection 
agreements. 
97
 Southwestern Bell Tel Co. v. FCC, 153 F.3d 523, 543 (8* Cir. 1998) (affirming the jurisdictional^ mixed 
nature of ISP-bound traffic). 
See, e.g., Louisiana PSC v. FCC, 476 U.S. 355, 375n.4. 
100
 See Letter from John W. Kure, Qwest, to Magalie Roman Salas, Secretary, FCC (Dec. 8, 2000)(attaching A 
Legal Roadmapfor Implementing a Bill and Keep Rule for All Wireline Traffic, at 10-11 ){Qwest Roadmap). 
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historically been justified in relying on this method when determining whether a particular 
communication is jurisdictional^ interstate."101 The court nevertheless found that we had not 
supplied a logical nexus between the jurisdictional end-to-end analysis (which delineates the 
contours of our section 201 authority) and our interpretation of the scope of section 251(b)(5). 
In that regard, the court appeared not to question the Commission's longstanding assertion of 
jurisdiction over ESP traffic, of which Internet-bound traffic is a subset. It did, however, 
unambiguously question whether, for purposes of interpreting section 251(b)(5), the jurisdictional 
end-to-end analysis was dispositive. Accordingly, the court explained its basis for remand as 
follows: "Because the Commission has not supplied a real explanation for its decision to treat 
end-to-end analysis as controlling [in interpreting the scope of section 251(b)(5)]... we must 
vacate the ruling and remand the case."103 
54. As explained above, we no longer construe section 251(b)(5) using the dichotomy 
set forth in the Declaratory Ruling between "local" traffic and interstate traffic. Rather, we have 
clarified that the proper analysis hinges on section 251(g), which limits the reach of the reciprocal 
compensation regime mandated in section 251(b). Thus our discussion no longer centers on the 
jurisdictional inquiry set forth in the underlying order. Nonetheless, we take this opportunity to 
respond to questions raised by the court regarding the differences between ISP-bound traffic 
(which we have always held to be predominantly interstate for jurisdictional purposes) and 
intrastate calls to "communications-intensive business end user[s],"1 such as travel agencies and 
pizza parlors. 
55. Contrary to the arguments made by some IXCs, the Commission has been 
consistent in its jurisdictional treatment of ISP-bound traffic. For compensation purposes, in 
order to create a regulatory environment that will allow new and innovative services to flourish, 
the Commission has exempted enhanced service providers (including ISPs) from paying for 
interstate access service at the usage-based rates charged to IXCs. The ESP exemption was 
and remains an affirmative exercise of federal regulatory authority over interstate access service 
under section 201, and, in affirming pricing under that exemption, the D.C. Circuit expressly 
101
 Bell Atlantic, 206 F.3d at 5; see Qwest Roadmap at 4. 
102
 The D.C. Circuit itself has long recognized that ESPs use interstate access. See, e.g., NARUC v. FCC, 737 F.2d 
at 1136. 
103
 Bell Atlantic, 206 F.3d. at 8. 
104
 Bell Atlantic, 206 F.3d at 7. 
105
 As notedrthe Commission has permitted ESPs to pay local business line rates from intrastate tariffs for ILEC-
provided access service, in lieu of interstate carrier access charges. See, e.g., MTS/WATS Market Structure Order, 
97 FCC 2d at 715; ESP Exemption Order, 3 FCC Red at 2635 n.8, 2637 n.53. ESPs also pay the federal subscriber 
lines charges associated with those business lines and, where appropriate, the federal special access surcharge. 
The subscriber line charge (SLC) recovers a portion of the cost of a subscriber's line that is allocated, pursuant to 
jurisdictional separations, to the interstate jurisdiction. See 47 C.F.R. § 69.152 (defining SLC); 47 C.F.R. Part 36 
(jurisdictional separations). The special access surcharge recovers for use of the local exchange when private 
line/PBX owners "circumvent the conventional long-distance network and yet achieve interstate connections 
beyond those envisioned by the private line service." NARUC v. FCC, 737 F.2d at 1138. See 47 C.F.R. § 69.115. 
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recognized that ESPs use interstate access service.1 Moreover, notwithstanding the ESP 
exemption, the Commission has always permitted enhanced service providers, including ISPs, to 
purchase their interstate access out of interstate tariffs - thus underscoring the Commission's 
consistent view that the link LECs provide to connect subscribers with ESPs is an interstate 
access service. 
56. We do not believe that the court's decision to remand the Declaratory Ruling 
reflects a finding that such traffic constitutes two calls, rather than a single end-to-end call, for 
jurisdictional purposes. The court expressly acknowledged that "the end-to-end analysis applied 
by the Commission here is one that it has traditionally used to determine whether a call is within 
its interstate jurisdiction.1' The court also said that M[t]here is no dispute that the Commission 
has historically been justified in relying on this method when determining whether a particular 
communication is jurisdictionally interstate." And the court appeared to suggest, at least for 
the sake of argument, that the Commission had not misapplied that analysis as a jurisdictional 
matter in finding that ISP-bound traffic was interstate. We do recognize, however, that the 
court was concerned by how one would categorize this traffic under our prior interpretation of 
section 251(b)(5), which focused on whether or not ISP-bound calls were "local." That inquiry 
arguably implicated the compensation mechanism for the traffic (which included a local 
component), as well as the meaning of the term "termination" in the specific context of section 
251(b); but neither of these issues is germane to our assertion of jurisdiction here under our 
section 201 authority. 
57. For jurisdictional purposes, the Commission views LEC-provided access to 
enhanced services providers, including ISPs, on the basis of the end points of the communication, 
rather than intermediate points of switching or exchanges between carriers (or other providers). 
With judicial approval, the Commission initially adopted this access service pricing policy in order to avoid rate 
shock to a fledgling enhanced services industry. NARUC v FCC, 111 F.2d at 1136-37. In the decision affirming 
this pricing policy, the court expressly recognized that ESPs use interstate access service. Id at 1136 (enhanced 
service providers "may, at times, heavily use exchange access")- The Commission recently decided to retain this 
policy, largely because it found that it made little sense to mandate, for the first time, the application of existing 
non-cost-based interstate access rates to enhanced services just as the Commission was reforming the access charge 
regime to eliminate implicit subsidies and to move such charges toward competitive levels. Access Charge Reform 
Order, 12 FCC Red at 16133, affd, Southwestern Bell Telephone Co, 153 F.3d at 541-42. 
107
 See, eg, MTS/WATS Market Structure Order, 97 FCC 2d at 711-12, 722; Filing and Review of Open Network 
Architecture Plans, CC Docket No. 88-2, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 4 FCC Rd 1,141 (1988), qffd, 
California v FCC, 4 F.3d 1505 (9th Cir. 1993) (ONA Plans Order); GTE Telephone Operating Cos , CC Docket 
No. 98-79, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 13 FCC Red 22466 (1998). 
108
 Bell Atlantic, 206 F.3d at 3. 
Id at 5 
See, eg, id at 6, 7 (accepting, arguendo, that ISP-bound traffic is like IXC-bound traffic Tor jurisdictional 
purposes). 
See, e g, BellSouth MemoryCall, 7 FCC Red at 1620 (voicemail is interstate because "there is a continuous 
path of communications across state line between the caller and the voice mail service"); ONA Plans Order, 4 FCC 
(continued. ..) 
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Thus, in the ON A Plans Order, the Commission emphasized that "when an enhanced service is 
interstate (that is, when it involves communications or transmissions between points in different 
states on an end-to-end basis), the underlying basic services are subject to [our jurisdiction]."112 
Consistent with that view, when end-to-end communications involving enhanced service providers 
cross state lines, the Commission has categorized the link that the LEC provides to connect the 
end-user with an enhanced service provider as interstate access service. Internet service 
providers are a class of ESPs. Accordingly, the LEC-provided link between an end-user and an 
ISP is properly characterized as interstate access. 
58. Most Internet-bound traffic traveling between a LEC's subscriber and an ISP is 
indisputably interstate in nature when viewed on an end-to-end basis. Users on the Internet are 
interacting with a global network of connected computers. The consumer contracts with an ISP 
to provide access to the Internet. Typically, when the customer wishes to interact with a person, 
content, or computer, the customer's computer calls a number provided by the ISP that is 
assigned to an ISP modem bank. The ISP modem answers the call (the familiar squelch of 
computers handshaking). The user initiates a communication over the Internet by transmitting a 
command. In the case of the web, the user requests a webpage. This request may be sent to the 
computer that hosts the webpage. In real time, the web host may request that different pieces of 
that webpage, which can be stored on different servers across the Internet, be sent, also in real 
time, to the user. For example, on a sports page, only the format of the webpage may be stored at 
the host computer in Chicago. The advertisement may come from a computer in California (and it 
may be a different advertisement each time the page is requested), the sports scores may come 
from a computer in New York City, and a part of the webpage that measures Internet traffic and 
records the user's visit may involve a computer in Virginia. If the user decides to buy something 
from this webpage, say a sports jersey, the user clicks on the purchase page and may be 
transferred to a secure web server in Maryland for the transaction. A single web address 
frequently results in the return of information from multiple computers in various locations 
(Continued from previous page) 
Red at 141 (an enhanced service is subject to FCC authority if it is interstate, "that is, when it involves 
communications or transmissions between points in different states on an end-to-end basis"). 
U1
^)NA Plans Order, 4 FCC Red at 141; see also id, Memorandum Opinion and Order on Reconsideration, 5 
FCC Red 3084,3088-89 (1990), affd, California v. FCC, 4 F.3d 1505 (9th Cir. 1993)(rejecting claim that basic 
service elements, consisting of features and functions provided by telephone company's local switch for benefit of 
enhanced service providers and others, are separate mfrastate offerings even when used in connection with end-to-
end-transmissions). 
113
 See, e g, MTS/WA TS Market Structure Order, 97 FCC 2d at 7 IT ("[a]mong the variety of users of access 
service are ... enhanced service providers"); Amendment of Part 69 of the Commission's Rules Relating to 
Enhanced Service Providers, CC Docket No. 87-215, Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 2 FCC Red 4305, 4305, 
4306 (1987) (noting that enhanced service providers use "exchange access service"); ESP Exemption Order, 3 FCC 
Red at 2631 (referring to "certain classes of exchange access users, including enhanced service providers"). 
1 {
*JSee, e g, Access Charge Reform Order, 12 FCC Red at 16131 -32; GTE Telephone Operating:Cos, 13 FCC Red 
at 22478. Cf Bell Atlantic, 206 F.3d at 4, 6-7. 
28 
Federal Communications Commission FCC 01-131 
globally. These different pieces of the webpage will be sent to the user over different network 
paths and assembled on the user's display.1 5 
59. The "communication" taking place is between the dial-up customer and the global 
computer network of web content, e-mail authors, game room participants, databases, or bulletin 
board contributors. Consumers would be perplexed to learn regulators believe they are 
communicating with ISP modems, rather than the buddies on their e-mail lists. The proper focus 
for identifying a communication needs to be the user interacting with a desired webpage, friend, 
game, or chat room, not on the increasingly mystifying technical and mechanical activity in the 
middle that makes the communication possible.116 ISPs, in most cases, provide services that 
permit the dial-up Internet user to communicate directly with some distant site or party (other 
than the ISP) that the caller has specified. 
60. ISP service is analogous, though not identical, to long distance calling service. An 
AT&T long distance customer contracts with AT&T to facilitate communications to out-of-state 
locations. The customer uses the local network to reach AT&T's facilities (its point of presence). 
By dialing " 1 " and an area code, the customer is in essence addressing his call to an out of state 
party and is instructing his LEC to deliver the call to his long distance carrier, and instructing the 
long distance carrier to pick up and carry that call to his intended destination. The caller on the 
other end will pick up the phone and respond to the caller. The communication will be between 
these two end-users. This analogy is not meant to prove that ISP service is identical to long 
distance service, but is used merely to bolster, by analogy, the reasonableness of not 
characterizing an ISP as the destination of a call, but as a facilitator of communication. 
61. Moreover, as the local exchange carriers have correctly observed, the technical 
configurations for establishing dial-up Internet connections are quite similar to certain network 
configurations employed to initiate more traditional long-distance calls.117 In most cases, an ISP's 
customer first dials a seven-digit number to connect to the ISP server before connecting to a 
website. Long-distance service in some network configurations is initiated in a substantially 
similar manner. In particular, under "Feature Group A" access, the caller first dials a seven-digit 
number to reach the IXC, and then dials a password and the called party's area code and number 
to complete the call. Notwithstanding this dialing sequence, the service the LEC provides is 
considered interstate access service, not a separate local call.m Internet calls operate in a similar 
manner: after reaching the ISP's server by dialing a seven-digit number, the caller selects a 
website (which is identified by a 12-digit Internet address, but which often is, in effect, "speed 
dialed" by clicking_a& icon) and the ISP connects the caller to the selected website. Such calling 
Of course, the Internet provides applications other than the World Wide Web, such as e-mail, games, chat sites, 
er streaming media, which have different technical characteristics but all of which involve computers m multiple 
locations, often across state and national boundaries. 
1,6
 See Qwest Roadmap at 4-5, 9-10. 
See, e g, Verizon Remand Reply at 9 (Internet traffic is indistinguishable from Feature Group A access 
service). 
118 
See Local Competition Order, 11 FCC Red at 15935 n. 2091 (describing "Feature Group A" access service); see 
also MCI Telecomm Corp v FCC, 566 F.2d 365, 367 n.3 (D.C. Cir. 1977), cert denied, 434 U.S. 1040 (1978). 
29 
Federal Cftroromwatiftns Q)mpigs*9q FCC 01-131 
should yield the same jurisdictional result as the analogous calls to IXCs using "Feature Group A" 
access. 
62. Commission precedent also rejects the two-call theory in the context of calls 
involving enhanced services. In BellSouth MemoryCall, the Commission preempted a state 
commission order that had prohibited BellSouth from expanding its voice mail service - an 
enhanced service - beyond its existing customers.119 In doing so, it rejected claims by the state 
that the Commission lacked jurisdiction to preempt because, allegedly, out-of-state calls to the 
voice mail service really constituted two calls: an interstate call from the out-of-state caller to the 
telephone company switch that routes the call to the intended recipient's location, and a separate 
intrastate call that forwards the communication from the switch to the voice mail apparatus in the 
120 
event that the called party did not answer. The Commission explained that, whether a basic 
telecommunications service is at issue, or whether an enhanced service rides on the telephone 
company's telecommunications service, the Commission's jurisdiction does not end at the local 
switchboard, but continues to the ultimate destination of the call.121 
63. The Internet communication is not analogous to traditional telephone exchange 
services. Local calls set up communication between two parties that reside in the same local 
calling area. Prior to the introduction of local competition, that call would never leave the 
network of the incumbent LEC. As other carriers were permitted to enter the local market, a call 
might cross two or more carriers' networks simply because the two parties to the communication 
subscribed to two different local carriers. The two parties intending to communicate, however, 
remained squarely in the same local calling area. An Internet communication is not simply a local 
call from a consumer to a machine that is lopsided, that is, a local call where one party does most 
of the calling, or most of the talking. ISPs are service providers that technically modify and 
translate communication, so that their customers will be able to interact with computers across the 
global Internet. 
64. The court in Bell Atlantic noted that FCC litigation counsel had differentiated ISP-
bound traffic from ordinary long-distance calls by stating that the former "is really like a call to a 
local business" - such as a pizza-delivery firm, a travel reservation agency, a credit card 
verification firm, or a taxicab company - "that then uses the telephone to order wares to meet the 
need."123 We find, however, thatthis citation to a former litigation position does not require us to 
alter our analysis. First, the Commission itself has never analogized ISP-bound traffic in the 
manner cited in the agency's briefin Southwestern Bell Indeed, in the particular order that the 
119
 BellSouth MemoryCall, 7 FCC Rcdat 1619. 
120
 Id at 1620. 
121
 Id at 1621. 
122
 ft is important to note that a dial-uj^eall to an ISP will not even be required when broadband services arrive. 
Those connections will be always on and there will be no phone call in any traditional sense. Indeed, the only 
initiating event will be the end-user interacting with other Internet content or usersr Thus, increasingly, notions of 
two calls become meaningless. 
m
 Bell Atlantic, 206 F.3d at 8 (citing FCC Brief at 76, Southwestern Bell v. FCC, 153 P.3d 523). 
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Commission was defending in Southwestern Bell, the Commission distinguished ISP-bound traffic 
from other access traffic on other grounds ~ e.g., call direction and call holding times - which 
have no arguable bearing on whether the traffic is one interstate call (as the Commission has 
always held) or two separate calls (one of which allegedly is intrastate) as some parties have 
contended. Second, the cited portion of the Commission's brief was not addressing jurisdiction at 
all. Rather, the brief was responding to a claim that the ESP exemption discriminated against 
IXCs and in favor of ISPs. Finally, in the very case in which litigation counsel made the cited 
analogy, the Eighth Circuit affirmed the Commission's consistent view that ISP-bound traffic is, as 
a jurisdictional matter, predominantly interstate.126 In any event, to the extent that our prior 
briefs could be read to conceptualize the nature of ISP service as local, akin to intense users of 
local service, we now embrace a different conceptualization that we believe more accurately 
reflects the nature of ISP service. 
65. For the foregoing reasons, consistent with our longstanding precedent, we find 
that we continue to have jurisdiction under section 201, as preserved by section 251(i), to provide 
a compensation mechanism for ISP-bound traffic. 
C. Efficient Intercarrier Compensation Rates and Rate Structures 
66. Carriers currently recover the costs of call transport and termination through some 
combination of carrier access charges, reciprocal compensation, and end-user charges, depending 
upon the applicable regulatory regime. Having concluded that ISP-bound traffic is not subject to 
the reciprocal compensation obligations of section 251(b)(5), we must now determine, pursuant 
to our section 201 authority, what compensation mechanism is appropriate when carriers 
collaborate to deliver calls to ISPs. In the companion NPRM, we consider the desirability of 
adopting a uniform intercarrier compensation mechanism, applicable to all traffic exchanged 
among telecommunications carriers, and, in that context, we intend to examine the merits of a bill 
and keep regime for all types of traffic, including ISP-bound traffic. In the meantime, however, 
we must adopt an interim intercarrier compensation rule to govern the exchange of ISP-bound 
traffic, pending the outcome of the NPRM. In particular, we must decide whether to impose (i) a 
"calling-party's-network-pays" (CPNP) regime, like reciprocal compensation, in which the calling 
party's network pays the network serving the ISP; (ii) a bill and keep regime in which all 
networks recover costs from their end-user customers and are obligatecfto deliver calls that 
originate on the networks of interconnecting carriers; or (iii) some other cost recovery 
mechanism. As set forth more fully below, our immediate goal in adopfing an interim 
compensation mechanism is to addressee market distortions created by the prevailing intercarrier 
compensation regime, even as we evaluate in a parallel proceeding what longer-term intercarrier 
compensation mechanisms are appropriate for this and other types of traffic. 
Access Charge Reform Order, 12 FCC Red at 16133-34. 
See FCC Brief at 75-76, Southwestern Bell it FCC, 153 F.3d 523. 
Southwestern Bell v FCC, 153 FJd at 534. 
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1. CPNP Regimes Have Distorted the Development of Competitive 
Markets 
67. For the reasons detailed below, we believe that a bill and keep approach to 
recovering the costs of delivering ISP-bound traffic is likely to be more economically efficient 
than recovering these costs from originating carriers. In particular, requiring carriers to recover 
the costs of delivering traffic to ISP customers directly from those customers is likely to send 
appropriate market signals and substantially eliminate existing opportunities for regulatory 
arbitrage. As noted above, we consider issues related to the broader application of bill and keep 
as an intercarrier compensation regime in conjunction with the NPRMthat we are adopting 
concurrently with this Order. In this Order, however, we adopt an interim compensation 
mechanism for the delivery of ISP-bound traffic that addresses the regulatory arbitrage 
opportunities present in the existing carrier-to-carrier payments by limiting carriers' opportunity 
to recover costs from other carriers and requiring them to recover a greater share of their costs 
from their ISP customers. 
68. In most states, reciprocal compensation governs the exchange of ISP-bound traffic 
between local carriers.127 Reciprocal compensation is a CPNP regime in which the originating 
carrier pays an interconnecting carrier for "transport and termination," i.e., for transport from the 
networks' point of interconnection and for any tandem and end-office switching.128 The central 
problem with any CPNP regime is that carriers recover their costs not only from their end-user 
customers, but also from other carriers,129 Because intercarrier compensation rates do not reflect 
the degree to which the carrier can recover costs from its end-users, payments from other carriers 
may enable a carrier to offer service to its customers at rates that bear little relationship to its 
actual costs, thereby gaining an advantage over its competitors. Carriers thus have the incentive 
to seek out customers, including but not limited to ISPs, with high volumes of incoming traffic 
that will generate high reciprocal compensation payments.130 To the extent that carriers offer 
these customers below cost retail rates subsidized by intercarrier compensation, these customers 
do not receive accurate price signals. Moreover, because the originating LEC typically charges its 
customers averaged rates, the originating end-user receives inaccurate price signals as the costs 
associated with the intercarrier payments are recovered through rates averaged across all of the 
originating carrier's end-users. Thus no subscriber faces a price that fully reflects the intercarrier 
127
 In the Declaratory Ruling, we stated that, pending adoption of a federal rule-governtng intercarrier 
compensation for ISP-bound traffic, state commissions would determine whether reciprocal compensation was due 
for such traffic. Declaratory Ruling, 14 FCC Red at 3706. Since that time, most, though not all, states have 
ordered the payment of reciprocal compensation for ISP-bound traffic. 
128
 47 C.F.R. § 51.703(a). 
,29
 Recovery from other carriers is premised on the economic assumption that the carries whose customer 
originates the call has "caused" the transport and termination costs associated with thatcall, and the originating 
carrier should, therefore, reimburse the interconnecting carrier for "transport and termination." The companion 
NPRM evaluates the validity of that assumption and tentatively concludes that it is an incorrect premise. 
130
 Cf Local Competition Order, 11 FCC Red at 16043 (symmetrical termination payments to paging providers 
based on ILECs' costs "might create uneconomic incentives for paging providers to generate traffic simply in order 
to receive termination compensation"). 
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payments. An ISP subscriber with extensive Internet usage may, for example, cause her LEC to 
incur substantial reciprocal compensation obligations to the LEC that serves her ISP, but that 
subscriber receives no price signals reflecting those costs because they are spread over all of her 
LEC's customers. 
69. The resulting market distortions are most apparent in the case of ISP-bound traffic 
due primarily to the one-way nature of this traffic, and to the tremendous growth in dial-up 
Internet access since passage of the 1996 Act Competitive carriers, regardless of the nature of 
their customer base, exchange traffic with the incumbent LECs at rates based on the incumbents' 
costs.m To the extent the traffic exchange is roughly balanced, as is typically the case when 
LECs exchange voice traffic, it matters little if rates reflect costs because payments in one 
direction are largely offset by payments in the other direction. The rapid growth in dial-up 
Internet use, however, created the opportunity to serve customers with large volumes of 
exclusively incoming traffic. And, for the reasons discussed above, the reciprocal compensation 
regime created an incentive to target those customers with little regard to the costs of serving 
them - because a carrier would be able to collect some or all of those costs from other carriers 
that would themselves be unable to flow these costs through to their own customers in a cost-
causative manner. 
70. The record is replete with evidence that reciprocal compensation provides 
enormous incentive for CLECs to target ISP customers. The four largest ILECs indicate that 
CLECs, on average, terminate eighteen times more traffic than they originate, resulting in annual 
CLEC reciprocal compensation billings of approximately two billion dollars, ninety percent of 
which is for ISP-bound traffic.132 Verizon states that it sends CLECs, on average, twenty-one 
times more traffic than it receives, and some CLECs receive more than forty times more traffic 
than they originate.133 Although there may be sound business reasons for a CLECs decision to 
serve a particular niche market, the record strongly suggests that CLECs target ISPs in large part 
because of the availability of reciprocal compensation payments.134 Indeed, some ISPs even seek 
to become CLECs in order to share in the reciprocal compensation windfall, and, for a small 
47 C.F.R. § 51.705 (an incumbent LEC's rates for transport and termination shall be established on the basis of 
the forward-looking economic costs of such offerings); 47 C.F.R. § 51.711 (subject to certain exceptions, rates for 
transport and termination shall be symmetrical and equal to those that the incumbent LEC assesses upon other 
carriers for the same services). 
132
 Letter from Robert T. Blau, BellSouth, to Magalie Roman Salas, Secretary, FCC (November 6, 2000); see also 
Verizon Remand Comments at 2 (Verizon will be billed more than one billion dollars in 2000 for Internet-bound 
calls); Letter from Richard J. Metzger, Focal, to Deena Shetler, Legal Advisor to Commissioner Gloria Tristani, 
FCC (Jan. 11, 2001)(ILECs owed $1.98 billion in reciprocal compensation to CLECs in 2000). 
Verizon Remand Comments at 11, 21. Verizon also cites extreme cases of CLECs that terminate in excess of 
eight thousand times more traffic than they originate. Id at 21. See also Letter from Robert T. Blau, BellSouth; 
Melissa Newman, Qwest; Priscilla Hill-Ardoin, SBC; and Susanne Guyer, Verizon, to Dorothy Attwood, Chief, 
Common Carrier Bureau, FCC (Nov. 9,2000). 
See, e g, Verizon Remand Comments at 15 (citing case of CLEC offer of free long distance service to dial-up 
Internet customers, an offer it did not extend to its customers that accessed the Internet via cable modem or DSL 
service); SBC Remand Comments at 45 (citing examples of CLEC offering free service to ISPs that collocated in 
its switching centers and CLECs offering to share reciprocal compensation revenues with ISPs). 
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number of entities, this revenue stream provided an inducement to fraudulent schemes to generate 
dial-up minutes.135 
71. For these reasons, we believe that the application of a CPNP regime, such as 
reciprocal compensation, to ISP-bound traffic undermines the operation of competitive 
markets. ISPs do not receive accurate price signals from carriers that compete, not on the basis 
of the quality and efficiency of the services they provide, but on the basis of their ability to shift 
costs to other carriers. Efficient prices result when carriers offer the lowest possible rates based 
on the costs of the service they provide to ISPs, not when they can price their services without 
regard to cost. We are concerned that viable, long-term competition among efficient providers of 
local exchange and exchange access services cannot be sustained where the intercarrier 
compensation regime does not reward efficiency and may produce retail rates that do not reflect 
the costs of the services provided. As we explain in greater detail in the companion NPRM, we 
believe that a compensation regime, such as bill and keep, that requires carriers to recover more 
of their costs from end-users may avoid these problems. 
72. We acknowledge that we did not always hold this view. In the Local Competition 
Order, the Commission concluded that state commissions may impose bill and keep arrangements 
for traffic subject to section 251(b)(5) only when the flow of traffic between interconnected 
carriers is roughly balanced and is expected to remain so.137 The Commission reasoned that "bili-
and-keep arrangements are not economically efficient because they distort carriers' incentives, 
encouraging them to overuse competing carriers' termination facilities by seeking customers that 
primarily originate traffic."138 The concerns about the opportunity for cost recovery and 
economic efficiency are not present, however, to the extent that traffic between carriers is 
balanced and payments from one carrier will be offset by payments from the other carrier. In 
these circumstances, the Commission found that bill and keep arrangements may minimize 
administrative burdens and transaction costs.139 
73. Since that time, we have observed the development of competition in the local 
exchange market, and we now believe that the Commission's concerns about economic 
inefficiencies associated with bill and keep missed the mark, particularly as applied to ISP-bound 
traffic. The Commission appears to have assumed, at least implicitly, that the calling party was 
the sole cost causer of the call, and it may have overstated any incentives that a bill and keep 
regime creates to target customers that primarily originate traffic. A carrier must provide 
originating switching functions and must recover the costs of those functions from the originating 
end-user, not from other carriers. Originating traffic thus lacks the same opportunity for cost-
shifting that reciprocal compensation provides with respect to serving customers with 
See, e.g, Verizon Remand Comments at 17-18. 
136
 The NPRM that we adopt in conjunction-with this Order seeks comment on the degree to which a modified 
CPNP regime might address these concerns. 
r37
 Local Competition Order, 11 FCQ^lcd at 16054-55; see also 47 C.F.R. § 51.713(b). 
138
 Local Competition Order, 11 FCC Red at 16055 (emphases added). 
m
 Id at 16055. 
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disproportionately incoming traffic. Indeed, it has become apparent that the obligation to pay 
reciprocal compensation to interconnecting carriers may give rise to uneconomic incentives. As 
the current controversy about ISP-bound traffic demonstrates, reciprocal compensation 
encourages carriers to overuse competing carriers' origination facilities by seeking customers that 
receive high volumes of traffic. 
74. We believe that a bill and keep regime for ISP-bound traffic may eliminate these 
incentives and concomitant opportunity for regulatory arbitrage by forcing carriers to look only to 
their ISP customers, rather than to other carriers, for cost recovery. As a result, the rates paid by 
ISPs and, consequently, their customers should better reflect the costs of services to which they 
subscribe. Potential subscribers should receive more accurate price signals, and the market should 
reward efficient providers.140 Although we do not reach any firm conclusions about bill and keep 
as a permanent mechanism for this or any other traffic, our evaluation of the record evidence to 
date strongly suggests that bill and keep is likely to provide a viable solution to the market 
distortions caused by the application of reciprocal compensation to ISP-bound traffic. We take 
that observation into account, below, as we fashion an interim compensation mechanism for this 
traffic. 
75. Bill and keep also may address the problem regulators face in setting intercarrier 
compensation rates that correlate to the costs carriers incur to carry traffic that originates on other 
networks. The record suggests that market distortions appear to have been exacerbated by the 
prevalence of excessively high reciprocal compensation rates. Many CLECs argue that the 
current traffic imbalances between CLECs and ILECs are the product of greediness on the part of 
ILECs that insisted on above-cost reciprocal compensation rates in the course of negotiating or 
arbitrating initial interconnection agreements.141 CLECs argue that, because these rates were 
artificially high, they naturally responded by seeking customers with large volumes of incoming 
traffic. If the parties or regulatory bodies merely set cost-based rates and rate structures, they 
argue, arbitrage opportunities and the resulting windfalls would disappear.142 They note that 
reciprocal compensation rates have fallen dramatically as initial agreements expire and the parties 
negotiate new agreements.143 
76. We do not believe that the solution to the current problem is as simple as the 
CLECs suggest.144 We seek comment in the accompanying NPRM on the potential for a modified 
We also note that bill and keep arrangements are common among entities providing Internet backbone services, 
where the larger carriers engage fn so-called "peering" arrangements. 
Time Warner Remand Comments at 15-16. 
142 
Time Warner Remand Comments atl6. Some parties suggest that a bifurcated rate structure (a call set-up 
charge and a minute of use charge) would ensure appropriate cost recovery. See Sprint Remand Comments at 2-4. 
We seek comment on this approach in the NPRM. 
See infra note 158. 
144 
We note that many CLECs expressed the same view following adoption of the Declaratory Ruling in 1999, yet 
the problems persist. See, e.g., Cox Reply Comments at 6 (If termination "rates are too high, this is entirely at the 
ILECs behest, and should be remedied in the next round of negotiations."). 
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CPNP regime, such as the CLECs advocate, to solve some of the problems we identify here. We 
are convinced, however, that intercarrier payments for ISP-bound traffic have created severe 
market distortions. Although it would be premature to institute a full bill and keep regime before 
resolving the questions presented in the NPRM,145 in seeking to remedy an exigent market 
problem, we cannot ignore the evidence we have accumulated to date that suggests that a bill and 
keep regime has very fundamental advantages over a CPNP regime for ISP-bound traffic. 
Contrary to the view espoused by CLECs, we are concerned that the market distortions caused by 
applying a CPNP regime to ISP-bound traffic cannot be cured by regulators or carriers simply 
attempting to "get the rate right." A few examples may illustrate the vexing problems regulators 
face. Reciprocal compensation rates have been determined on the basis of the ILEC's average 
costs of transport and termination. These rates do not, therefore, reflect the costs incurred by any 
particular carrier for providing service to a particular customer. This encourages carriers to target 
customers that are, on average, less costly to serve, and reap a reciprocal compensation windfall. 
Conversely, new entrants lack incentive to serve customers that are, on average, more costly to 
serve, even if the new entrant is the most efficient provider. It is not evident that this problem can 
be remedied by setting reciprocal compensation rates on the basis of the costs of carrier serving 
the called party (or, in the case of ISP-bound traffic, the CLEC that serves the ISP).146 Apart 
from our reluctance to require new entrants to perform cost studies, it is entirely impracticable, if 
not impossible, for regulators to set different intercarrier compensation rates for each individual 
carrier, and those rates still might fail to reflect a carrier's costs as, for example, the nature of its 
customer base evolves. Furthermore, most states have adopted per minute reciprocal 
compensation rate structures. It is unlikely that any minute-of-use rate that is based on average 
costs and depends upon demand projections will reflect the costs of any given carrier to serve any 
particular customer. To the extent that transport and termination costs are capacity-driven, 
moreover, virtually any minute-of-use rate will overestimate the cost of handling an additional call 
whenever a carrier is operating below peak capacity.147 Regulators and carriers have long 
struggled with problems associated with peak-load pricing.148 Finally, and most important, the 
fundamental problem with application of reciprocal compensation to ISP-bound traffic is that the 
intercarrier payments fail altogether to account for a carrier's opportunity to recover costs from 
its ISP customers. Modifications to intercarrier rate levels or rate structures suggested by CLECs 
do not address carriers' ability to shift costs from their own customers onto other carriers and 
their customers. 
145
 A number of questions must be resolved before we are prepared to implement fully a bill and keep regime where 
most costs are recovered from end-users. (We say most, not all, costs are recovered from end-users because a bill 
and keep regime may include intercarrier charges for transport between networks.) These questions include, for 
example, the allocation of transport costs between interconnecting carriers and the effect on retail prices of 
adopting a bill and keep regime that is not limited to ISP-bound traffic. We seek comment on these and other 
issues in the accompanying intercarrie^M^RM 
146
 Cf Verizon Remand Reply Comments at 14-15. 
147
 The problem of putting a per minute price-tag, in the form of intercarrier payments, where no per minute cost 
exists is exacerbated in the case of local exchange carriers that, in most cases, recover costs from their end-users on 
a flat-rated basis. 
148
 See, e.g., Local Competition Order, 11 FCC Red at 16028-29. 
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2. Intercarrier Compensation for ISP-bound Traffic 
77. We believe that a hybrid mechanism that establishes relatively low per minute 
rates, with a cap on the total volume of traffic entitled to such compensation, is the most 
appropriate interim approach over the near term to resolve the problems associated with the 
current intercarrier compensation regime for ISP-bound traffic. Our primary goal at this time is to 
address the market distortions under the current intercarrier compensation regimes for ISP-bound 
traffic. At the same time, we believe it prudent to avoid a "flash cut" to a new compensation 
regime that would upset the legitimate business expectations of carriers and their customers. 
Subsequent to the Commission's Declaratory Ruling, many states have required the payment of 
reciprocal compensation for ISP-bound traffic, and CLECs may have entered into contracts with 
vendors or with their ISP customers that reflect the expectation that the CLECs would continue 
to receive reciprocal compensation revenue. We believe it appropriate, in tailoring an interim 
compensation mechanism, to take those expectations into account while simultaneously 
establishing rates that will produce more accurate price signals and substantially reduce current 
market distortions. Therefore, pending our consideration of broader intercarrier compensation 
issues in the NPRM, we impose an interim intercarrier compensation regime for ISP-bound traffic 
that serves to limit, if not end, the opportunity for regulatory arbitrage, while avoiding a market-
disruptive "flash cut" to a pure bill and keep regime. The interim regime we establish here will 
govern intercarrier compensation for ISP-bound traffic until we have resolved the issues raised in 
the intercarrier compensation NPRM. 
78. Beginning on the effective date of this Order, and continuing for six months, 
intercarrier compensation for ISP-bound traffic will be capped at a rate of $.0015/minute-of-use 
(mou). Starting in the seventh month, and continuing for eighteen months, the rate will be capped 
at $.0010/mou. Starting in the twenty-fifth month, and continuing through the thirty-sixth month 
or until further Commission action (whichever is later), the rate will be capped at $.0007/mou. In 
addition to the rate caps, we will impose a cap on total ISP-bound minutes for which a LEC may 
receive this compensation. For the year 2001, a LEC may receive compensation, pursuant to a 
particular interconnection agreement, for ISP-bound minutes up to a ceiling equal to, on an 
annualized basis, the number of ISP-bound minutes for which that LEC was entitled to 
compensation under that agreement during the first quarter of 2001, plus a ten percent growth 
factor. For 2002, a LEC may receive compensation, pursuant to a particular interconnection 
agreement, for ISP-bound minutes up to a ceiling equal to the minutes for which it was entitled to 
compensation under that agreement in 2001, plus another ten percent growth factor. In 2003, a 
LEC may receive compensation, pursuant to a particular interconnection agreement, for ISP-
bound minutes up to a ceiling ^ qual to the 2002 ceiling applicable to that agreement.149 
79. We understand that some carriers are unable to identify ISP-bound traffic. In 
order to limit disputes and avoid costly efforts to identify this traffic, we adopt a rebuttable 
presumption that traffic delivered to a carrier, pursuant to a particular contract, that exceeds a 3:1 
ratio of terminating to originating traffic is ISP-bound traffic that is subject to the compensation 
This interim regime affects onlylhe intercarrier compensation (i e , the rates) applicable to the delivery of ISP-
bound traffic. It does not alter carriers^other obligations under our Part 51 rules, 47 C.F.R. Part 51, or existing 
interconnection agreements, such as obligations to transport traffic to points of interconnection. 
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mechanism set forth in this Order. Using a rebuttable presumption in this context is consistent 
with the approach that numerous states have adopted to identify ISP-bound traffic or 
"convergent" traffic (including ISP traffic) that is subject to a lower reciprocal compensation rate. 
150
 A carrier may rebut the presumption, for example, by demonstrating to the appropriate state 
commission that traffic above the 3:1 ratio is in fact local traffic delivered to non-ISP customers. 
In that case, the state commission will order payment of the state-approved or state-arbitrated 
reciprocal compensation rates for that traffic. Conversely, if a carrier can demonstrate to the state 
commission that traffic it delivers to another carrier is ISP-bound traffic, even though it does not 
exceed the 3:1 ratio, the state commission will relieve the originating carrier of reciprocal 
compensation payments for that traffic, which is subject instead to the compensation regime set 
forth in this Order. During the pendency of any such proceedings, LECs remain obligated to pay 
the presumptive rates (reciprocal compensation rates for traffic below a 3:1 ratio, the rates set 
forth in this Order for traffic above the ratio), subject to true-up upon the conclusion of state 
commission proceedings. 
80. We acknowledge that carriers incur costs in delivering traffic to ISPs, and it may 
be that in some instances those costs exceed the rate caps we adopt here. To the extent a LECs 
costs of transporting and terminating this traffic exceed the applicable rate caps, however, it may 
recover those amounts from its own end-users.151 We also clarify that, because the rates set forth 
above are caps on intercarrier compensation, they have no effect to the extent that states have 
ordered LECs to exchange ISP-bound traffic either at rates below the caps we adopt here or on a 
See Texas Public Utility Commission, Docket No. 21982, Proceeding to Examine Reciprocal Compensation 
Pursuant to Section 252 of the Federal Telecommunications Act of 1996, at 36 (July 12, 2000)(applying a blended 
tandem switching rate to traffic up to a 3:1 (terminating to originating) ratio; traffic above that ratio is presumed to 
be convergent traffic and is compensated at the end office rate unless the terminating carrier can prove tandem 
functionality); New York Public Service Commission, Op. No. 99-10, Proceeding on Motion of the Commission to 
Reexamine Reciprocal compensation, Opinion and Order, at 59-60 (Aug. 26, 1999) (traffic above a 3:1 ratio is 
presumedto be convergent traffic and is compensated at the end office rate unless the terminating carrier can 
demonstrate "that [the terminating] network and service are such as to warrant tandem-rate compensation"); 
Massachusetts Dept. of Telecommunications and Energy, D.T.E. 97-116-C, at 28-29 n.31 (May 19, 1999) 
(requiring reciprocal compensation for traffic that does not exceed a 2:1 (terminating to originating) ratio as a 
proxy to distinguish ISP-bound traffic from voice traffic; carriers may rebut that presumption). 
,5!
 We note that CLEC end-user recovery is generally not regulated. As4ton-dominant carriers, CLECs can charge 
their end^users what the market will bear. Access Charge Reform, CC Docket No. 96-262, Sixth Report and 
Order, lSPCC Red 12962, 13005 (2000) (CALLS <9™fer)("Competitive LECs are not regulated by the Commission 
and are^iet restricted in the same manner as price caps LECs in how theyirecover their costs."). Accordingly, we 
permit CLECs to recover any additional costs of serving ISPs from their fSP customers. ILEC end-user charges, 
howeveivare generally regulated by the Commission, in the case of interstate charges, or by state commissions, for 
intrastate charges. Pursuant to the ESP exemption, ILECs will continue to serve their ISP customers out of 
intrastate=business tariffs that are subject to state regulation. As the Commission said in 1997, if ILECs feel that 
these rates are so low as to preclude cost recovery, they should seek relieffrom their state commissions. Access 
Charge Reform Order, 12 FCC Red at 16134 ("To the extent that some intrastate rate structures fail to compensate 
incumbent LECs adequately for providing service to customers with high-volumes of incoming calls, incumbent 
LECs may address their concerns to state regulators." (emphasis added)). 
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bill and keep basis (or otherwise have not required payment of compensation for this traffic).152 
The rate caps are designed to provide a transition toward bill and keep or such other cost 
recovery mechanism that the Commission may adopt to minimize uneconomic incentives, and no 
such transition is necessary for carriers already exchanging traffic at rates below the caps. 
Moreover, those state commissions have concluded that, at least in their states, LECs receive 
adequate compensation from their own end-users for the transport and termination of ISP-bound 
traffic and need not rely on intercarrier compensation. 
81. Finally, a different rule applies in the case where carriers are not exchanging traffic 
pursuant to interconnection agreements prior to adoption of this Order (where, for example, a 
new carrier enters the market or an existing carrier expands into a market it previously had not 
served). In such a case, as of the effective date of this Order, carriers shall exchange ISP-bound 
traffic on a bill-and-keep basis during this interim period. We adopt this rule for several reasons. 
First, our goal here is to address and curtail a pressing problem that has created opportunities for 
regulatory arbitrage and distorted the operation of competitive markets. In so doing, we seek to 
confine these market problems to the maximum extent while seeking an appropriate long-term 
resolution in the proceeding initiated by the companion NPRM. Allowing carriers in the interim 
to expand into new markets using the very intercarrier compensation mechanisms that have led to 
the existing problems would exacerbate the market problems we seek to ameliorate. For this 
reason, we believe that a standstill on any expansion of the old compensation regime into new 
markets is the more appropriate interim answer.153 Second, unlike those carriers that are presently 
serving ISP customers under existing interconnection agreements, carriers entering new markets 
to serve ISPs have not acted in reliance on reciprocal compensation revenues and thus have no 
need of a transition during which to make adjustments to their prior business plans. 
82. The interim compensation regime we establish here applies as carriers re-negotiate 
expired or expiring interconnection agreements. It does not alter existing contractual obligations, 
except to the extent that parties are entitled to invoke contractual change-of-law provisions. This 
Order does not preempt any state commission decision regarding compensation for ISP-bound 
traffic for the period prior to the effective date of the interim regime we adopt here. Because we 
now exercise our authority under section 201 to determine the appropriate intercarrier 
compensation for ISP-bound traffic, however^ state commissions will no longer have authority to 
address this issue. For this same reason, as of the date this Order is published in the Federal 
Register, carriers may no longer invoke section 252(i) to opt into an existing interconnection 
agreement with regard to the rates paid for the exchange of ISP-bound traffic.154 Section 252(i) 
Thus, if a state has ordered all LECs to exchange-ISP-bound traffic on a bill and keep basis, or if a state has 
ordered bill and keep for ISP-bound traffic in a particular arbitration, those LECs subject to the state order would 
continue to exchange ISP-bound traffic on a bill and keep basis. 
153
 See American Public Communications Council vrFCC, 215 F.3d 51 (D.C. Cir. 2000)("Where existing 
methodology or research in a new area of regulation is. deficient, the agency necessarily enjoys broad discretion to 
attempt tojbrmulate a solution to the best of its ability on the basis of available information."). 
47 U.S.C. § 252(i) (requiring LECs to "make available any interconnection, service, or network element 
provided under an agreement approved under this section" to "any other requesting telecommunications carrier"). 
This Order will become effective 30 days after publication in the Federal Register. We find there is good cause 
under 5 U.S.C. § 553(d)(3), however, to prohibit carriers from invoking section 252(f) with respect to rates paid for 
(continued....) 
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applies only to agreements arbitrated or approved by state commissions pursuant to section 252; 
it has no application in the context of an intercarrier compensation regime set by this Commission 
pursuant to section 201.155 
83. This interim regime satisfies the twin goals of compensating LECs for the costs of 
delivering ISP-bound traffic while limiting regulatory arbitrage. The interim compensation regime, 
as a whole, begins a transition toward what we have tentatively concluded, in the companion 
NPRM, to be a more rational cost recovery mechanism under which LECs recover more of their 
costs from their own customers. This compensation mechanism is fully consistent with the 
manner in which the Commission has directed incumbent LECs to recover the costs of serving 
ESPs, including ISPs.156 The three-year transition we adopt here ensures that carriers have 
sufficient time to re-order their business plans and customer relationships, should they so choose, 
in light of our tentative conclusions in the companion NPRM that bill and keep is the appropriate 
long-term intercarrier compensation regime. It also affords the Commission adequate time to 
consider comprehensive reform of all intercarrier compensation regimes in the NPRM and any 
resulting rulemaking proceedings. Both the rate caps and the volume limitations reflect our view 
that LECs should begin to formulate business plans that reflect decreased reliance on revenues 
from intercarrier compensation, given the trend toward substantially lower rates and the strong 
possibility that the NPRM may result in the adoption of a full bill and keep regime for ISP-bound 
traffic. 
84. We acknowledge that there is no exact science to setting rate caps to limit carriers' 
ability to draw revenue from other carriers, rather than from their own end-users. Our adoption 
of the caps here is based on a number of considerations. First, rates that produce meaningful 
reductions in intercarrier payments for ISP-bound traffic must be at least as low as rates in 
existing interconnection agreements. Second, although we make no finding here regarding the 
actual costs incurred in the delivery of ISP-bound traffic, there is evidence in the record to 
suggest that technological developments are reducing the costs incurred by carriers in handling all 
sorts of traffic, including ISP-bound traffic.157 Third, although the process has proceeded too 
(Continued from previous page) 
the exchange of ISP-bound traffic upon publication of^his Order in the Federal Register, m order to prevent 
carriers from exercising opt in rights during the thirty days after Federal Register publication. To permit a carrier 
to opt into a reciprocal compensation rate higher than the caps we impose here during that window would seriously 
undermine our effort to curtail regulatory arbitrage and-to begin a transition from dependence on intercarrier 
compensation and toward greater reliance on end-user recovery. 
,55
 In any event, our rule implementing section 252(i)^equires incumbent LECs to make available "[individual 
interconnection, service, or network element arrangements" to requesting telecommunications carriers only "for a 
reasonable period of time." 47 C.F.R. § 51.809(c). We conclude that any "reasonable period of time" for making 
available rates applicable to the exchange of ISP-bound1 traffic expires upon the Commission's adoption in this 
Order of an intercarrier compensation mechanism for fSP-bound traffic. 
156
 Access Charge Reform Order, 12 FCC Red at 16195-34. 
157
 See, e.g., Letter from David J. Hostetter, SBC, to Magalie Roman Salas, Secretary, FCC (Feb. 14, 2001), 
Attachmenf(citing September 2000 Morgan Stanley Dean Witter report that discusses utilization of lower cost 
switch technology); Donny Jackson, "One Giant Leap for Telecom Kind?," Telephony, Feb. 12,2001, at 38 
(discussing cost savings associated with replacing circuit switches with packet switches); Letter from Gary L. 
Phillips, SBC, to Magalie Roman Salas, Secretary, FCC (Feb. 16,2001) (attaching press release from Focal 
(continued....) 
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slowly to address the market distortions discussed above, we note that negotiated reciprocal 
compensation rates continue to decline as ILECs and CLECs negotiate new interconnection 
agreements. Finally, CLECs have been on notice since the 1999 Declaratory Ruling that it might 
be unwise to rely on the continued receipt of reciprocal compensation for ISP-bound traffic, thus 
many have begun the process of weaning themselves from these revenues. 
85. The rate caps adopted herein reflect all these considerations. The caps we have 
selected approximate the downward trend in intercarrier compensation rates reflected in recently 
negotiated interconnection agreements. In these agreements, carriers have agreed to rates, like 
those we adopt here, that decline each year of a three-year contract term, and at least one 
agreement reflects different rates for balanced and unbalanced traffic.158 For example, the initial 
rate cap of $.0015/mou approximates the rates applicable this year in agreements Level 3 has 
negotiated with Verizon and SBC.159 The $.0010/mou rate that applies during most of the three-
year interim period reflects a proposal by ALTS, the trade association representing CLECs, for a 
transition plan pursuant to which intercarrier compensation payments for ISP-bound traffic would 
decline to $.0010/mou.160 Similarly, the $.0007/mou rate reflects the average rate applicable in 
2002 under Level 3's agreement with SBC.161 We conclude, therefore, that the rate caps 
constitute a reasonable transition toward the recovery of costs from end-users. 
86. We impose an overall cap on ISP-bound minutes for which compensation is due in 
order to ensure that growth in dial-up Internet access does not undermine our efforts to limit 
(Continued from previous page) 
Communications announcing planned deployment of next-generation switching technology "at a fraction of the 
cost of traditional equipment"); see also infra para. 93. 
The Commission takes notice of the following interconnection agreements: (1) Level 3 Communications and 
SBC Communications (effective through May 2003): This 13-state agreement has two sets of rates. For balanced 
traffic, the rate is $.0032/mou. For traffic that is out of balance by a ratio exceeding 3:1, the rate starts at 
$.0018/mou, declining to a weighted average rate of $.0007/mou by June 1, 2002. See PR Newswire, WL 
PRWIRE 07:00:00 (Jan. 17, 2001); Letter from John T. Nakahata, Harris, Wiltshire & Grannis, toMagalie Roman 
Salas, Secretary, FCC, Attachment (Jan. 19,2001). (2) ICG Communications and BellSouth (retroactively 
effective to Jan. 1,2000): This agreement provides for rates to decline over three years, from $O.O02/mou to 
$0.00175/mou to $0.0015/mou. See Communications Daily, 2000 WL 4694709 (Mar. 15, 2000). (3) KMC 
Telecom and BellSouth: This agreement provides for a rate of $0.002/mou in 2000, $0.00175/mou in 2001, 
$0.0015/mou in 2002. See Business Wire, WL 5/18/00 BWIRE 12:50:000 (May 18, 2000). (4) Level 3 
Communications and Verizon (formerly Bell Atlantic) (effective Oct. 14, 1999): This agreement governs ^ 11 of the 
former Bell Atlantic/NYNEX states. The applicable rate declines over the term of the agreement from $.003/mou 
in 1999 to rates in 2001 of $.0015/mou for balanced traffic and $.0012/mou where the traffic imbalance exceeds a 
10:1 ratio. See Letter from Joseph J. Mulieri, Bell Atlantic, to Magalie Roman Salas, Secretary, FCC (Nov. 22, 
1999)(attaching agreement); see also Letter from John T. Nakahata, Harris, Wiltshire & Grannis,4o Magalie 
Roman Salas, Secretary, FCC, at 2 (Jan. 4, 2001)(reciprocal compensation rate in most recent Levet3 - Verizon 
agreement is now $.0012/mou in all states except New York, where the rate is $.0015/mou). 
,S9
 In the Level 3 - SBC agreement, the applicable rate is $.0018/mou for traffic that exceeds a 3:1 *atio; m the 
Level 3 - Verizon agreement, the applicable rate is $.0015/mou for balanced traffic and $.0012/mott for traffic that 
exceeds a 10:1 ratio. See supra note 158. 
160
 See Letter from Jonathan Askin, ALTS, to Magalie Roman Salas, Secretary, FCC, at 3 (Dec. 19r2000). 
See supra note 158. 
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intercarrier compensation for this traffic and to begin, subject to the conclusion of the NPRM 
proceedings, a smooth transition toward a bill and keep regime. A ten percent growth cap, for 
the first two years, seems reasonable in light of CLEC projections that the growth of dial-up 
Internet minutes will fall in the range of seven to ten percent per year.162 We are unpersuaded by 
the ILECs' projections that dial-up minutes will grow in the range of forty percent per year,163 but 
adoption of a cap on growth largely moots this debate. If CLECs have projected growth in the 
range often percent, then limiting intercarrier compensation at that level should not disrupt their 
customer relationships or their business planning. Nothing in this Order prevents any carrier from 
serving or indeed expanding service to ISPs, so long as they recover the costs of additional 
minutes from their ISP customers. The caps merely ensure that growth in minutes above the caps 
is based on a given carrier's ability to provide efficient and quality service to ISPs, rather than on 
a carrier's desire to reap an intercarrier compensation windfall. 
87. We are not persuaded by arguments proffered by CLECs that requiring them to 
recover more of their costs from their ISP customers will render it impossible for CLECs 
profitably to serve ISPs or will lead to higher rates for Internet access.164 First, as noted above, 
this compensation mechanism is fully consistent with the manner in which this Commission has 
directed ILECs to recover the costs of serving ISPs.165 Moreover, the evidence in the record does 
not demonstrate that CLECs cannot compete for ISP customers in the growing number of states 
that have adopted bill and keep for ISP-bound traffic or that the cost of Internet access has 
increased in those states. Second, next-generation switching and other technological 
developments appear to be contributing to a decline in the costs of serving ISPs (and other 
customers).166 Third, if reciprocal compensation merely enabled CLECs to recover the costs of 
serving ISPs, CLECs should be indifferent between serving ISPs and other customers. Instead, 
CLECs have not contradicted ILEC assertions that more than ninety percent of CLEC reciprocal 
compensation billings are for ISP-bound traffic,167 suggesting that there may be a considerable 
margin between current reciprocal compensation rates and the actual costs of transport and 
162
 See, e.g., Letter from Jonathan Askin, ALTS, to Magalie Roman Salas, Secretary, FCC (Dec. 18,2000) 
(offering evidence that dial-up traffic per household will grow only 7%/year from 1998 to 2003 and that dial-up 
household penetration will decline between 2000 and 2003); Letter from Jonathan Askin, ALTS, to Magalie 
Roman Salas, Secretary, FCC (Jan. 9,2001)(citing, inter alia, Merrill Lynch estimate of 7% annual increased 
Internet usage per user between 1999 and 2003, and PricewaterhouseCoopers' study suggesting that Internet usage 
per user declined from 1999 to 2000). 
163
 See, e.g., Letter from Robert T. Blau, BellSouth, to Dorothy Attwood, Chief, Common Carrier Bureau, FCC 
(Dec. 22, 2000) (forecasting 42% annual growth in total Internet access minutes between 2000 and 2003); but see 
Dan Beyers, "Internet Use Slipped Late Last Year," Washingtonpost.com, Feb. 22,2001, at E10 (noting decline in 
average time spent online in 2000). 
164
 See, e.g., Time Warner Remand Comments at 4-5; Centennial Remand Comments at 2, 6-7. 
165
 Access Charge Reform Order, 12 FCC Red at 16134; MTS/WATS Market Structure Order, 97 FCC 2d at 720-
721. 
See infra para. 93. 
167
 See Letter from Robert T. Blau, BellSouth, et al, to Dorothy Attwood, Chief, Common Carrier Bureau, FCC, at 
4 (Nov. 3, 2000); SBC Remand Comments at 42, 51, 57. 
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termination.168 Finally, there is reason to believe that our failure to act, rather than the actions we 
take here, would lead to higher rates for Internet access, as ILECs seek to recover their reciprocal 
compensation liability, which they incur on a minute-of-use basis, from their customers who call 
ISPs.169 Alternatively, ILECs might recover these costs from all of their local customers, 
including those who do not call ISPs.170 There is no public policy rationale to support a subsidy 
running from all users of basic telephone service to those end-users who employ dial-up Internet 
access.171 
88. We also are not convinced by the claim of CLECs that limiting intercarrier 
compensation for ISP-bound traffic will result in a windfall for the incumbent LECs.172 The 
CLECs argue that the incumbents' local rates are set to recover the costs of originating and 
terminating calls and that the ILECs avoid termination costs when their end-users call ISP 
customers served by CLECs. The record does not establish that ILECs necessarily avoid costs 
when they deliver calls to CLECs,173 and CLECs have not demonstrated that ILEC end-user rates 
are designed to recover from the originating end-user the costs of delivering calls to ISPs. The 
ILECs point out that, in response to their complaints about the costs associated with delivering 
traffic to ISPs, the Commission has directed them to seek permission from state regulators to 
raise the rates they charge the ISPs, an implicit acknowledgement that ILECs may not recover all 
of their costs from the originating end-user.174 
We do not suggest that it costs CLECs less to serve ISPs than other types of customers. New switching 
technologies make it less costly to serve all customers. If, however, costs are lower than prevailing reciprocal 
compensation rates, then CLECs are likely to target customers, such as ISPs, with predominantly incoming traffic, 
in order to maximize the resulting profit. 
See, e.g., Verizon Remand Comments at 16. 
Most CLECs assert that they compete with ILECs on service, not price, and that the rates they charge to ISPs 
are comparable to the ILEC rates for the same services. See, e.g., Time Warner Remand Comments at 5. We 
acknowledge, however, that any CLECs that use reciprocal compensation payments to offer below cost service to 
ISPs may be unable to contimie that practice under the compensation regime we adopt here. We reiterate that we 
see no public policy reason to maintain a subsidy running from ILEC end-users to ISPs and their customers. 
172
 See, e,g, Letter from Robert W. McCausland, Allegiance Telecom; Kelsi Reeves, Time Warner Telecom; 
Richard L Metzger, Focal, R^Gerard Salemme, XO Communications; and Heather B. Gold, Intermedia; to 
Dorothy Attwood, Chief, Common Carrier Bureau, FCC, at 6 (Oct. 20, 2000). 
See, e.g., SBC Remand Reply Comments at 31-32 (explaining how an ILEC may incur additional switching 
and transport costs when its end-user customer calls an ISP served by a CLEC). 
174
 See Access Charge Reform Order, 12 FCC Red at 16134; see also MTS/WATS Market Structure Order, 97 FCC 
2d at 721 (the local business-line rate paid by ISPs subsumes switching costs). Moreover, most states have adopted 
price cap regulation of local rates, in which case rates do not necessarily correlate to cost in the manner the CLECs 
suggest. See "Price Caps Standard Form of Telco Regulation in 70% of States," Communications Daily, 1999 WL 
7580319 (Sept. 8, 1999). 
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3. Relationship to Section 251(b)(5) 
89. It would be unwise as a policy matter, and patently unfair, to allow incumbent 
LECs to benefit from reduced intercarrier compensation rates for ISP-bound traffic, with respect 
to which they are net payors, while permitting them to exchange traffic at state reciprocal 
compensation rates, which are much higher than the caps we adopt here, when the traffic 
imbalance is reversed- Because we are concerned about the superior bargaining power of 
incumbent LECs, we will not allow them to "pick and choose" intercarrier compensation regimes, 
depending on the nature of the traffic exchanged with another carrier. The rate caps for ISP-
bound traffic that we adopt here apply, therefore, only if an incumbent LEC offers to exchange all 
traffic subject to section 251(b)(5) 7 at the same rate. Thus, if the applicable rate cap is 
$.0010/mou, the ILEC must offer to exchange section 251(b)(5) traffic at that same rate. 
Similarly, if an ILEC wishes to continue to exchange ISP-bound traffic on a bill and keep basis in 
a state that has ordered bill and keep, it must offer to exchange all section 251(b)(5) traffic on a 
bill and keep basis.178 For those incumbent LECs that choose not to offer to exchange section 
251(b)(5) traffic subject to the same rate caps we adopt for ISP-bound traffic, we order them to 
exchange ISP-bound traffic at the state-approved or state-arbitrated reciprocal compensation 
rates reflected in their contracts.179 This "mirroring" rule ensures that incumbent LECs will pay 
the same rates for ISP-bound traffic that they receive for section 251(b)(5) traffic. 
90. This is the correct policy result because we see no reason to impose different rates 
for ISP-bound and voice traffic. The record developed in response to the Intercarrier 
Compensation NPRMmd the Public Notice fails to establish any inherent differences between the 
costs on any one network of delivering a voice call to a local end-user and a data call to an ISP. 
The four largest incumbent LECs - SBC, BellSouth, Verizon, and Qwest - estimate that they owed over $2 
billion in reciprocal compensation for ISP-bound traffic in 2000. See, e.g., Letter from Robert T. Blau, BellSouth, 
to Dorothy Attwood, Chief, Common Carrier Bureau, FCC (Jan. 16,2001), 
176
 More calls are made from wireless phones to wireline phones than vice-versa. The ILECs, therefore, are net 
recipients of reciprocal compensation from wireless carriers. 
177
 Pursuant to the analysis we adopt above, section 251(b)(5) applies to telecommunications traffic between a LEC 
and a telecommunications carrier other than a CMRS provider that is not interstate or intrastate access traffic 
delivered to an IXC or an information service provider, and to telecommunications traffic between a LEC and a 
CMRS provider that originates and terminates within the same MTA. See supra § 1V.B. 
178
 If, however, a state has ordered bill and keep for ISP-bound traffic only with respect to a particular 
interconnection agreement, as opposed to state-wide, we do not require the incumbent LEC to offer to exchange all 
section 251(b)(5) traffic on a bill and keep basis. This limitation is necessary so that an incumbent is not required 
to deliver .all section 251(b)(5) in a state on a bill and keep baas even though it continues to pay compensation for 
most ISP-bound traffic in that state. See, e.g., Letter from John W. Kure, Qwest, to Magalie Roman Salas, 
Secretary, FCC (April 2,2001)(citing, for example, Washington state, where 16% of ISP-bound traffic is subject to 
bill and keep). In those states, the rate caps we adopt here wilfapply to ISP-bound traffic that is not subject to bill 
and keep under the particular interconnection agreement if the incumbent LEC offers to exchange all section 
251(b)(5) traffic subject to those rate caps. 
179
 ILECs may make this election on a state-by-state basis. 
180
 Many commenters argue that there is, in fact, no difference^etween the cost and network functions involved in 
terminating ISP-bound calls and the cost and functions involved in terminating other calls to users of the public 
(continued....) 
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Assuming the two calls have otherwise identical characteristics {e.g., duration and time of day), a 
LEC generally will incur the same costs when delivering a call to a local end-user as it does 
delivering a call to an ISP.181 We therefore are unwilling to take any action that results in the 
establishment of separate intercarrier compensation rates, terms, and conditions for local voice 
and ISP-bound traffic.182 To the extent that the record indicates that per minute reciprocal 
compensation rate levels and rate structures produce inefficient results, we conclude that the 
problems lie with this recovery mechanism in general and are not limited to any particular type of 
traffic. 
91. We are not persuaded by commenters' claims that the rates for delivery of ISP-
bound traffic and local voice traffic should differ because delivering a data call to an ISP is 
inherently less costly than delivering a voice call to a local end-user. In an attached declaration to 
Verizon's comments, William Taylor argues that reciprocal compensation rates may reflect 
switching costs associated with both originating and terminating functions, despite the fact that 
ISP traffic generally flows in only one direction.1 If correct, however, this observation suggests 
a need to develop rates or rate structures for the transport and termination of all traffic that 
exclude costs associated solely with originating switching. Mr. Taylor similarly argues that 
ISP-bound calls generally are longer in duration than voice calls, and that a per-minute rate 
structure applied to calls of longer duration will spread the fixed costs of these calls over more 
minutes, resulting in lower per-minute costs, and possible over recovery of the fixed costs 
incurred. Any possibility of over recovery associated with calls (to ISPs or otherwise) of 
longer than average duration can be eliminated through adoption of rate structures that provide 
(Continued from previous page) 
switched telephone network. See, eg, AOL Comments at 10-12 ("thereis absolutely no technical distinction, and 
therefore no cost differences, between the way an incumbent LEC network handles ISP-destined traffic and the way 
it handles other traffic within the reciprocal compensation framework."); AT&T Comments at 10-11 (cc[T]here is 
no economic justification for subjecting voice and data traffic to different compensation rules." "ILECs have not 
demonstrated, and cannot demonstrate, that the costs of transporting and terminating data traffic differ 
categorically from the costs of transporting and terminating ordinary voice traffic."); Choice One Comments at 8 
("[C]osts do not vary significantly based on whether data or voice traffic is being transmitted."); Corecomm Reply 
at 2 (network functions are identical whether a carrier is providing service to an ISP or any other end-user); Cox 
Comments at 7 & Exhibit 2, Statement of Gerald W. Brock at 2 ("None of the distinctions between ISP calls and 
average calls relate to a cost difference for handling the calls."); MediaOne Comments at 4 (LECs incur the same 
costs for terminating calls to an ISP as they do for terminating any other local calls); Time Warner Comments at 9 
("[A]U LECs perform the same functions when transporting and delivering calls to ISP end-users as they do when 
transporting and delivering calls to other end-users. When LECs perform the same functions, they incur the same 
costs."); Letter from Donald F. Shepheard, Time Warner Telecom, to Dorothy Attwood, Chief, Common Carrier 
Bureau, FCC (Feb. 28, 2001)(disputing claim that CLEC switching costs are as low as the ILECs argue). 
1
 See, e g., Cox Comments at Exhibit 2, Statement of Gerald W. Brock at 2. 
2
 See, eg, Intermedia Comments at 3-4 (arguing that the rates for transport and termination of ISP-bound traffic 
must be identical to the rates established for the transport and termination of local traffic). 
183
 See Verizon Remand Comments, Declaration of WiHiam E. Taylor at 14, 17. 
184
 See Time Warner Remand Reply Comments, Exhibit 1, Declaration of Don J. Wood at 14. See also Letter from 
John W. Kure, Qwest, to MagaHe Roman Saias, Secretary, FCC, Attachment at 7-8 (Oct 26, 2000). 
185 
See Verizon Remand Comments, Declaration of William E. Taylor at 14-15. 
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for recovery of per-call costs on a per-call basis, and minute-of-use costs on a minute-of-use 
basis. We also are not convinced that ISP-bound calls have a lower load distribution (i.e., 
number and duration of calls in the busy hour as a percent of total traffic), and that these calls 
therefore impose lower additional costs on a network. It is not clear from the record that there 
is any "basis to speculate that the busy hour for calls to ISPs will be different than the CLEC 
switch busy hour," especially when the busy hour is determined by the flow of both voice and 
data traffic. 
92. Nor does the record demonstrate that CLECs and ILECs incur different costs in 
delivering traffic that would justify disparate treatment of ISP-bound traffic and local voice traffic 
under section 251(b)(5). Ameritech maintains that it costs CLECs less to deliver ISP-bound 
traffic than it costs incumbent LECs to deliver local traffic because CLECs can reduce 
transmission costs by locating their switches close to ISPs.189 The proximity of the ISP or other 
end-user to the delivering carrier's switch, however, is irrelevant to reciprocal compensation 
rates.190 The Commission concluded in the Local Competition Order that the non-traffic sensitive 
cost of the local loop is not an "additional" cost of terminating traffic that a LEC is entitled to 
recover through reciprocal compensation. 
93. SBC argues that CLECs should not be entitled to symmetrical reciprocal 
compensation rates for the delivery of ISP-bound traffic, because CLECs do not provide end 
office switching functionality to their ISP customers and therefore do not incur the same costs 
that ILECs incur when delivering local voice traffic. Specifically, SBC claims that the switching 
functionality that CLECs provide to ISPs is more like a trunk-to-trunk connection than the 
switching functionality normally provided at end offices.192 SBC also claims that CLECs are able 
to reduce the costs of delivering ISP-bound traffic by using new, less expensive switches that do 
not perform the functions necessary for both the origination and delivery of two-way voice 
traffic.193 Similarly, GTE asserts that new technologies and system architectures make it possible 
for some CLECs to reduce costs by entirely avoiding circuit-switching on calls "to selected 
186
 See Time Warner Remand Reply Comments, Exhibit 1, Declaration of Don J. Wood at 10-11. Time Warner 
also disputes that the "average duration of calls to ISPs has been accurately measured to date." Id. at 11. 
187
 See Verizon Remand Comments, Declaration of William E, Taylor at 17-18. 
188
 See Time Warner Remand Reply Comments, Exhibit 1, Declaration of Don J. Wood at 14-15. 
189
 See Letter from Gary L. Phillips, Ameritech, to Magalie Roman Salas, Secretary, FCC, Attachment at 5 (Sept 
14, 1999). See also SBC Remand Comments at 32-33 (referring to Global NAPS Comments, Exhibit 1,Statement 
of Fred Goldstein at 6, which describes CLEC reduction ^ f loop costs through collocation); Letter from Melissa 
Newman, U S West, to Magalie Roman Salas, Secretary, FCC, Attachment at 8 (Dec. 2,1999). 
190
 See Time Warner Remand Reply Comments, Exhibit l, Declaration of Don J. Wood at 25. 
191
 See Local Competition Order, 11 FCC Red at 16025. 
192
 SBC Remand Comments at 33. 
193
 SBC Remand Comments at 33-34 (referring, infer alia, to "managed modem** switches). 
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telephone numbers."194 CLECs respond, however, that they are in fact using the same circuit 
switching technology used by ILECs to terminate the vast portion of Internet traffic. In any 
event, it is not evident from any of the comments in the record that the apparent efficiencies 
associated with new system architectures apply exclusively to data traffic, and not to voice traffic 
as well. ILECs and CLECs alike are free to deploy new technologies that provide more efficient 
solutions to the delivery of certain types of traffic, and these more efficient technologies will, 
over time, be reflected in cost-based reciprocal compensation rates. The overall record in this 
proceeding does not lead us to conclude that any system architectures or technologies widely used 
by LECs result in material differences between the cost of delivering ISP-bound traffic and the 
cost of delivering local voice traffic, and we see no reason, therefore, to distinguish between voice 
and ISP traffic with respect to intercarrier compensation. 
94. Some CLECs take this argument one step further. Whatever the merits of bill and 
keep or other reforms to intercarrier compensation, they say, any such reform should be 
undertaken only in the context of a comprehensive review of all intercarrier compensation 
197 
regimes, including the interstate access charge regime. First, we reject the notion that it is 
inappropriate to remedy some troubling aspects of intercarrier compensation until we are ready to 
solve all such problems. In the most recent of our access charge reform orders, we recognized 
that it is "preferable and more reasonable to take several steps in the right direction, even if 
incomplete, than to remain frozen" pending "a perfect, ultimate solution." Moreover, it may 
GTE Comments at 7-8 (noting the existence of SS7 bypass devices that can avoid circuit switching andarguing 
that competitive LEC networks are far less complex and utilize fewer switches than incumbent LEC networks); 
GTE Reply Comments at 16 (compensating competitive LECs based on an incumbent LECs costs inflates the 
revenue that competitive LECs receive); Letter from W. Scott Randolph, GTE, to Magalie Roman Salas, Secretary, 
FCC, Attachment (Dec. 8, 1999 (new generation traffic architectures may use SS7 Gateways instead of more 
expensive circuit-switched technology). 
See, e.g., Letter from John D. Windhausen, Jr., ALTS, and H. Russell Frisby, Jr., CompTel, to Kyte Dixon, 
Legal Advisor, Chairman Michael Powell, FCC, at 4-5 (March 16, 2001)(Focal is testing two softswitches^ but as 
of now all ISP-bound traffic terminated by Focal uses traditional circuit switches; Allegiance Telecom has & single 
Softswitch in its network; Advanced Telecom Group, Inc. is in the testing phase of Softswitch deployment; Pac-
West Telecomm, Inc., does not have any softswitches in its network; e.spire uses only circuit switches to terminate 
ISP-bound traffic)^Time Warner Remand Reply Comments, Exhibit 1, Declaration of Don J. Wood at 27 (Time 
Warner is "deploying fully functional end office switches"); Letter from Donald F. Shepheard, Time Warner, to 
Dorothy Attwood, Chief, Common Carrier Bureau, FCC, at 3 (February 28, 2001)(Time Warner "does not provide 
managed modem services." Like the ILECs, Time Warner "has an extensive network of circuit switched 
technology" andJias only just begun to deploy softswitches); Letter from Teresa Marrero, AT&T, to Magalie 
Roman Salas, Secretary, FCC, at 1 (April 11, 2001)(" Virtually all of AT&T's ISP-bound traffic is today terminated 
using full circuit switches."). 
See Time Warner Remand Reply Comments, Exhibit 1, Declaration of Don J. Wood at 28; see also Letter from 
Donald F. Shepheard, Time Warner, to Dorothy Attwood, Chief, Common Carrier Bureau, FCC, at 3 (Feb. 28, 
200l)("if softswitoh technology will lower carriers' costs, then all carriers, including the ILECs[,] will have 
incentive to deploycthem"); Letter from John D. Windhausen, Jr., ALTS, and H. Russell Frisby, Jr., CompTel, to 
Dorothy Attwood, Thief, Common Carrier Bureau, FCC, at 4 (February 16, 2001)(same). 
See, e.g., Letter-from Karen L. GuHck, Harris, Wiltshire & Grannis, to Magalie Roman Salas, Secretary, FCC, 
at 1 (Dec. 22, 2000J. 
198
 See CALLS Order, 15 FCC Red at 12974. 
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make sense to begin reform by rationalizing intercarrier compensation between competing 
providers of telecommunications services, to encourage efficient entry and the development of 
robust competition, rather than waiting to complete reform of the interstate access charge regime 
that applies to incumbent LECs, which was created in a monopoly environment for quite different 
purposes. Second, the interim compensation scheme we adopt here is fully consistent with the 
course the Commission has pursued with respect to access charge reform. A primary feature of 
the CALLS Order is the phased elimination of the PICC and CCL, two intercarrier payments 
we found to be inefficient, in favor of greater recovery from end-users through an increased SLC, 
an end-user charge.200 Finally, like the CALLS Order, the interim regime we adopt here "provides 
relative certainty in the marketplace" pending further Commission action, thereby allowing 
carriers to develop business plans, attract capital, and make intelligent investments. 
D. Conclusion 
95. In this Order, we strive to balance the need to rationalize an intercarrier 
compensation scheme that has hindered the development of efficient competition in the local 
exchange and exchange access markets with the need to provide a fair and reasonable transition 
for CLECs that have come to depend on intercarrier compensation revenues. We believe that the 
interim compensation regime we adopt herein responds to both concerns. The regime should 
reduce carriers' reliance on carrier-to-carrier payments as they recover more of their costs from 
end-users, while avoiding a "flash cut" to bill and keep which might upset legitimate business 
expectations. The interim regime also provides certainty to the industry during the time that the 
Commission considers broader reform of intercarrier compensation mechanisms in the NPRM 
proceeding. Finally, we hope this Order brings an end to the legal confusion resulting from the 
Commission's historical treatment of ISP-bound traffic, for purposes of jurisdiction and 
compensation, and the statutory obligations and classifications adopted by Congress in 1996 to 
promote the development of competition for all telecommunications services. We believe the 
analysis set forth above amply responds to the court's mandate that we explain how our 
conclusions regarding ISP-bound traffic fit within the governing statute. 
199
 The PICC, or presubscribed interexchange earner charge, and the CCLC, carrier common line charge, are 
charges levied by mcumbent LECs upon IXCs to recover portions ofthe interstate-allocated cost of subscriber 
loops. See 47 C F.iL §§ 69.153, 69.154. 
200
 CALLS Order, \5 FCC Red at 12975 (permitting a greater proportion of the local loop costs of primary 
residential and single-line business customers to be recovered through the SLC). 
201
 CALLS Order, \S FCC Red at 12977 (The CALLS proposal is aimed to " bring lower rates and less confusion 
to consumers; and create a more rational interstate rate structure. This, in turn, will support more efficient 
competition, more certainty for the industry, and permit more rational investment decisions."). 
202
 Bell Atlantic, 2M F.3d at 8. 
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PROCEDURAI .MATTERS 
A. FinalRegula1 i ^ i 
96 As required by the Regulator) I ^\;t)ildy Aa (JKl-A). an li .„rtory 
Iflexibility Analysis (IRFA) was incorporated in the Declaratory Riding ana . ,< ..,;*. The 
Commission sought and received written comments on the IRFA. I he Final Regulatory 
Flexibility Analysis (FRFA) in this Order on Remand and Report and Order conforms to the RFA, 
as amended.2 5 To the extent that any statement contained in this FRFA is perceived as creating 
ambiguity with respect to our rules, or statements made in preceding sections of this Order on 
Remand and Report and Order, the rules and statements set forth in those preceding sections shall 
be controlling. 
1. P *leecl for, and. Objectives, of, this Order on Remand and.Report, and.,. ., 
Order 
97. " In the Declaratory Ruling, we found that we did i lot have ai l adequate record"' 
upon which to adopt a rule regarding intercarrier compensation, for ISP-bound traffic, but we 
indicated that adoption of a rule would serve the public interest, ' We sought comment on two 
alternative proposals, and stated that we might issue new rules or alter existing rules in light of the 
207 
comments received. Prior to the release of a decision, the Court ol Appeals tor the I )istrict of 
Columbia Circuit vacated certain provisions of the Declaratory Ruling and remanded the matter 
to the Commission; 
98; This Order on Remand and Report and Order addresses the concerns of various 
parties to this proceeding and responds to the court's remand The Commission exercises 
jurisdiction over ISP-bound traffic pursuant to section 201, and establishes a three-year interim 
intercarrier compensation mechanism for the exchange of ISP-bound traffic that applies if 
incumbent LECs offer to exchange section 251(b)(5) traffic at the same rates. During this interim 
period, intercarrier compensation for ISP-bound trafficiis subject to a rate cap that declines over 
the three-year period, from $.0015/mou to $.0007/moiE The Commission also imposes a cap on 
the total ISP-bound minutes for which a LEC may receive this compensation under a particular 
interconnection agreement equal to, on an annualized T>asis, the number of ISP-bound minutes for 
which that LEC was entitled to receive compensation during the first quarter of 2001, increased 
See 5 U.S.C. § 603. 
204
 Declaratory Riding, 14 FCC Red at MI: ! 
^ ^ y ^ Q g £0^ j | i e RegU|atof^ i-Kjxjkiiuj r\U, 5 U.S.C. § 601 et. seq., was a . uc >>man 
Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act of 1996" (SBREFA), which was enact, • 1 i of the Contract 
With America Advancement Act of 1996, Pub 1. \'« 104 ! "1 M0 Stat. 847 (1996) (CWAA A) 
Declaratory Ruling and Intercarrier Compensation NPRM, 14 FCC Red at 3707. 
Declaratory Riding and Intercarrier Compensation NPRM, 14 FCC Red at 3711. 
208
 See Bell Atlantic, 206 F.3d 1. 
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by ten percent in each of the first two years of the transition. If an incumbent LEC does not offer 
to exchange all section 251(b)(5) traffic subject to the rate caps set forth herein, the exchange of 
ISP-bound traffic will be governed by the reciprocal compensation rates approved or arbitrated by 
state commissions. 
2. Summary of Significant Issues Raised by the Public Comments in 
Response to the IRFA 
99. The Office of Advocacy, U.S. Small Business Administration (Office of Advocacy) 
submitted two filings in response to the IRFA. In these filings, the Office of Advocacy raises 
significant issues regarding our description, in the IRFA, of small entities to which our rules will 
apply, and the discussion of significant alternatives considered and rejected. Specifically, the 
Office of Advocacy argues that the Commission has failed accurately to identify all small entities 
affected by the rulemaking by refusing to characterize small incumbent local exchange carriers 
(LECs), and failing to identify small ISPs, as small entities.210 We note that, in the IRFA, we 
stated that we excluded small incumbent LECs from the definitions of "small entity" and "small 
business concern" because such companies are either dominant in their field of operations or are 
not independently owned and operated.211 We also stated, however, that we would nonetheless, 
out of an abundance of caution, include small incumbent LECs in the IRFA, and did so. "* Small 
incumbent LECs and other relevant small entities are included in our present analysis as described 
below. 
100. The Office of Advocacy also states that Internet service providers (ISPs) are 
directly affected by our actions, and therefore should be included in our regulatory flexibility 
analysis. We find, however, that rates charged to ISPs are only indirectly affected by our actions. 
We have, nonetheless, briefly discussed the effect on ISPs in the primary text of this Order." * 
101. Last, the Office of Advocacy also argues that the Commission has failed to 
adequately address significant alternatives that accomplish our stated objective and minimize any 
significant economic impact on small entities.214 We note that, in the IRFA, we described the 
nature and effect of our proposed actions, and encouraged small entities to comment (including 
giving comment on possible alternatives). We also specifically sought-comment on the two 
alternative proposals for implementing intercarrier compensation - oner that resolved intercarrier 
compensation pursuant to the negotiation andarbitration process set forth in Section 252, and 
209
 Office of Advocacy, U.S. Small Business Administration ex parte, May 27, 1999; Office of Advocacy, U.S. 
Small Business Administration ex parte, June 14, 1999. 
2,0
 Office of Advocacy, U.S. Small Business Administration ex parte, May 27, 1939, at 1-3; Office of Advocacy, 
U.S. Small Business Administration ex parte, June Ft, 1999, at 2-3. 
211
 Declaratory Ruling and Intercarrier Compensation NPRM, 14 FCC Red at 3744. 
2,2
 Declaratory Ruling and Intercarrier Compensation NPRM, 14 FCC Red at 37 H. 
213
 See supra paras. 87-88. 
2,4
 Office of Advocacy, U.S. Small Business Administration ex parte, June 14, 1999, at 3. 
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another that would have had us adopt a set of federal rules to govern such intercarrier 
compensation.215 We believe, therefore, that small entities had a sufficient opportunity to 
commen* •*"','t,M"» «* omivKnk 
I", NTCA also filed comments, not directly in response to the , urging the 
Commission to fulfill its obligation to consider small telephone companies. " Some commenters 
also raised the issue of small entity concerns over increasing Internet traffic and the use ol 
Extended Area Service (EAS) arrangements,"'" We are especially sensitive to the needs ot rural 
and small LECs that handle ISP-bound traffic, but we find that the costs that LECs incur in 
originating this traffic extends beyond the scope of the present proceeding and should nnt dr ! <! 
the appropriate approach to compensation for delivery of ISP-bound traffic, 
' Description and Estimate of the Number of Small Entitic s to Whi ch 
Rules Will'Apply 
103. The rules we are adopting apply to local exchange carriers. To estimate the 
number of small entities that would be affected by this economic impact, we first consider the 
statutory definition of "small entity" under the RFA. The RFA generally defines "small entity" as 
having the same meaning as the term "small business," "small organization," and "small 
218 
governmental jurisdiction." In addition, the term "small business" has the same meaning as the 
term "small business concern" under the Small Business Act, unless the Commission has 
developed one or more definitions that are appropriate to its activities. Under the Small 
Business Act, a "small business concern"" is one that: (!) is independently owned'and operated; (2) 
is not dominant in its field of operation; and (3) meets any additional criteria established by the 
SBA. The SBA has defined a small business for Staiidard Industrial Classification (SIC) 
categories 4812 (Radiotelephone Communications) arid 4813 (Telephone Communications, 
Except Radiotelephone) to be small entities when they have no more than 1,500 employees." 
• 404/. • The most'reliable source of information regarding the total numbers-of certain-
common carrier and related providers nationwide, as well as the numbers of commercial wireless 
entities, appears to be data the Commission publishes annually in its Carrier Locator report, 
derived from filings made in connection with the Telecommunications Relay Service (TRS). " 
215
 Declaratory Ruling[!RFA],\di'( « ,, •;, > .• . ; . . - . .
 i t j / u7_ 
08 (paras. 30-31). 
216
 N T C A CoiniiK-iits.it 
' See, e.^ , iCORH L\..• \ it: 1 7; II I'R C Coi nn lents at 7; R ichi: nond ' I • : lepi ic: n e Compai i> Conn nents at 1 8. : •. 
2 I 8 5 U . S . G §f>0K6) 
5 U.S.C. § 601(3) (incorporating by reference the definition of "small business concern" in 5 I L S . C § 632). 
220
 15U.S.C. §632. 
22!
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According to data in the most recent report, there are 4,144 interstate carriers. These carriers 
include, inter alia, incumbent local exchange carriers, competitive local exchange carriers, 
competitive access providers, interexchange carriers, other wireline carriers and service providers 
(including shared-tenant service providers and private carriers), operator service providers, pay 
telephone operators, providers of telephone toll service, wireless carriers and services providers, 
and resellers. 
105. We have included small incumbent local exchange carriers (LECs) in this 
regulatory flexibility analysis. As noted above, a "small business" under the RFA is one that, inter 
alia, meets the pertinent small business size standard (e.g., a telephone communications business 
having 1,500 or fewer employees), and "is not dominant in its field of operation." 4 The SBAfs 
Office of Advocacy contends that, for RFA purposes, small incumbent LECs are not dominant in 
their field of operation because any such dominance is not "national" in scope.225 We have 
therefore included small incumbent LECs in this regulatory flexibility analysis, although we 
emphasize that this action has no effect on the Commission's analyses and determinations in 
other, non-RFA contexts. 
106. Total Number of Telephone Companies Affected. The United States Bureau of 
the Census (the Census Bureau) reports that, at the end of 1992, there were 3,497 firms engaged 
in providing telephone services, as defined therein, for at least one year. This number contains 
a variety of different categories of carriers, including local exchange carriers, interexchange 
carriers, competitive access providers, cellular carriers, mobile service carriers, operator service 
providers, pay telephone operators, PCS providers, covered SMR providers, and resellers. It 
seems certain that some of those 3,497 telephone service firms may not qualify as small entities or 
small incumbent LECs because they are not "independently owned and operated." For 
example, a PCS provider that is affiliated with an interexchange carrier having more than 1,500 
employees would not meet the definition of a small business. It seems reasonable to conclude, 
therefore, that fewer than 3,497 telephone service firms are small entity telephone service firms or 
small incumbent LECs that may be affected by the decisions and rule changes adopted in this 
proceeding. 
Carrier Locator at Fig. 1. 
2245U.S.C.§601(3). 
225
 Office of Advocacy, U.S. Small Business Administration ex parte, May 27, 1999, at 1-3; Office of Advocacy, 
U.S. Small Business Administration ex parte, June 14, 1999, at 2-3. The Small Business Act contains a definition 
of "small business concern," which the RFA incorporates into its own definition of "small business." See 15 
U.S.C. § 632(a) (Small Business Act); 5 U.S.C. § 601(3) (RFA). SBA regulations interpret "small business 
concern" to include the concept of dominance on a national basis. 13 C.F.R. § 121.102(b). Since 1996, out of an 
abundance of caution^ the Commission has included small incumbent LECs in its regulatory flexibility analyses. 
See, e.g., Implementation of the Local Competition Provisions of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, CC 
Docket, 96-98, First Report and Order, 11 FCC Red 15499, 16144-45 (1996). 
226
 United States Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, 1992 Census ofTransportation, 
Communications, and Utilities: Establishment and Firm Size, at Firm Size 1-123 (1995) (1992 Census). 
227
 15 U.S.C. § 632(a)(1). 
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107. Wireline Carriers and Service Providers. The SB A has developed a definition of 
small entities for telephone communications companies other than radiotelephone companies. The 
Census Bureau reports that there were 2,321 such telephone companies in operation for at least 
one year at the end of 1992;"" According to the SBA's definition, a. small business telephone 
company other than a radiotelephone company is one employing no more than 1,500 persons/" 
All but 26 of the 2,321 non-radiotelephone companies listed by the Census Bureau were reported 
to have fewer than 1,000 employees. Thus, even if all 26 of those companies had more than 1,500 
employees, there would still be 2,295 non-radiotelephone companies that might qualify as small \ 
entities or small incumbent LECs. Although it seems certain that some of these carriers are not 
independently owned and operated, we are unable at this time to estimate with greater precision 
the number of wireline carriers and service providers that would qualify as small business 
concerns under the SBA's definition. Consequently, we estimate that there are fewer than 2,295 
small entity telephone communications companies other than radiotelephone companies that may 
iv* -iflr.-K*H Kv the decisions and rule changes adopted in this proceeding. 
Local Exchange Carriers, Interexchange Carriers, Competitive Access Providers, 
operator Service Providers, and Resellers. Neither the Commission nor the SB A has developed 
a definition particular to small LECs, interexchange carriers (IXCs), competitive access providers 
(CAPs), operator service providers (OSPs), or resellers. Hie closest applicable definition for these 
carrier-types under the SBA rules is for telephone communications companies other tha-
radiotelephone (wireless) companies. According to our most recent TRS data, there arc i. *,\ 
incumbent LECs and 212 CAPs and competitive LECs. Although it seems certain that some oi 
these carriers are not independently owned and operated, or have more than 1,500 employees, we 
are unable at this time to estimate with greater precision (he numbn .»f these carriers I hat wou'd 
qualify as small business concerns under the SBA's definition. Consequently, we estimate that 
there are fewer than 1,348 incumbent LECs and fewer than 212 CAPs and compHiii\ .* I J:r* \U-n 
may be affected by the decisions and rule changes adopted in this proceeding. 
^ • • 4 d e s c r i p t i o n o f P r o j e c t e d R e p u i tui |>, Ilkini in illlaT|»i!iij» IIIIMII I 111 II in'in 
Compliance Requirements 
109. The rule we are aaopung imposes direct compliance requirements on 
interconnected incumbent and competitive LECs, including small LECs. In order to compl) w tilt 
\\\^ rule, these entities will be required to exchange their ISP-bound traffic subject to the rules we 
are adopting above. 
1992 Census at Firm Size 1-123. 
9
 13 C.F.R. § 121.201, Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) Code 4813, 
0
 13 C.F.R. § 121.201, SIC Code 4813. 
Carrier Locator at Fig. 1. 
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5, Steps Taken to Minimize Significant Economic Impact on Small 
Entities, and Significant Alternatives Considered 
110. In the Declaratory Ruling and Intercarrier Compensation NPRM the Commission 
proposed various approaches to intercarrier compensation for ISP-bound traffic. During the 
course of this proceeding the Commission considered and rejected several alternatives.233 None of 
the significant alternatives considered would appear to succeed as much as our present rule in 
balancing our desire to minimize any significant economic impact on relevant small entities, with 
our desire to deal with the undesirable incentives created under the current reciprocal 
compensation regime that governs the exchange of ISP-bound traffic in most instances. We also 
find that for small ILECs and CLECs the administrative burdens and transaction costs of 
intercarrier compensation will be minimized to the extent that LECs begin a transition toward 
recovery of costs from end-users, rather than other carriers. 
111. Although a longer transition period was considered by the Commission, it was 
rejected because a three-year period was considered sufficient to accomplish our policy objectives 
with respect to all LECs.234 Differing compliance requirements for small LECs or exemption from 
all or part of this rule is inconsistent with our policy goal of addressing the market distortions 
attributable to the prevailing intercarrier compensation mechanism for ISP-bound traffic and 
beginning a smooth transition to bill-and-keep. 
Report to Congress: The Commission will send a copy of this Order on Remand and Report and 
Order, including this FRF A, in a report to be sent to Congress pursuant to the Congressional 
Review Act. In addition, the Commission will send a copy of this Order on Remand and 
Report and Order, including the FRF A, to the Chief Counsel for Advocacy of the Small Business 
Administration. A copy of this Order on Remand and Report and Order and FRF A (or summaries 
thereof) will also be published in the Federal Register. 
VI. ORDERING CLAUSES 
112. Accordingly, IT IS ORDERED, pursuant to Sections 1, 4(i) and 0), 201-209, 251, 
252, 332, and 403 of the Communications Act, as amended, 47 U.S.C. §§ 151, 154(i), 1540), 
201-209, 251, 252, 332, and 403, and Section 553 of Title 5, United States Code, 5 U.S.C. § 
553, that this Order on Remand and Report and Order and revisions to Part 51 of the 
Commission's rules, 47 C.F.R. Part 51, ARE ADOPTED. This Order on Remand and Report 
and Order and the rule revisions adopted herein will be effective 30 days after publication in the 
Federal Register except that, for good cause shown, as set forth in paragraph 82 of this Order, the 
32
 Declaratory Ruling, 14 FCC Red at 3707-10. 
233
 See supra paras. 67-76 (rejecting application of a reciprocal compensation mechanism to ISP-bound traffic). 
234
 We note, however, that the interim regime we adopt here governs for 36 months or until further action by the 
Commission, whichever is longer. 
235
 5 U.S.C. § 801(a)(1)(A). 
236
 See 5 U.S.C. § 604(b). 
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provision of this Order prohibiting carriers from invoking section 252(i) of the Act to opt into an. 
existing interconnection agreement as it applies to rates paid for the exchange of ISP-bound traffic 
v ill be effective immediatelv *nrp r?uIication of this Order in the Federal Register, 
113. Fl IS H UM'11HR ORDERED that the Commission's Consumer Information 
Bureau, Reference Inlonnalion Center, SHALL SEND a copy of this Order on Remand and 
Report and Order, including the Final Regulator Ki'.-vN'ih \T..,I- .•; * ^ n»t> / 'h^*'Counsel for 
Advocacy of the Small Business Administration. 
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Appendix A 
List of Commenters in CC Docket Nos. 96-98, 99-68 
Comments Filed in Response to the June 23, 2000 Public Notice 
Advanced TelCom Group, Inc.; e.spire Communications, Inc.; Intermedia Communications, Inc.; 
KMC Telecom, Inc.; Nextlink Communications, Inc.; The Competitive Telecommunications 
Association 
Alliance for Public Technology 
Association of Communications Enterprises 
Association for Local Telecommunications Services 
AT&T Corp. (AT&T) 
BellSouth Corporation 
Cablevision Lightpath, Inc. 
California State and California Public Utilities Commission 
Centennial Communications Corp. (Centennial) 
Florida Public Service Commission 
Focal Communications Corporation, Allegiance Telecom, Inc., and Adelphia Business Solutions, 
Inc. 
General Services Administration 
Global NAPs, Inc. 
ICG Telecom Group, Inc. 
Keep America Connected; National Association of the Deaf; National Association of 
Development Organizations; National Black Chamber of Commerce; New York Institute of 
Technology; Ocean of Know; Telecommunications for the Deaf, Inc.; United States Hispanic 
Chamber of Commerce 
Massachusetts Department of Telecommunications & Energy 
Missouri Public Service Commission 
National Consumers League 
National Exchange Carrier Association, Inc. 
New York Department of Public Service 
Pac-West Telecomm, Inc. 
Pennsylvania Office of Consumer Advocate 
Prism Communications Services, Inc. 
Qwest Corporation 
RCN Telecom Services, Inc. and Connect Communications Corporation 
RNK, Inc. 
Rural Independent Competitive Alliance 
SBC Communications, Inc. (SBC) 
Sprint Corporation (Sprint) 
Texas Public Utility Commission 
Time Warner Telecom Inc. (Time Warner) 
-United States Telecom Association 
Verizon Communications (Verizon) 
Western Telephone Integrated Communications, Inc. 
WorldCom, Inc. 
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Reply Comments Filed in Response to the June 23, 2000 Public Notice 
lsu>iness Solutions, Inc., ANeyiiinLi^ T'k'C V,!1!. hr " va1'"' >niiiiciiti< .itioii ' oipnu'i »r 
u. . i *N Telcom Services, Inc. 
AT&T Corp. 
BellSouth Corporation 
Cablevision Lightpath, Inc. 
Cincinnati Bell Telephone Company 
Commercial Internet Exchange Association 
Converscent Communications, LLC 
Covad Communication Company 
Duckenfield, Pace 
e.spire Communications, Inc., Intermedia Communications Inc.;KMC Telecom, Inc., 
NEXTLINK Communications, Inc., The Association for Local Telecommunications Services, 
and The Competitive Telecommunications Association 
General Services Administration 
Global NAPs, Inc. 
ICG Telecom Group, Inc. 
Keep America Connected; Natioilal Association of Development Organizations; National Black 
Chamber of Commerce; New York Institute of Technology; United States Hispanic Chamber 
of Commerce 
Pac-West Telecomm, Inc. 
Prism Communications Services In :: 
Qwest Corporation 
Riter, Josephine 
SBC Communications, Inc. (SBC) 
Sprint Corporation 
Time Warner Telecom Inc. (Time Wan icr) 
US Internet Industry Association 
United States Telecom Association 
Verizon Communications (Verizon) 
Western Telephone Integrated Communications, Inc. 
WorldCom, Inc. 
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Comments Filed in Response to the February 26, 1999 Notice of Proposed Rulemaking 
Airtouch Paging 
America Online, Inc. (AOL) 
Ameritech 
Association for Local Telecommunications Services 
AT&T Corp. (AT&T) 
Baldwin, Jesse 
Bardsley, June 
Bell Atlantic Corporation 
BellSouth Corporation 
Cablevision Lightpath, Inc. 
California Public Utilities Commission 
Choice One Communications (Choice One) 
Cincinnati Bell Telephone Company 
Commercial Internet eXchange Association 
Competitive Telecommunications Association ) 
Corecomm Limited 
Cox Communications, Inc. (Cox) 
CT Cube, Inc. & Leaco Rural Telephone Cooperative, Inc. 
CTSI, Inc. 
Florida Public Service Commission 
Focal Communications Corporation 
Frontier Corporation 
General Communication, Inc. 
General Services Administration 
Global NAPs Inc. 
GST Telecom, Inc. 
GTE Services Corporation (GTE) 




Indiana Utility Regulatory Commission 
Information Technology Association of America 
Intermedia Communications Inc. (Intermedia) 
Keep America Connected; Federation offiispanic Organizations of the Baltimore Metropolitan 
Area, Inc; Latin American Women and Supporters; League of United Latin American 
Citizens; Massachusetts Assistive Technology Partnership; National Association of 
Commissions for Women; National Association of Development Organizations; National 
Hispanic Council on Aging; New York Institute of Technology; Resources for Independent 
Living; Telecommunications Advocacy Project; The Child Health Foundation; The National 
Trust for the Development of African American Men; United Homeowners Association; 
United Seniors Health Cooperative 
KMC Telecom Inc. 
Lewis, Shawn 
Lloyd, Kimberly, D. 
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MCI WorldCom, Inc. 
MediaOne Group (Media One) 
Miner, George 
Missouri Public Service Commission 
National Telephone Cooperative Association 
New York State Department of Public Service 
Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission 
Personal Communications Industry Assoc. 
Public Utility Commission of Texas 
Prism Communications Services, Inc. 
RCN Telecom Services, Inc. 
Reinking, Jerome C. 
Richmond Telephone Company 
RNKInc." 
SBC Communicaiah. 
Schaefer, Karl W. 
Sefton, Tim 
Shook, Ofeh< \ 
Sprint Corporal ion 
John Staurulakis, Inc. 
Telecommunications Resellers Association 
Telephone Association of New England • 
Thomas, William J. 
Time Warner Telecom Inc. (Time Warner) 
United States Telephone Association 
Verio Inc. 
Vermont Public Service Board 
Virgin Islands Telephone Corporation 
Wisconsin State Telecommunications Association 
Reply Cuianiciitb i iicu m Response to the Februai y z,u, 1999 Notice of Proposed Kinematcing 
Airtouch Pa 
Ameriteeh 
Association foi I ,ocal 1 elecoi i in u n iicatioi is Sei v ices 
AT&T Corp. 
Bell Atlantic Corporal 
BellSouth Corporation and BellSouth Telecommunications, Inc. 
Competitive Telecommunications Association 
Corecomm Limited (CoreComm) 
Cox Communications, Inc. (Cox) 
Focal Communications Corporation 
General Services Administration 
Global NAPs Inc. 
GST Telecom Inc. 
GTE Services Corporation (GTE) 
•GVNWConsulting, Inc. 
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ICG Communications, Inc 
Illinois Commerce Commission 
Intermedia Communications Inc. 
KMC Telecom Inc. 
MCI WorldCom, Inc. 
National Exchange Carrier Association, Inc. 
National Telephone Cooperative Association 
Network Plus, Inc. 
New York State Department of Public Services 
Pac-West Telecomm., Inc. 
Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission 
Personal Communications Industry Association 
Prism Communications Services, Inc. 
Public Service Commission of Wisconsin 
RCN Telecom Services 
RNK Telecom 
SBC Communications, Inc. 
Sprint Corporation 
Supra Telecommunications & Information Systems, Inc. 
TDS Telecommunications Corporation 
Time Warner Telecom 
United States Telephone Association 
US West Communications, Inc. 
Verio Inc. 
Virgin Islands Telephone Corporation 
Wyoming Public Service Commission 
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Appendix B Final Rules 
AMENDMENTS i u i i l*, CODE Of FEDER AI < R E G l JI • A I IONS .; 
Part 51, Subpart H, of Title 47 of the Code of Federal Regulations (l .1;.R.) is amended as' 
follows: 
;
 ilk; of part M . Subpart I L is revised to read as follows: 
Su5pa rt H—Reciprocal Compi Yansnortand Termination of 
Telecommunications Traffic 
2. Section 51.701 (b) n revised to read as follows: 
" Si./ui scope oi transport aim it 
(b) Tel "/• ://;;> ii;- • .• ..•.-. -or purposes of this subpai t, telecommiinicatioi is traffic means: ' 
{l) Telecommunications traffic exchanged between a LEC and a telecommunications carrier <»thcr 
than a CMRS provider, except for telecommunications traffic that is interstate or intrastate 
exchange access, information access, or exchange services for such access (see V<*C n 1 l"}-, 
paras; 34, 36, 39, 42-43); or 
(2) Telecommunications traffic exchanged between a LEC and a CMRS pro\ idcr that, at the 
beginning of the call, originates and terminates within the same Major Trading Area, as 
defined in § 24.202(a) 'of this chapter, 
3. Sections .. i., ui w , 51.701(c) through (e), 51.703, 51.105, J i. / i. .) i. /1 ^ 
51.715, and 51.717 are each amended by striking "local" before "teicujmmuiucauons traffic" each 
place such word appear;,. 
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SEPARATE STATEMENT OF CHAIRMAN MICHAEL K. POWELL 
Re: Implementation of the Local Competition Provisions in the Telecommunications Act of 
1996; Intercarrier Compensation for ISP-Bound Traffic (CC Docket Nos. 96-98, 99-68) 
In this Order, we re-affirm our prior conclusion that telecommunications traffic delivered 
to Internet service providers (ISPs) is subject to our jurisdiction under section 201 of the Act. 
Thus, we reject arguments that section 251(b)(5) applies to this traffic. I firmly believe that this 
Order is supported by reasonable interpretations of statutory provisions that read together are 
ambiguous and, absent a reconciling interpretation, conflicting. 
I also support the fact that this Order, for the first time, establishes a transition mechanism 
that will gradually wean competitive carriers from heavy reliance on the excessive reciprocal 
compensation charges that incumbents have been forced to pay these competitors for carrying 
traffic from the incumbent to the ISP. This transition mechanism was carefully crafted to balance 
the competing interests of incumbent and competitive telephone companies and other parties, so 
as not to undermine the Act's goal of promoting efficient local telephone competition. 
I write separately only to emphasize a few points: 
As an initial matter, I respectfully disagree with the objections to our conclusion that 
section 251(g) "carves out" certain categories of services that, in the absence of that provision, 
would likely be subject to the requirements of section 251(b)(5).1 Section 251(b)(5)'s language 
first appears to be far-reaching, in that it would seem to apply, by its express terms, to all 
"telecommunications."2 There is apparently no dispute, however, that at least one category of the 
LEC-provided telecommunications services enumerated in section 251(g) (namely, "exchange 
access") is not subject to section 251(b)(5), despite the broad language of this provision. Indeed, 
the Bell Atlantic Court appears to have endorsed that conclusion.3 The question then arises 
whether the other categories of traffic that are enumerated in section 251(g) (including, 
"information access") should also be exempted from the application of section 251(b)(5). We 
answer this question in the affirmative, and no justification (compelling or otherwise) has been 
offered for why only one service - exchange access - should be afforded disparate treatment in 
the construction of section 251(g). I would note, moreover, that on the only other occasion in 
1
 To be more precise, section 251(g) refers to certain categories of service provided by LECs to ISPs and 
interexchange carriers. 47 U.S.C. §"251(g). In this statement, I use a short-hand reference to the "categories of 
services" enumerated in section 25 l(gj. 
2
 47 U.S.C § 251(b)(5). 
* See cf Bell Ail Tel Cos v. FCC, 206 F.3d 1,4 (D.C. Cir. 2000) ("Although [section] 251(b)(5) purports to 
extend reciprocal compensation to all 'telecommunications/ the Commission has construed the reciprocal 
compensation requirement as limited to local traffic"). The Court then went on to conclude that the Commission 
had not provided an adequate explanation of why LECs that carry traffic to ISPs are providing "'exchange access/ 
rather than 'telephone exchange service.'" Id at 9. The Court does not appear to have questioned anywhere in its 
opinion the notion that the scope of the reciprocal compensation requirement does not extend to certain categories 
of LEC-provided services, including "exchange access." 
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which the Commission directly addressed the question whether section 251(g) serves as such a 
"carve-out," the Commission concluded, as we do here, that it does perform that function.4 
Nor do I find the position we adopt here irreconcilable with our decision in the Advanced 
Services Remand Order,s In discussing the term 'infotmation access" in that Order, we were noi 
addressing the question whether section 251(g) eMiiif IS certain categories of traffic provided by 
LECs to ISPs and interexchange carriers from the other requirements of section 251. Rather, we 
addressed only the relationship between 'Information access" and the categories of "exchange 
access" and "telephone exchange service." Specifically, we "dcclinefd] to find that information 
access services are a separate category of services, distinct from, and mutually exclusive with, 
telephone exchange and exchange access services."6 But under the reading of section 251(g) put 
forth in this Order, the question whether information access is distinct from these other services is 
irrelevant Because information access is specifically enumerated in section 251(g), it is not 
subject to the requirements of section 251(b)(5), whether or not that category of service overlaps 
with, or is distinct from, telephone exchange service or exchange access. 
Similarly, I reject the suggestion that section 251(g) only preserves the MFJ requirements. 
The language of section 251(g) specifically refers to "each local exchange carrier," not just to the 
Bell Operating Companies.7 Section 251(g) also expressly refers to any "regulation, order, or 
policy of the Commission."8 Such clauses support the reading of section 251(g) that we adopt 
today.9 
Fiuall}, J disagree that section 2M(g) cannot be construed to exempt certain categories ot 
traffic from the requirements of section 251(b)(5), simply because the former provision does not 
include the words "exclude" or "reciprocal compensation" or "telecommunications."1" As I have 
said, our reading that the categories of LEC-provided services enumerated in subsection (g) are 
exempted from reciprocal compensation arises from our duty to give effect to both section 251(g) 
Implementation of the Local Competition Provisions in the Telecommunications Act of 1996, Interconnection 
Between Local Exchange Carriers and Commercial Mobile Radio Service Providers, CO Dkt. Nos, 96-98, 95-185, 
First Report and Order, 11 FCC Red 15499 (1996), f 1014 
Deployment of Wireline Services Offering Advanced Telecommunications Capability, CC Dkt. Nos. 98-147 et 
al., Order on Remand, 15 FCC Red 385 (1999) {AdvancedServices Remand Order); see also WorldCom, fnc v. 
FCC, No. 00-1002 (DC Cir. filed Apr. 20, 2001) (affirming Advanced Services Remand Order on one of the 
alternative grounds proffered by the Commission). 
Advanced Services Remand Order, 15 l:CC Red at 406, f 46. 
7
 47 W.S.C. § 251(g). 
Had the language of section 251(g) been limited to the Bell Companies oi iu uouit orders and consent decrees, 
for example, perhaps one could construct an argument that Congress meant to limit the scope of section 251(g) to 
the MFJ requirements. 
Section 251(b)(5) states that all LECs must "establish reciprocal compensation arrangements fot the transport 
and termination of telecommunications " 47 U.S.C. § 251(g) (emphasis added). 
6] 
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and section 251(b)(5). I also would point out that section 251(g) does include a specific reference 
to "receipt of compensation," just as the services enumerated in that section (e.g., exchange 
access, information access) undeniably involve telecommunications.11 
In closing, I would only reiterate that the statutory provisions at issue here are ambiguous 
and, absent a reconciling interpretation, conflicting. Thus, the Commission has struggled long and 
hard in an effort to give as full a meaning as possible to each of the provisions in a manner we 
conclude is consistent with the statutory purpose. It would not be overstating matters to 
acknowledge that these issues are highly complex, disputed and elusive, and that what we decide 
here will have enormous impact on the development of new technologies and the economy more 
broadly. It is for their relentless efforts to wrestle with (and now resolve) these issues that I am 
deeply grateful to my colleagues and our able staff 
11
 As the Order suggests, Section 251(g) enumerates "exchange access," "information access" and "exchange 
services for such access." 47 U.S.C. § 251(g). For purposes of subsection (g), all of these services are provided by 
LECs to "interexchange carriers and information service providers." These three categories undeniably involve 
telecommunications. "Information access" was defined in the MFJ as "the provision of specialized exchange 
telecommunications services" to information service providers. United States v. AT&T, 552 F. Supp. 131,196, 229 
(D.D.C. 1982). The term "exchange service" as used in section 251(g): is not defined in the Act or in the MFJ. 
Rather, the term "exchange service" is used in the MFJ as part of the definition of the term "exchange access," 
which the MFJ defines as "the provision of exchange services for the purposes of originating or terminating 
interexchange telecommunications *" UnitedTStates v. AT&T, F. Supp. at 228. Thus, the term "exchange service" 
appears to mean, in context, the provision of services in connection with interexchange communications. 
Consistent with that, in section 251(g), the term is used as part of the longer phrase "exchange services for such 
[exchange] access to interexchange carriers and information service providers " All of this indicates that the term 
"exchange service" is closely related to the provision of exchange access and information access, and that all three 
involve telecommunications. 
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DISSENTING STATEMENT OF 
COMMISSIONER HAROLD FURCHTGOTT HO 111 
Re: Implementation of the Local Competition Provisions in the Telecommunications Act of 
1996 and Inter-Carrier Compensation for ISP-Bound Traffic, Order on Remand and 
Report and Order, CC Docket Nos. 96-98, 99-68 
To some observers, the Telecommunications Act of 1996 ("1996 Act"), in general, mi\ 
sections 251 and 252 (47 U.S.C. §§ 251 and 252), in particular, have become unnecessary 
inconveniences. The poster child for those who proclaim the 1996 Act's failure is reciprocal 
compensation If has led to large billings - some paid, some unpaid among telecommunications 
carriers. These billings have not shrunk, in large part because the Commission's interpretation of 
the pick-and-choose provision of the Act |47 11 S C § ?5?(i)) has led to unstable contracts, with 
perverse incentives for renegotiation. 
Reciprocal compensation is an obscure and tedious topic. It is not, however, a topic that 
Congress overlooked. To the contrary, in describing reciprocal compensation arrangements in 
sections 251 and 252, Congress went into greater detail than it did for almost any other 
commercial relationship between carriers covered in the 1996 Act. Among other things, Congress 
mandated that reciprocal compensation arrangements would be 
(1) made by contract; (2) under State supervision; (3) at rates to be negotiated or arbitrated; and 
(4) would utilize a bill-and-keep plan only on a case-by-case basis under specific statutory 
conditions. See 47 U.S.C. §§ 251(b)(5), 252(a), 252(b), 252(d)(2) 
Faced with these statutory mandates, how should the large billings for reciprocal 
compensation be addressed? Renegotiating contracts would be the simple market solution, out) 
made precarious by our pick-and-choose rules. Another solution would be to seek review of 
reciprocal compensation agreements by State commissions. Other solutions would be for this 
Commission to change its pick-and-choose rules or to issue guidelines for State commission 
decisions {see AT&T Corp v. Iowa Utilities Bd9 525 U.S. 366, 385 (1999)). 
Each of these solutions, of course, would reflect at least a modicum of respect for States, 
their lawmakers, their regulators, federal law, and the Congress that enacted the 1996 Act. Each 
would also be consistent with, and respectful of, the prior ruling on reciprocal compensation by 
the Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit See Bell Atlantic Tel. Cos. v. FCC, 206 F.3d 1 (D.C. 
Cir ^0001 
There is, however, one solution that is not respectful of other governmental m (itiilii HI 
It is a solution that places under exclusive federal jurisdiction broad expanses of 
telecommunications. It is a solution that does not directly solve the problem at hand, It is a 
solution that can be reached only through a twisted interpretation of the law and a vitiation of 
economic reasoning and general common sense. That solution is nationwide price regulation. 
That is the regrettable solution the Commission has adopted. 
The Commission's decision has broad consequences for the iuture of telecommunications 
regulation. In holding that essentially all packetized communications fall within federal 
jurisdiction, the Commission has dramatically diminished the States' role going forward, as such 
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communications are fast becoming the dominant mode. Whatever the merits of this reallocation 
of authority, it is a reallocation that properly should be made only by Congress. It certainly 
should not be made, as here, by a self-serving federal agency acting unilaterally. 
There is doubtlessly underway a publicity campaign by the proponents of today's action. 
It will spin nationwide mandatory price regulation as "deregulation." It will spin the abandonment 
of States and contracts as "good government." 
The media might be spun by this campaign. The public might be spun. But it will be far 
more difficult to convince the courts that the current action is lawful. 
A Flawed Order From Flawed Decisionmaking 
Today's order is the product of a flawed decisionmaking process that occurs all too 
frequently in this agency. It goes like this. First, the Commission settles on a desired outcome, 
based on what it thinks is good "policy" and without giving a thought to whether that outcome is 
legally supportable. It then slaps together a statutory analysis. The result is an order like this one, 
inconsistent with the Commission's precedent and fraught with legal difficulties. 
In March 2000, the Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit vacated the Commission's 
conclusion that section 251(b)(5) does not apply to calls made to Internet service providers 
("ISPs"). See Bell Atlantic, 206 F.3d at 9. The court ruled that, among other things, the 
Commission had not provided a "satisfactory explanation why LECs that terminate calls to ISPs 
are not properly seen as 'terminating . . . local telecommunications traffic,' and why such traffic is 
'exchange access' rather than 'telephone exchange service.'" Id. 
The Commission has taken more than a year to respond to the court's remand decision. 
My colleagues some time ago decided on their general objective - asserting section 201(b) 
jurisdiction over ISP-bound traffic and permitting incumbent carriers to ramp down the payments 
that they make4o competitive ones. The delay in producing an order is attributable to the 
difficulty the Commission has had in putting together a legal analysis to support this result, which 
is at odds with the agency's own precedent as well as the plain language of the statute. 
Today, $ie Commission rules, once again, that section 251(b)(5) does not apply to ISP-
bound traffic, in a set of convoluted arguments that sidestep the court's objections to its previous 
order, the Commission now says that ISP-bound traffic is "information access," which, the 
Commission asserts, is excluded "from the universe of'telecommunications' referred to in section 
251(b)(5)" (Order \\ 23, 30) - despite the Commission's recent conclusion in another context 
that "information access" is not a separate category of service exempt from the requirements of 
section 251. See Deployment of Wireline Services Offering Advanced Telecommunications 
Capability, Order on Remand, 15 FCC Red 385, ffl[ 46-49 (1999) ("AdvancedServices Remand-
Order"). 
The result will be another round of litigation, and, in all likelihood, this issue will be back 
at the agency m another couple of years. In the meantime, the uncertainty that has clouded the 
issue of compensation for ISP-bound traffic for the last five years will continue. The Commission 
would act far more responsibly if it simply recognized that ISP-bound traffic comes within section 
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25 l(b)( i > IK \ .id mean that the tomnii ^ impose on 
these communicate _, .. ,; ^:..LCS up, as the agency bclie\. .. .
 T cd to do under 
section 201(b). Rather, the Commission would be forced to work w ithin the confines of sections 
251(b)(5) and 252(d)(2), which, among other things, grant author^ to Stale commissions to 
decide on "just and reasonable" rates for reciprocal compensation. 47 U.S.C. § 252(d)(2). But' 
the Commission surely could issue "rules to guide the state-commission judgments" regarding 
reciprocal compensation (Iowa Utilities Bd9 525 U.S. at 385) and perhaps could even put in place 
the same compensation scheme it orders here. At the same time, the confusion that this order will 
add to the agency's already bewildering precedent on Internet-related issues would be avoided. .. 
The Commission's Vt e\ ions Order and 
the Court's Remand Decision 
'i i) see how far the Commission I las eon le in its atten lpt to assert sectioi i 201(b) 
jurisdiction over ISP-bound traffic, let us briefly review the court's decision on the Commission a 
previous order, which receives little attention in the order released today, In its previous order, 
issued in February 1999, the Commission focused on the jurisdictional nature of ISP-bound 
traffic. See Implementation of the Local Competition Provisions in the Telecommunications Act 
of 1996; Inter-Carrier Compensation for ISP-Bound Traffic, Declaratory Ruling, 14 FCC Red 
3689 (1999) (^'Reciprocal Compensation Declaratory Ruling"). Applying an "end-to-end" 
analysis, the agency concluded that calls to ISPs do not terminate at the ISP's local server, but 
instead continue to the "ultimate destination or destinations, specifically at a[n] Internet website 
that is often located in another state." Id. f 12. Based on this jurisdictional analysis, the 
Commission ruled that a substantial portion of calls to ISPs are jurisdictional^ interstate, and n 
described ISP-bound traffic as interstate "access servu e " Id, ffl[ 17, 18. The Commission 
reasoned that, since reciprocal compensation is required only for the transport and terminaliui. oi 
/oca/traffic, section 251(b)(5)'s obligations did noi apply to ISP-bound calls. See id 1 |^ 7, 26. 
Iv'-'•' •'': The'Court'Asked the Commission "• ISI s \ r e Not Like Othei <«w»l 
Businesses 
The court vacated the Commission's decision. It held that, regardless of the jurisdictional 
issue, the Commission had not persuasively distinguished ISPs from other businesses that use 
communications services to provide goods or services to their customers. See Bell Atlantic, 206 
F.3d at 7. In the court's view, the Commission had lailed to explain why "an ISP is not, for 
purposes of reciprocal compensation, 'simply a communications-intensive business end user 
selling a product to other consumer and business encfMisers.'" Id, (citation omitted). 
v 2v ' The Court Asked the Commission Why Calls Do Not Terminate at ISPs 
I he court also questioned the Commission's-conclusion that a call to an 1M' did not 
"terminate" at the ISP. "[T]he mere fact that the ISP originates further telecommunications does 
not imply that the original telecommunication does not 'terminate' at the ISP." Id. The court 
concluded that, "[hjowever sound the end-to-end analysis may be for jurisdictional purposes,1 -\ 
Commission had failed to explain why treating these "linked telecommunications as continuous 
works for purposes of reciprocal compensation " Id 
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3. The Court Asked the Commission How Its Treatment of ISP-Bound Traffic 
Is Consistent with Its Treatment of Enhanced Service Providers 
The court also wondered whether the Commission's treatment of ISP-bound traffic was 
consistent with the approach it applies to enhanced service providers ("ESPs"), which include 
ISPs. See id. at 7-8. The Commission has long exempted ESPs from the access charge system, 
effectively treating them as end-users of local service rather than long-distance carriers. The court 
observed that this agency, in the Eighth Circuit access charge litigation, had taken the position 
"that a call to an information service provider is really like a call to a local business that then uses 
the telephone to order wares to meet the need." Id. at 8. The court rejected as "not very 
compelling" the Commission's argument that the ESP exemption is consistent with the 
understanding that ESPs use interstate access services. Id. 
4. The Court Asked the Commission Whether ISP-Bound Traffic is "Exchange 
Access" or "Telephone Exchange Service" 
Finally, the court rejected the Commission's suggestion that ISPs are "users of access 
service." Id. The court noted that the statute creates two statutory categories - "telephone 
exchange service" and "exchange access" - and observed that on appeal, the Commission had 
conceded that these categories occupied the field. Id. If the Commission had meant to say that 
ISPs are users of "exchange access," wrote the court, it had "not provided a satisfactory 
explanation why this is the case." Id. 
The Commission's Latest Order 
Today, the Commission fails to answer any of the court's questions. Recognizing that it 
could not reach the desired result within the framework it used previously, the Commission offers 
up a completely new analysis, under which it is irrelevant whether ISP-bound traffic is "local" 
rather than "long-distance" or "telephone exchange service" rather than "exchange access." 
In today's order, the Commission concludes that section 251(b)(5) is not limited to local 
traffic as it had previously maintained, but instead applies to all "telecommunications" traffic 
except the categories specifically enumerated in section 251(g). See Order ^ 32, 34. The 
Commission concludes that ISP-bound traffic falls within one of these categories - "information 
access" - and is therefore exempt from section 25 1(b)(5). See id. \ 42. The agency wraps up 
with a determination4hat ISP-bound traffic is interstate, and it thus has jurisdiction under section 
201(b) to regulate compensation for the exchange ofiSP-bound traffic. See id. Yi 52-65. 
The Commission's latest attempt to solve the reciprocal compensation puzzle is no more 
successful than were its earlier efforts. As discussed below, its determination that ISP-bound 
traffic is "information^ccess" and, hence, exempt from section 251(b)(5) is inconsistent with still-
warm Commission precedent. Moreover, its interpretation of section 251(g) cannot be reconciled 
with the statute's plain language. 
1. Today's decision is a complete reversal ofthe Commission's recent decision in the 
Advanced Services Remand Order. In that order, the Commission rejected an argument that 
xDSL traffic is exempt from the unbundling obligations of section 251(c)(3) as "information 
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access." Among other things, the Commission found meritless the argument that section 251(g) 
exempts "information access" traffic from other requirements of section 251. Id. \ 47. Rather, 
the Commission explained, "this provision is merely a continuation of the equal access and 
nondiscrimination provisions of the Consent Decree until superseded by subsequent regulations of 
the Commission." Id According to the Commission, section 251(g) "is a transitional 
enforcement mechanism that obligates the incumbent LECs to continue to abide by equal access 
and nondiscriminatory interconnection requirements of the MFJ." Id. The Commission thus 
concluded that section 251(g) was not intended to exempt xDSL traffic from section 25 Fs other 
provisions. See id. \\ 47-49. 
In addition, the Commission rejected the contention that "information access" is a 
statutory category distinct from "telephone exchange service" and "exchange access." See id. 
K 46.l It pointed out that "'information access' is not a defined term under the Act, and is cross-
referenced in only two transitional provisions." Id. f 47. It ultimately concluded that nothing in 
the Act suggests that "information access" is a category of services mutually exclusive with 
exchange access or telephone exchange service. See id. f 48. 
The Commission further determined that ISP-bound traffic is properly classified as 
"exchange access." See id. f 35. It noted that exchange access refers to "access to telephone 
exchange services or facilities for the purpose of originating or terminating communications that 
travel outside an exchange." Id. % 15. Applying this definition, and citing the Reciprocal 
Compensation Declaratory Ruling, the Commission reasoned that the service provided by the 
local exchange carrier to an ISP is ordinarily exchange access service, "because it enables the ISP 
to transport the communication initiated by the end-user subscriber located in one exchange to its 
ultimate destination in another exchange, using both the services of the local exchange carrier and 
in the typical case the telephone toll service of the telecommunications carrier responsible for the 
interexchange transport." Id. f^ 35. 
The Advanced Services Remand Order was appealed to the D.C. Circuit. See WorldCom, 
2001 WL 395344. The Commission argued to the court in February that the term "information 
access" is merely "a holdover term from the MFJ, which the 1996 Act supersedes." WorldCom, 
Inc. v. FCC, Brief for Respondents at 50 (D.C. Cir. No. 00-1002). Its brief also emphasized that 
section 251(g) was "designed simply to establish a transition from the MFJ's equal access ami 
nondiscrimination provisions . . . to the new obligations set out in the statute." Id. 
Today, just two months after it made those arguments to the D.C. Circuit, the 
Commission reverses itself. It now says that section 251(g) exempts certain categories of traffic, 
including "information access," entirely from the requirements of section 251(b)(5) and thatf SP-
bound traffic is "information access." See Order ffl 32, 34, 42. The Commission provides nary a 
word to explain this reversal. 
Of course, the Commission's conclusions in the Advanced Services Remand Order that 
This aspect of the Advanced Services Remand Order was remanded to the Commission by the D.C. Circuit 
because of its reliance on the vacated Reciprocal Compensation Declaratory Ruling. See WorldCom, Inc. v FCC, 
No. 00-1062, 2001 WL 395344, *5-*6 (D.C. Cir. Apr 20, 2001). 
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ISP-bound traffic is "exchange access" and that the term "information access" has no relevance 
under the 1996 Act were themselves reversals of earlier Commission positions. In the Non-
Accounting Safeguards Order? the Commission concluded, relying in part on a purported 
distinction between "exchange access" and "information access," that ISPs "do not use exchange 
access as it is defined by the Act." Id. f 248. In that order, the Commission was faced with 
determining the scope of section 272(e)(2), which states that a Bell operating company ["BOC"] 
"shall not provide any facilities, services, or information regarding its provision of exchange 
access to [a BOC affiliate] unless such facilities, services, or information are made available to 
other providers of interLATA services in that market on the same terms and conditions." 47 
U.S.C. § 272(e)(2). The Commission rejected the argument that BOCs are required to provide 
exchange access to ISPs, reasoning that ISPs do not use exchange access. See Non-Accounting 
Safeguards Order ^ 248. In making that decision, the Commission relied on the language of the 
statute as well as the MFJ's use of the term "information access." See id. \ 248 & n. 621. As the 
Commission explained, its "conclusion that ISPs do not use exchange access is consistent with the 
MFJ, which recognized a difference between 'exchange access' and 'information access/" Id. % 
248n.621. 
Thus, in reversing itself yet again, the Commission here follows a time-honored tradition. 
When it is expedient to say that ISPs use "exchange access" and that there is no such thing as 
"information access," that is what the Commission says. See Advanced Service Remand Order ^% 
46-48. When it is convenient to say that ISPs use the local network like local businesses, then the 
Commission adopts that approach. See Access Charge Reform, First Report and Order, 12 FCC 
Red 15982, ^ 345 (1997). And, today, when it helps to write that ISPs use "information access," 
then that is what the Commission writes. The only conclusion that one can soundly draw from 
these decisions is that the Commission is willing to make up whatever law it can dream up to suit 
the situation at hand. 
Nevertheless^ there is one legal proposition that the Commission has, until now, 
consistently followed - a fact that is particularly noteworthy given the churn in the Commission's 
other legal principles. The Commission has consistently held that section 251(g) serves only to 
"preserve[] the LECs' existing equal access obligations, originally imposed by the MFJ." 
Operator Communications, Inc., D/B/A Oncor Communications, Memorandum Opinion and 
Order, 14 FCC Red 12506, % 2 n.5 (1999).3 Today's order ignores this precedent and transforms 
2
 Implementation of the Non-Accounting Safeguards Of Sections 271 and 272 of the Communications Act of1934, 
as Amended, First Report and Order and Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 11 FCC Red 21905 (1996) 
("Non-Accounting Safeguards Order"'). 
3
 See also, e.g, Application for Review and Petition for Reconsideration or Clarification of Declaratory Ruling 
Regarding US West Petitions To Consolidate Latas in Minnesota and Arizona, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 
14 FCC Red 14392, ^  17 (1999) ("In section 251(g), Congress delegated to the Commission sole authority to 
administer the 'equal access and nondiscriminatory interconnection restrictions and obligations' that applied under 
the AT&T Consent Decree."); AT&T Corporation, et al, Complainants, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 13 
FCC Red 21438, \ 5 (1998) ("Separately, section 251(g) requires the BOCs, both pre- and_post-entry, to treat all 
-interexchange carriers in accordance with their preexisting equal access and nondiscrimination obligations, and 
thereby neutralize the potential anticompetitive impact they could have on the long distance market until such time 
as the Commission finds it reasonable to revise or eliminate those obligations."). 
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section 251(g) into a categorical exemption for certain traffic from section 251(b)(5). It is this 
transformation - much more than the shell game played with "information access" and "exchange 
access"- that is most offensive in today's decision. 
2. The Commission's claim that section 251(g) "excludes several enumerated categories 
of traffic from the universe of'telecommunications' referred to in section 251(b)(5)" (Order f 23) 
stretches the meaning of section 251(g) past the breaking point. Among other things, that 




 Section 251(g), which is entitled, "Continued enfi ^  ^ * ,!': " ,f c f exchange access ai id 
interconnection requirements," states in relevant part: 
On and after February 8, 1996, each local exchange carrier, to the extent that it 
provides wireline services, shall provide exchange access, information access, and 
exchange services for such access to interexchange carriers and information service 
providers in accordance with the same equal access and nondiscriminatory 
interconnection restrictions and obligations (including receipt of compensation) 
that apply to such carrier on the date immediately preceding February 8, 1996 
under any court order, consent decree, or regulation, order, or policy of the 
Commission, until such restrictions and obligations are explicitly superseded by 
regulations prescribed by the Commission after February 8, 1996. 
47 U.S.C.§ 251(g). 
As an initial matter, it is plain from reading this language that section 251(g) has 
absolutely no application to the vast majority of local exchange carriers, including those most 
affected by today's order. The provision states that "each local exchange carrier... shall provide 
[the enumerated services]... in accordance with the same equal access and nondiscriminatory 
interconnection restrictions and obligations . . . that apply to such carrier on the date immediately 
preceding February 8, 1996 r Id. (emphasis added). If a carrier was not providing service on 
February 7, 1996, no restrictions or obligations applied to "such carrier" on that date, and section 
251(g) would appear to have no impact on that carrier. The Commission has thus repeatedly 
stated that section 251(g) applies to "Bell Operating Companies" and is intended to incorporate 
aspects of the MFJ. Applications For Consent To The Transfer Of Control Of Licenses And 
Section 214 Authorizations From Tele-Communications, Inc., Transferor To AT&T Corp., 
Transferee., Memorandum Opinion and Order, 14 FCC Red 3160, ^  53 (1999); see also cases 
cited supra note 3. Accordingly, by its express terms, section 251(g) says nothing about the 
obligations of most CLECs serving ISPs, which are the primary focus of the Commission's order. 
Moreover, it is inconceivable that section 251(g)'s preservation of pre-1996 Act "equal 
access and nondiscriminatory interconnection restrictions and obligations" is intended to displacer 
section 251(b)(5)'s explicit compensation scheme for local carriers transporting and terminating 
each other's traffic. Prior to passage of the 1996 Act, there were no rules governing 
compensation for such services, whether or not an ISP was involved. It seems unlikely, at best, 
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that Congress intended the absence of a compensation scheme to preempt a provision explicitly 
providing for such compensation.4 At the very least, one would think Congress would use 
language more explicit than that seized upon by the Commission in section 251(g). 
Finally, if, as the Commission maintains, section 251(g) "excludes several enumerated 
categories of traffic from the universe of'telecommunications' referred to in section 251(b)(5)" 
(Order Tf 23), why does section 251(g) not also exclude this traffic from the "universe of 
'telecommunications'" referred to in the rest of section 251, or, indeed, in the entire 1996 Act? 
As noted, section 251(g) nowhere mentions "reciprocal compensation" or even "section 251." In 
fact, there appears to be no limiting principle. It would thus seem that, under the Commission's 
interpretation, the traffic referred to in section 251(g) is exempt from far more than reciprocal 
compensation - a consequence the Commission is sure to regret. See, e.g., Implementation of the 
Local Competition Provisions in the Telecommunications Act of 1996; Interconnection Between 
Local Exchange Carriers and Commercial Mobile Radio Service Providers, First Report and 
Order 11 FCC Red 15499, f 356 (1996) (concluding that "exchange access" provided to IXCs is 
subject to the unbundling requirements of section 251(c)(3)). 
* * * 
The end result of today's decision is clear. There will be continued litigation over the 
status of ISP-bound traffic, prolonging the uncertainty that has plagued this issue for years. At 
the same time, the Commission will be forced to reverse itself yet again, as soon as it dislikes the 
implication of treating ISP-bound traffic as "information access" or reading section 251(g) as a 
categorical exemption from other requirements of the 1996 Act. The Commission could, and 
should, have avoided these consequences by applying its original analysis in the manner sought by 
the court. 
4
 The case of IXC traffic is thus completely different. There was a compensation scheme in effect forsuch traffic 
prior to enactment of the 1996 Act - the access charge regime. Because reciprocal compensation andlhe access 
charge regime could not both apply to the same traffic, the Commission could reasonably conclude that the access 
charge regime should trump the^  reciprocal compensation provision of section 251(b)(5). See Competitive 
Telecommunications Ass'n v FCC, 111 F.3d 1068, 1072-73 (8th Cir. 1997). Here, there is no pre-1996 Act 
compensation scheme to conflictwith reciprocal compensation. As the Commission has stated, uthe Commission 
has never applied eitherthe ESP exemption or its rules regarding the joint provision of access to the situation 
where two carriers collaborate to deliver traffic to an ISP." Reciprocal Compensation Declaratory Riding \ 26. 
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MEMORANDUM IN SUPPOR I'M 
MOTION TO REMAND 
(Oral A rgument Requested) 
Hon. Dale A. Kimball 
2:06cv00132 DAK 
Level 3 Communications, LLC ("Level 3"), through its counsel, and pursuant to the 
provisions at 28 U.S.C § 1447(c) and Rule 7-1 of the Rules ot Put iice uf flic United States 
District Court for the District of Utah, hereby submits this Memorandum in Support of its 
Motion to Remand this case to the Supreme Court of Utah. This Motion is based on the grounds 
that the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction to hear this controversy. 
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I. STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. On January 10, 2001, Level 3 entered into an interconnection agreement with 
U.S. West, Qwesf s predecessor. ("Old Agreement"). The Old Agreement provided among 
other things: 
If the Parties' elect to establish two-way direct trunks, the compensation for such 
jointly used 'shared' facilities shall be adjusted as follows: The nominal 
compensation shall be pursuant to the rates for direct trunk transport in Appendix 
A. The actual rate paid to the provider of the direct trunk facility shall be 
reduced to reflect the provider's use of that facility. The adjustment in the direct 
trunk transport rate shall be a percentage that reflects the provider's relative use 
(i.e. originating minutes of use) of the facility in the busy hour. 
Old Agreement, Attachment 1 § 5.1.2.4 (emphasis added). 
2. The Old Agreement was approved by the Utah Public Service Commission 
("Commission") pursuant to the Communications Act of 1934, as amended by the 
Telecommunications Act of 1996 (the "Telecommunications Act" or "Act") and Utah Code Ann 
§58-8b-2.2. Report and Order, Docket No. 00-049-88, Findings of Fact (Jan. 10, 2001) 
("Original Order"). 
3. One of the agreed upon terms of the Old Agreement was an "Evergreen clause" 
which read: 
This Agreement shall be effective upon Commission approval and 
shall remain in effect until June 26, 2001 and thereafter shall 
continue in force and effect unless and until a new agreement 
addressing all of the terms of this Agreement, becomes effective 
between the Parties. ... This Agreement shall remain in effect until 
a new interconnection agreement approved by the Commission has 
become effective. 
Old Agreement, Part A, § 20.1 (emphasis added). Thus, the terms of the Old Agreement were to 
apply until a new agreement was approved by the Commission. 
4. The parties undertook negotiations and were able to agree to all the terms of a 
new agreement except for one general issue. On August 6, 2002, Level 3 filed its Petition for 
2 
831693.13 
Case 2:06-cv-00132-DAK Uuuument Filed 03/15/2006 Paqo \ i »l Hi 
Arbitration to resolve that one 01 itstanding issue. The arbiti ated issue was wl lethei ISP bound 
traffic should count as Qwest originating minutes for the calculation of "relative use" of direct-
trunked transport on Qwest's side of'thc pnitm nf mien uittiet linii ii'TOPi I H.ili I'nblu Seiv. 
Comm'n, Docket No. 02-2266-02 (Feb. 20, 2004). 
5. . On February 20, 2004, the Commission issued ii( < Mtli'i m the adiiinifiu n 
proceeding ("Arbitration Order"), approving the parties' new agreement ("New Agreement") (a 
copy of the Arbitration Order is attached hereto as Attachment 1). Althoi lgl i the Commission' 
adopted Qwest's proposed language excluding ISP-bound traffic from the calculation of a 
relative use factor, it adopted Level 3's position prohibiting the retroactive application of the new 
factor that would be established by studying the traffic exchanged between the parties in the first 
three months of the term of the New Agreement. The Commission's Arbitration Order stated: 
Qwest proposes that when a new factor is established that bills 
should be retroactively adjusted for the initial billing quarter. 
Level 3 argues that any new relative use factor should be used 
prospectively only. We will adopt Level 3's position and order that 
the contract language be modified so that no true up will be made 
and new relativeuse factors will apply prospectively only. 
Docket No. 02-2266-02, at p. 4 (emphasis added). 
• From July 2002 to February 2004 ("Dispute Period"), roughlj the same pei iod of time 
that the parties were irt arbitration over the question of whether the New Agreement should 
introduce language that excluded ISP-bound traffic from the calculation of originating minutes, 
Qwest billed Level 3 approximately $563,616.99 in charges for interconnection trunks in Utah. 
Level 3 has consistently disputed those charges because there was no basis for them under the 
terms of the Old Agreement. Although the parties held multiple discussions in an attempt to 
resolve the billing dispute, they were unable to reach any agreement as a result of those 
discussions. On June 43, 2005, Qwest sent to Level 3 a demand letter rejecting Level 3's 
3 
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position, demanding payment of $563,616.99, and threatening suspension of all service order 
activity and disconnection of services, effective June 28, 2005. 
6. From the time the New Agreement was approved by the Commission, Level 3 
has paid the relative use charges for direct trunk transport facilities pursuant to the language in 
the New Agreement and the Commission's Arbitration Order. However, on June 23, 2005, Level 
3 petitioned the Commission for an order enjoining Qwest from disconnecting Level 3's service, 
and for a declaratory judgment that Level 3 was current in its payment to Qwest for direct-trunk 
transport services that Qwest agreed to provide pursuant to the terms of the Old Agreement. See 
Petition of Level 3 Communications, LLC for Enforcement of the Interconnection Agreement 
Between Qwest and Level 3 ("Petition"), filed with the Commission June 23, 2005 (attached 
hereto as Attachment 2). 
7. Level 3's Petition invoked the jurisdiction of the Commission under Title 54 
and Title 63 Chapter 46b of the Utah Code. It requested that the Commission prevent Qwest 
from terminating Level 3's services. It also requested enforcement of the straightforward, 
unambiguous language of the relative use clause of the Old Agreement, which dictates that 
Qwest bear its own costs for carrying its originated traffic to Level 3 for termination. Level 3 
also sought to invoke the Commission's Arbitration Order which prohibited Qwest from 
applying the new relative use language from the New Agreement retroactively to the Old 
Agreement. Level 3 did not state any claim under the Act, did not claim that Qwest or the New 
or Old Agreement violated the Act, and did not assert that any provision of the Act controlled the 
outcome. Level 3 only invoked state contract law concerning contract interpretation to 
determine the plain meaning of the Old Agreement. 
831693.13 
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8. On August 18, 2005, the Commission issued its Report and Order ruling that 
regardless of the absence of language requiring it, Qwest should be allowed to exclude ISP-
bound traffic from the relative use calculation in the pricing provision for shared trunks in the 
Old Agreement. 
9. Level 3 filed a Motion for Reconsideration and Rehearing of the Commission's 
decision on or about September -MS (attached hereto as Attachment 3). I he basis for that 
Motion was that the Commission's interpretation of the Old Agreement had failed to give effect 
to the unambiguous intention of the parties as expressed in the relative use calculation set out in 
the pricing provision of the Old Agreement. 
"•'" 10.. On or about October 4," 2003, Qwest submitted an I Jnopposed I\ lotion'for 
Limited Reconsideration. On the same day, the Commission issued an Order Granting Limited 
Reconsideration so that the parties could have a chance to conclude settlement discussions that 
were occurring at the time. Upon the unsuccessful conclusion of settlement discussions, the 
Commission allowed the period of time to run foi deciding Level 3 b - 1 '-' sideration 
and Rehearing, thus resulting in a deemed denial of that Motion. 
11. On January 13, 2006, Level 3 filed a time! - ^ ' ;>p. «" * • '>'<• Utah 
Supreme Court pursuant to Utah Code Ann. 63-46b-16, seeking review of the Commission's 
August 18, 2005 Report am1 Order. 
12. On February 13, 2006, Qwest and the Commission filed a Notice of Removal. 
By the present Motion, and based on the grounds set forth below, Level ~< i<\\\u-<\< \U.\\ the Court 
find that it lacks subject matter jurisdiction and remand this appeal to the Utah Supreme Court. 
II. LEGAL STANDARD 
A party may remove a civil action only if the plaintiff could have originally brought the 
action in federal court. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a). A court must remand "if at any time before final 
5 • • ' • 
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judgment it appears that the district court lacks subject matter jurisdiction/' 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c). 
Because a federal court is a court of limited jurisdiction, "there is a presumption against removal 
jurisdiction." Laughlin v. Kmart Corp.. 50 R3d 871, 873 (10th Cir. 1995) (remand to state court 
for failure to meet amount in controversy requirement). Thus, the party requesting removal bears 
the burden to demonstrate jurisdiction exists. Laughlin, 50 F.3d at 873 (quoting Gaus v. Miles, 
Inc., 980 F.2d 564, 567 (9th Cir. 1992)); Basso v. Utah Power & Light Co., 495 F.2d 906, 909 
(10th Cir. 1974). Accordingly, "[rjemoval statutes are to be strictly construed [citation omitted] 
and all doubts are to be resolved against removal/' Fajen v. Foundation Reserve Ins. Co., Inc., 
683 F.2d 331, 333 (10th Cir. 1982) (reversing district court's decision to remove because the 
district court failed to apply this strict standard). 
HI. THE FEDERAL COURT DOES NOT HAVE SUBJECT MATTER 
JURISDICTION OVER THIS MATTER 
The Utah Supreme Court has jurisdiction to hear all appeals from decisions of the Utah 
Public Service Commission. Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-16. Level 3 properly and timely filed its 
appeal from the Commission's Report and Order with the Utah Supreme Court. 
Qwest seeks to invoke federal jurisdiction of the Level 3 Petition for Review pursuant to 
Section 1331 of the United States Code. Section 1331 provides "The district courts shall have 
original jurisdiction of all civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the 
United States." 28 U.S.C. § 1331. A case is deemed to "arise under" federal law if'"its well-
pleaded complaint establishes either that federal law creates the cause of action or that the 
plaintiff s right to relief necessarily depends on resolution of a substantial question of federal 
law.'" Morris v. City of Hobart, 39 F.3d 1105, 1111 (10th Cir. 1994) (quoting Franchise Tax 
Bd. of Cal. v. Constructioni,aborers Vacation Trust for S. Cal, 463 U.S. 1,27-28 (1983)). 
831693.13 
6 
Case 2:06-cv-00132-DAK Document 5 Filed 03/15/2006 Page 7 of 16 
Under the law of the Tenth. Circuit, two conditions must be met I >efoi e jurisdiction « :\ ir I: c • 
found. First, the plaintiffs complaint must, on its face, raise a question of federal law. 
Nicodemus v. Union Pac. Corp., 318 F.3d 1231, 1235 (10th Cir. 2003) (citing Rice v. Office of 
Servicemembers, Group Life Ins., 260 F.3d 1240, 1245 (10th Cir. 2001)). Second, the plaintiff s 
cause of action must "either be (1) created by federal law, or (2) if it is a state-created cause of 
action, 'its resolution must necessarily turn on a substantial question of federal law.'" Id. 
(quoting Rice, 260 F.3d at 1245). 
A, Level 3 V Petition for Relief Does Not Raise a Question of Federal Law 
This case is not one where a plaintiff is seeking relief in a complaint. Instead it is an 
appeal fn>m Ik* Rrpml ,tml Oulci of tir |l|;th Public Service Commission, ' riie Commission 
already has taken evidence and heard argument. Determination of the proper jurisdiction for this 
•'matter ne\ ertheless''requires-' consideration c f the causes of action alleged 'by I ,evel 3.• 
Jurisdiction under Section 1331 may be found only if Qwest demonstrates that Level 3's Petition 
raises a federal question on its face. A response fro* M*-n>. -^  at raises a federal 
question is inadequate to confer federal jurisdiction." Merrell Dow Pharms. Inc. v. Thompson. 
478 U.S. 804, 808(1986). 
Level 3's Petition sought an order from the Commission enjoining Qwest from 
disconnecting .service to Level 3, and foi a declaration that I evel 3 v as ci it i eiit on its payments' 
to Qwest-for shared trunks. Petition at 8 (Attachment 2 to this Memorandum). On its face, the 
Petition does not'allege that the Commission has jurisdiction pui'.uani In IWIenil luw, or dial 
Level 3 is-asserting any claim under federal law, It does not raise any issues that are to be 
determined under federal law or suggest that federal law provrdes ; r * umnw i ie 
relief requested in the Petition. Instead, the Petition alleges that state law provides the basis for 
the Commission's jurisdiction and for the requested relief. Petition at 1. 
7 
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Level 3's Petition to the Commission also sought to enforce the Commission's 
Arbitration Order adopting Qwest's new version of the relative use calculation in the New 
Agreement on a prospective basis only. It asked the Commission to bar Qwest's attempts to 
retroactively impose relative use charges on Level 3 for the period the parties were operating 
under the Old Agreement terms requiring Qwest to bear its own costs. Those issues do not raise 
any question of federal law. The Commission's Arbitration Order approving the New 
Agreement clearly stated that the new provision in the New Agreement allocating costs for 
shared trunks would be applied prospectively only beginning with the second billing quarter after 
the New Agreement had been approved and became effective. Report and Order at 4. Level 3's 
Petition sought a declaration by the Commission enforcing that part of its Order. Petition at 
mi8-ii . 
Level 3 also pleaded that relative use payment obligations could not be imposed by 
retroactive application of the Report and Order or otherwise because the unambiguous language 
in the Old Agreement provided no basis for such charges. Level 3 pleaded this as a request to 
the Commission to enforce the plain, Commission-approved language of the Old Agreement. 
Petition at 1fl[ 5, 14. 
Finally, the Petition sought an order from the Commission enjoining Qwest from 
disconnecting service to Level 3 in violation of the Old and New Interconnection Agreements. 
The Commission's authority to issue injunctions and the basis for doing so in a case of a billing 
dispute is derived from state law. See e.g., Utah Code Ann. §§ 54-4-1; 54-8b-2.2(l)(e). 
Federal law is not implicated in Levet3's Petition. The only reference to federal law in 
the Petition involves the Federal Communications Commission's ("FCC") treatment of 
reciprocal compensation for telecommunications traffic bound for Internet service providers 
831693.13 
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("ISPs"). The reference to federal law in that instance merely demonstrated that the parties 
amended the Old Agreement after the FCC's "ISP Remand Order," and that subsequent to such 
amendment there was still no language anywhere in the contract that provided a basis for Qwest 
to impose charges on Level 3 for direct trunk transport. Level 3 did not assert, and never has 
contended that the ISP Remand Order controls or is even applicable to the parties' negotiated 
terms of payment for direct trunks. 
The Petition, therefore, does not allege a violation of federal law, does not invoke federal 
law to state its causes of action or to invoke the Commission's jurisdiction, and does not contend 
that the resolution of any of the issues raised in the Petition depends on the interpretation of any 
federal law. 
B. Level 3's Cause of Action Was Not Created by Federal Law. 
The Telecommunications Act, 47 U.S.C § 151 etseq., requires incumbent local exchange 
carriers to interconnect with a requesting competitive carrier's facilities and equipment, and to 
exchange traffic with competitive carriers. 47 U.S.C. § 251(c). The specific duties of 
telecommunications carriers are enumerated in Sections 251(b) and (c). Among other things, 
carriers must "establish reciprocal compensation arrangements for the transport and termination 
of telecommunications." 47 U.S.C. £251(b)(5). Incumbent carriers must offer access to 
network elements "on rates terms and conditions that are just, reasonable and non-
discriminatory." 47 U.S.C. § 251(c)(3). To achieve interconnection and fulfill their duties under 
the Act, the incumbent and the requesting carrier must enter into an interconnection agreement. 
Interconnection agreements may be arrived at through negotiation or mediation or, if the parties 
are unable to agree, through arbitration conducted by a state commission. 47 U.S.C. § 252(a)-
(b). Once a local exchange carrier has agreed, through an interconnection agreement, to make 
available any interconnection service or network element, it must make the same service or 
9 
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element available to any requesting carrier on the same terms and conditions as those stated in 
the interconnection agreement. 47 U.S.C. § 252(i). In the present case, Level 3 and Qwest (as 
successor to U.S. West) entered into the Old Agreement through Level 3's adoption of the same 
terms and conditions as had been negotiated between U.S. West and AT&T, which agreement, in 
turn, had been arrived at through a process of negotiation and arbitration by the state 
commission. The Utah Commission approved the Old Agreement, finding that it met all of the 
necessary requirements of the Act. Report and Order, Docket No. 00-049-88 (Jan. 10, 2001). 
The Act provides that a party aggrieved by a determination of the state commission in 
either approving a negotiated agreement or in arbitrating a disputed agreement, may "bring an 
action in an appropriate Federal district court to determine whether the agreement ... meets the 
requirements of § 251." 47 U.S.C. § 252(e)(6) The federal courts' jurisdiction to hear appeals 
from state commission determinations regarding interconnection agreements is set forth in 
Section 252(e)(6). The present matter however, is not an appeal of the Utah Commission's 
determination in an arbitration proceeding, but is strictly an appeal of the Commission's decision 
on a question of contractual interpretation of undisputed language in an agreement already 
approved by the Commission. 
State commission authority to interpret and enforce interconnection agreements is not 
express in Section 252. In Verizon Maryland, Inc. v. Public Service Commission of Maryland, 
535 U.S. 635 (2002), the United States Supreme Court considerechflie argument that Section 252 
implicitly encompassed the authority for state commissions to interpret and enforce 
interconnection agreements, and that Section 252, for that reason, could serve as a basis for 
federal jurisdiction in interpretation or enforcement cases. Id. at 641-42. The Supreme Court 
declined to decide the issue, relying instead on Section 1331 to find that jurisdiction existed in 
831693 13 
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that case. Id. at 642. The Court stated: "Even if § 252(e)(6) does not confer jurisdiction, it at 
least does not divest the district courts of their authority under 28 U.S.C. §1331 to review the 
Commission's order for compliance with federal law." Id. (emphasis in original). Analyzing the 
case under Section 1331, the Court noted that Verizon had alleged in its complaint that the state 
commission "violated the Act and the FCC ruling when it ordered payment of reciprocal 
compensation for the ISP-bound calls," and that the state commission's regulation was pre-
empted by federal statute. Id Under those facts, the Court had "no doubt" that the federal court 
could hear the case under Section 1331. Li 
Unlike Verizon, Level 3 did not plead a cause of action under, or raise issues covered by 
Section 252. In requesting that the Utah Public Service Commission interpret the relative use 
formula for direct-trunk transport, Level 3 was not seeking to impose any federal standard, or 
alleging that federal law should dictate the Commission's interpretation of the pricing provision. 
Further, because there is no expression under Section 252(e)(6) that a state commission is 
authorized to interpret or enforce interconnection agreements, the causes of action alleged by 
Level 3, which involve only interpretation and enforcement, do not "arise" under Section 252. 
While the Court in Verizon Maryland concluded that Section 252 does not strip the federal 
courts of jurisdiction that would otherwise lie under Section 1331, the Court was not willing to 
hold that Section 252 conferred jurisdiction upon federal courts to hear appeals from state 
commissions on issues of interpretation or enforcement. 
The present case is not an appeal from the Commission's decision in an arbitration 
proceeding, but a request for interpretation and enforcement of a Commission approved 
interconnection agreement and enforcement of a Commission Order. The basis for Level 3's 
petition to the Commission, and the basis for this appeal of the Commission's decision, was and 
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remains that the plain meaning of the direct trunk pricing provision in the Old Agreement 
controls, and that one party cannot unilaterally modify the parties' contractual relationship 
simply by claiming changes in federal law. The fact that a relative use pricing provision may be 
contained in an interconnection agreement is not enough to confer federal jurisdiction under 
Section 1331. 
C. The Resolution of this Case Does Not Turn on a Substantial Question of 
Federal Law. 
Federal jurisdiction may be found when a plaintiffs right to relief "turns on the 
construction of a federal law." Morris v. City of Hobait 39 F.3d 1105, 1111 (10th Cir. 1994) 
(citing Smith v. Kansas City Title & Trust Co.. 255 U.S. 180, 199-200 (1921)). However, the 
"mere presence of a federal issue in a state cause of action does not automatically confer federal-
question jurisdiction." Id. (quoting Merrell Dow Pharms., 478 U.S. at 813). A resolution "turns" 
on a substantial question of federal law if: 
"the right of the petitioners to recover under their complaint will be 
sustained if the Constitution and laws of the United States are 
given one construction and will be defeated if they are given 
another," unless the claim "clearly appears to be immaterial and 
made solely for the purpose of obtaining jurisdiction or where such 
a claim is wholly insubstantial and frivolous." 
Verizon Maryland. 535 U.S. at 643 (quoting Steel Co. v. Citizens for Better Env't 523 U.S. 83, 
89 (1998)).1 When deciding whether a case turns on a substantial question of federal law, 
"courts should exercise 'prudence and restraint'" because such determinations "'require sensitive 
An earlier articulation of the rule states as follows: 
The general rule is that where it appears from the bill or statement of the 
plaintiff that the right to relief depends upon the construction or application of 
the Constitution of laws of the United States, and that such federal claim is not 
merely colorable, and rests upon a reasonable foundation, the District Court has 
jurisdiction. 
Merrell Dow Pharms., 478 U.S. at 819-20 (quoting Smith, 255 U.S. at 199). 
12 
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judgments about congressional intent, judicial power, and the federal system.'" Morris, 39 F.3d 
at 1111 (quoting Merrell Dow Pharms., 478 U.S. at 810). Thus, the court "must focus on 
whether Congress evidenced an intent to provide a federal forum." Id. 
The fact that the interconnection agreement may be required under federal law, or that the 
incumbent carrier has a duty to make network elements available does not mean that the 
interpretation or enforcement of an interconnection agreement always turns on a question of 
federal law. See, e.g., Verizon Maryland, Inc. v. Global Naps, 377 F.3d 355, 366 (4th Cir. 2004) 
("We are not saying that every dispute about a term in an interconnection agreement belongs in 
federal court");2 Nuvox Commc'ns, Inc. v. North Carolina Utils. Comm'n. 409 F. Supp. 2d 660, 
664-65 (E.D.N.C 2006) (no federal jurisdiction under § 1331 for interpretation of audit provision 
in federal interconnection agreement). Not every term of an interconnection agreement is 
required by the Act. Indeed, Section 252 contemplates that the parties may agree to terms 
"without regard to the standards set forth in subsections (b) and (c) of section 251." 47 U.S.C. 
§ 252(a)(1). Thus, while the existence of interconnection agreements may be essential to the 
federal interest in promoting competition, Congress did not consider all specific terms of the 
agreements to be essential to that goal. The federal interest is to further the goal of promoting 
competition, not to ensure absolute uniformity of terms within all contractual relationships 
between telecommunications carriers. 
The obligation to establish reciprocal compensation is not only express in the federal Act, 
but it has been the subject of FCC Orders and of litigation in the federal courts as to what that 
obligation might entail with respect to ISP-bound traffic. The Supreme Court in Verizon 
2
 Unlike the dispute in Global Naps, the dispute in the instant case does not involve a federally mandated essential 
duty under the Act to establish reciprocal compensation arrangements, but instead involves a purely xonsensual 
agreement regarding pricing of shared transport. There is nothing in the Act that requires parties to establish two-
way direct trunks. 
13 
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Maryland and the Fourth Circuit on remand, therefore, were dealing with the construction of a 
federal statute which would have dictated the outcome of the dispute. In the present case, 
although the treatment of ISP-bound traffic may be a somewhat relevant factual consideration, 
the federal statute, the FCC's orders, and the precedent established in the federal courts are 
irrelevant to the legal resolution of this matter. 
Thus, while this dispute involves an interconnection agreement, there is no foundation for 
a conclusion that the provision in the Old Agreement allocating costs for direct trunk transport 
was compelled by federal law. Rather, the controlling language is a product of negotiation 
between the parties, and is subject to general principles of contract interpretation that have 
evolved under state law. It is state contract law that dictates that one party to a contract cannot 
unilaterally change the controlling language of a contract or act in a way that violates the express 
terms of the contract. Likewise, there is no provision in federal law upon which the outcome 
may turn. The issue of whether the parties intended to share the cost of trunks according to the 
minutes of each party's originating use, requires only a garden-variety interpretation of the 
contract language. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The Federal Court does not have subject matter jurisdiction over this appeal from the 
Commission's Report and Order. Level 3's Petition before the Commission did not raise a 
question of federal law. Its causes of action were not created by federal law, and there is no 
issue in this case that turns on a substantial question of federal law. Instead, the resolution of this 
matter requires only the application of state law principles of contract interpretation. Qwest has 
failed to demonstrate why the straightforward interpretation of the contract between the parties 
should be determined by a Federal court. Therefore, Level 3 respectfully requests that this 
matter be remanded back to the Utah State Supreme Court for resolution as originally filed. 
14 
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DATED this 15th day of March, 2006. 
/s/ William J. Evans 
William J. Evans (5276) 
Vicki M. Baldwin (8532) 
PARSONS BEHLE & LATIMER 
One Utah Center 
201 South Main Street, Suite 1800 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Telephone: (801) 532-1234 
Facsimile: (801) 536-6111 
Attorneys for Level 3 Communications, LLC 
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Gregory L. Rogers 
LEVEL 3 COMMUNICATIONS, LLC 
1025 Eldorado Boulevard 
Broomfield, CO 80021 
Telephone: (720) 888-2512 
Facsimile: (720) 888-5134 
William J. Evans (5276) RECEIVED 
Vicki M. Baldwin (8532) * J?/YJSM ? L q 
PARSONS BEHLE & LATIMER*,U u ' , u * ' " 
n p ssfe One Utah Center 201 South Main Street, Sui 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Telephone: (801) 532-1234 
Facsimile: (801) 536-6111 
Attorneys for Level 3 Communications, LLC 
BEFORE THE UTAH PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION 
In the Matter of the Petition of Level 3 
Communications, LLC for Enforcement of the 
Interconnection Agreement Between Qwest and 
Level 3 
MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION 
AND REHEARING 
Docket No. 05-2266-01 
Level 3 Communications, LLC ("Level 3")> through its counsel, and pursuant to the 
provisions at Utah Code Annotated § 63-46b-12 and 54-7-15, hereby requests reconsideration 
and rehearing of the Order of Administrative Law Judge Steven F. Goodwill, as approved and 
confirmed by the Utah Public Service Commission ("Commission") on August 18, 2005, and in 
support of its motion, hereby submits the following: 
For the purposes of this Motion for Reconsideration ("Motion"), Level 3 does not dispute 
the Procedural History or Background recited in the Order. The Commission's Findings and 
Conclusions of Law, however, contain errors that have led the Commission to reach the wrong 
result 
When the parties brought the present dispute to the Commission, Level 3 requested that 
the Commission enforce the straightforward, unambiguous language of the operative 
interconnection contract between Level 3 and Qwest Corporation ("Qwest") ("Old Agreement") 
ta prevent Qwest from collecting on charges that were never contemplated by the parties when 
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the Old Agreement was executed. Qwest requested that the Commission "interpret" the clause in 
a way^which Qwest argued was the only just and reasonable way: to, regardless of the explicit 
language In the fcoWact, exclude ISP-bound traffic from the relative use calculation to which the 
parties had otherwise agreed. Report and Order, Discussion, B. Qwesf s Position (Aug. 18, 
2005). Qwesf s position is contrary to well-established contract law, in Utah and the rest of the 
country, as is the Commission's decision accepting Qwest's position. 
A. The Relative Use Provision in the Old Agreement Was Determined by the 
Commission to be Just and Reasonable. 
On January 10, 2001, the Commission approved the agreement between Level 3 and 
Qwest, which is referred to in these proceedings as the Old Agreement In approving the Old 
Agreement, the Commission specifically found that it "does not discriminate against any 
telecommunication carrier not a party to it" and that it "comports with the [Telecommunications 
Act ofl996's (the "Act")] §25F. Report and Order, Docket No. 00-049-88, Findings of Fact 
(January 10,2001) (emphasis added) ("Original Order")-
The Old Agreement contained the following language: 
If the Parties' elect to establish two-way direct trunks, the 
compensation for such jointly used 'shared' facilities shall be 
adjusted as follows. The nominal compensation shall be pursuant 
to the rates for direct trunk transport in Appendix A. The actual 
rate paid to the provider of the direct trunk facility shall be reduced 
to reflect the provider's use of that facility. The adjustment in the 
direct trunk transport rate shall be a percentage that reflects the 
provider's relative use (le. originating minutes of use) of the 
facility in the busy hour. 
Old Agreement, Attachment 1 § 5.1.2.4 (emphasis added).1 
1
 As noted in Level 3ys Position Statement, the Old Agreement provided that the terms of the Old Agreement were 
to apply until the New Agreement was approved by the Commission. 
This Agreement shall be effective upon Commission approval and shall remain in effect until June 
26, 2001 and thereafter shall continue in force and effect unless and until a new agreement 
addressing all of the terms of this Agreement, becomes effective between the Parties. Either Party 
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Section 251 of the Act states, in part, that an incumbent local exchange carrier must 
interconnect with the competitive carrier's network "on rates, terms and conditions that are just, 
reasonable, and non discriminatory." 47 U.S.C. § 251(c)(2)(d). Thus, in finding that the Old 
Agreement complied with Section 251 of the Act, the Commission necessarily found that Section 
5.1.2.4, the Relative Use clause of the Old Agreement, was just and reasonable. 
The Original Order whereby the Commission approved the Old Agreement also ordered 
that the Old Agreement met the requirements of Section 252(e)(1) of the Act. Report and Order, 
Docket No. 00-049-88, Conclusions of Law (January 10,2001). That section of the Act provides 
that a state commission may only reject an interconnection agreement adopted by negotiation or 
arbitration2 when it finds, among other things, that: 
the agreement does not meet the requirements of section 251 of 
this title, ... or the standards set forth in subsection (d) of this 
section. 
47 U.S.C. § 252(eX2). Subsection (d) of Section 252 requires state commissions to set "just and 
reasonable" rates for interconnection, network elements and the reciprocal exchange of traffic. 
47 U.S.C, § 252(d). Necessarily implicit in the Commission's Original Order, therefore, was a 
determination that the relative use clause, as stated, was just and reasonable. 
may request resolution of open issues in accordance with the provisions of Section 27 of this Part 
A of this Agreement, Dispute Resolution, beginning nine (9) months prior to the expiration of this 
Agreement Any disputes regarding the terms and conditions of the new interconnection 
agreement shall be resolved in accordance with said Section 27 and the resulting agreement shall 
be submitted to the Commission. This Agreement shall remain in effect until a new 
interconnection agreement approved by the Commission has become effective. 
Old Agreement, Part A, Section 20.1 (emphasis added), 
2
 The Old Agreement was an "opt in" by Level 3 of the AT&T/US West Agreement that had been the subject of 
arbitration before this Commission. (See In re Petition of Level 3 Comm'cns, LLC for Enforcement of the 
Interconnection Agreement between Qwest and Level 3, TR at 40 (July 26,2005)) (Counsel for Qwest: "I assure you 
that the AT&T agreements, I believe, have been arbitrated in every case.") 
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B. Contrary to Established Utah Contract Law, the Commission Failed to Give 
Effect to the Intention of the Parties. 
Instead of enforcing the unambiguous language of the Old Agreement, which the 
Commission found to be just and reasonable, or applying acceptable principles of contract 
interpretation to determine the meaning of the relative use clause of the Old Agreement, the 
Commission ignored its explicit finding that the 2004 Arbitration Order should be applied 
prospectively only? and instead applied retroactively the rationale of its 2004 Arbitration Order 
along with a new and selective interpretation of the FCC ISP Remand Order. See Report and 
Order, Findings and Conclusions of Law. It is also critically important to note that prior to the 
Arbitration Order and the implementation of the new Agreement, Qwest and Level 3 negotiated, 
agreed to and filed an amendment to reflect the affect of the FCC ISP Remand Order on the Old 
Agreement ("ISP Remand Amendment"). The Relative Use clause is unambiguous. It does not 
include any exception for ISP-bound traffic, and cannot reasonably be read to impose one. See 
Level 3 Position Statement at ^  17. 
While it is true that the Commission may interpret contracts between parties, as 
demonstrated in Yeargin, Inc. v. Utah State Tax Comm'n, 20 P.3d 237, 297 (Utah 2001) and 
Cache County v. Property Tax Div. of Utah State Tax Comm'n, 922 P.2d 758, 766-67 (Utah 
1996), the Commission must abide by the principles of contract interpretation in doing so. 
Principles of contract interpretation require that the meaning of contractual terms must be 
determined by the intent of the parties at the time they entered into the agreement Uintah 
Basin Med Ctr.v. Hardy, 110 P.3d 16&, 172 (Utah Ct. App. 2005) (citing Central Fla. Invs., Inc. 
v, Parkwest Assocs., 40 P.3d 599 (Utah 2002)). Only if the plain language of the contract itself 
is ambiguous, may the language be interpreted to determine the intent of the parties. Id. "The 
3
 See 2004 Arbitration Order, Discussion, Subissues. 
743965 1 4 
Case 2:06-cv-00132-DAK Document 5 Filed 03/15/2006 Page 6 of 13 
plain meaning rule preserves the intent of the parties and protects the contract against judicial 
revision/' Plateau Mining Co, v. Utah Div. of State Lands & Forestry. 802 P.2d 720, 725 (Utah 
1990). Only if interpretation is required because of an ambiguity may extrinsic evidence be 
considered, but then only to ascertain the intent of the parties at the time they entered into the 
agreement Id. However, "'[tjhe only evidence relevant to that inquiry is evidence of the facts 
known to the parties at the time they entered the [agreement]"* Peterson v. The Sunrider 
Corp>, 48 P.3d 918,925 (Utah 2002) (quoting Yeargin, 20 P3d 287) (emphasis added). Not only 
must the Commission determine the intent of the parties at the time they contracted, it must 
apply the law that was in effect at the time the contract was signed. Cache County. 922 P.2d at 
765-67; Washington Naf 1 Ins. Co. v. Sherwood Assocs., 795 P.2d 665, 669 (Utah Ct App. 
1990). 
The parties to the Old Agreement could have included language allowing an exception 
for ISP-bound traffic, but they did not. Qwest knew full well from doing business and 
exchanging traffic with Level 3 in other states that Level 3 served only ISPs at that time, and 
Qwest could have sought to have ISP-bound traffic excluded from relative use calculations 
during any one of the three times the commission was considering the Old Agreement 
However, while Qwest likely drafted and arbitrated the agreement that Level 3 agreed to, it did 
not seek to exclude ISP-bound traffic from the relative use calculation and it did not seek to 
change the language of the contract through the change-in-Iaw clause of the Old Agreement after 
the FCC's ISP Remand Order. Rather, Qwest acted unilaterally and billed Level 3 for fees not 
contained in the contract, threatening to shut down Level 3's services if it did not pay the 
unjustified amounts. The contract must control and this kind of unilateral behavior must be 
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prevented or it will result in the inability of parties to rely on fairly negotiated and approved 
contracts. 
Even though Level 3 believes that the law in Utah governing direct trunk transport 
("DTT") billing was in Level 3's favor at the time Level 3 and Qwest entered into the Old 
Agreement, the parties were free to negotiate and determine their rights by contract before 
presenting the Old Agreement to the Commission for its determination that the contract was "just 
and reasonable/' As this Commission itself noted in the 2004 Arbitration Order, this exact issue 
had been addressed with conflicting results in various states, and the issue was unsettled in Utah. 
2004 Arbitration Order, Discussion. The parties, therefore, would have no reason to believe that 
anything other than the plain language of the contract would govern their conduct Any other 
interpretation would have to have been specifically delineated by language in the agreement. 
The Commission is not free to "re-interpret" what it had already found to be a "just and 
reasonable" provision in light of the law as it existed at that time. 
As noted above, after the FCCs ISP Remand Order, the parties amended the Old 
Agreement in accordance with the change-in-law provision of the Old Agreement, but still, they 
did not include any exception to the relative use calculation for ISP-bound traffic, though they 
certainly could have if that had been their intent, and presumably, it would have been an 
appropriate time to do so. Instead, the parties chose to continue to abide by the relative use 
language of the Old Agreement, which the Commission had previously determined was just and 
isasonable and in compliance with Sections 251 and 252 of the Act 
While the Commission stated that it did not view the 2004 Order as precedent in this 
case, it stated: 
The rationale behind the 2004 Order is equally applicable to the 
parties' current dispute both because the issue now before us is 
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identical to the issue in Docket No. 02-2266-02 and because the 
release of the ISP Remand Order predates the start of the Dispute 
Period by more than a year. 
Report and Order, Docket No. 05-2266-01, Findings and Conclusions of Law. This quoted 
section apparently states two reasons, for the Commission's decision: (1) the rationale of the 
2004 Order is applicable; and (2) the ISP Remand Order predates the Dispute Period. However, 
neither reason allows the Commission to impose an interpretation other than what was intended 
by the parties at the time they entered the Old Agreement, based on facts known to the parties 
at the time they entered the Old Agreement, and under existing law at the time they entered the 
Old Agreement. Peterson, 48 P.3d at 925; Cache County. 922 P.2d at 765-67. 
The rationale in the 2004 Order was that the FCC had determined in the ISP Remand 
Order that payment of reciprocal compensation for internet traffic could cause uneconomic 
subsidies and create incentives for CLECs to specialize in serving ISPs to the exclusion of other 
customers. 2004 Order, Discussion, Obligations under the Telecommunications Act. The 
Commission's 2004 Order decision was made in the context of the parties arbitrating the relative 
use clause in the New Agreement in light of the FCC ISP Remand Order, with the Commission 
adopting the FCCs reciprocal compensation rationale for relative use payments. However, this 
rationale cannot1*e retroactively imposed as the factual basis for the parties' intent regarding 
relative use payments at the time they entered the Old Agreement 
C. Tfa Commission Failed to Give Effect to the Parties Agreement on How to 
A<j3ress a Change in the Law. 
Level 3 is not requesting in this Docket that the Commission find that its rationale for the 
2004 Arbitration Order is not applicable on a going forward basis in light of the FCC's ISP 
Remand Order? Rather, Level 3 submits that the fundamentals of contract law dictate that if 
4
 In fact, since the Commission's 2004 Order, there has been no dispute about charges for the ISP-bound traffic. 
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Qwest never availed themselves of the contractual provision that established the process for 
amending the Old Agreement for a change in the law, the Commission has no authority to ignore 
the terms of the Old Agreement and amend it 
The Old Agreement provided a procedure that the parties were to follow in the event of a 
change in the law. In fact, Qwest and Level 3 agreed to an ISP Remand Amendment to the Old 
Agreement See Level 3 Position Statement at % 17. Because the ISP Remand Order only spoke 
to intercarrier compensation, that amendment only established new terminating intercarrier 
compensation rates. Id. If the parties had understood the JSP Remand Order to also affect the 
Relative Use clause of the Old Agreement, the parties could have included language at that time 
that would have excluded ISP-bound traffic from relative use calculations. They chose not to 
and Section 5.1.2.4 of the Old Agreement was never amended. 
The same is true with respect to the SPOP Amendment that the parties executed in June 
2002. There is no language in the SPOP Amendment that changes the "relative use" treatment 
that is set forth in Section 5.1.2.4 concerning the exchange of ISP-bound traffic or the fact that 
all such traffic was Qwest originated during the Dispute Period. Instead, the SPOP Amendment 
confirms the well-established rule that competitive providers are allowed to interconnect at one 
point of interconnection in each LATA. The parties thus dealt with the change-of-law clause on 
more than one occasion yet the Old Agreement consistently dictated relative use treatment in 
accordance with the Commission's^inding that it was just and reasonable. 
The Commission stated in its Report and Order in the present case that the ISP remand 
Order "illuminatfes] the proper meaning of Section 5.1.2.4 of Attachment 1 to the Old 
Agreement-* Report and Order, Findings and Conclusions of Law. Bui, the Commission in fact 
made no real attempt to ascertain the "proper meaning," or it would have looked to the intent of 
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the parties as set forth in the plain language of Section 5.1.2,4 of the Old Agreement The 
Commission imposed its own amendment to the contract based on its own reading of the JSP 
Remand Order in the 2004 docket The Commission stated: 
No one disputes that including ISP-bound traffic in the RUF 
calculation of the Old Agreement would result in Qwest bearing 
all of the costs of the DTT Facilities. We cannot conclude that 
such a result would equate to just and reasonable compensation for 
Qwest 
Report and Order, Findings and Conclusions of Law. Yet the Commission did conclude 
precisely that in its initial Original Order in Docket No. 00-049-88 approving the Old 
Agreement Thus, while the Commission characterizes its current decision as ascertaining the 
proper meaning of Section 5.1.2.4, in fact the Commission has imposed a new obligation on the 
contract that never existed before, based on the rationale used in the 2004 Arbitration Order 
interpreting the JSP Remand Order, neither of which existed as "facts known to the parties at the 
time they entered the [Old Agreement]." Peterson, 48 P.3d at 925. 
D. The Commission's Action Is in the Nature of a Rulemaking and Results in 
Discriminatory Treatment of Level 3, 
The Commission's interpretation amounts to a rulemaking and the state has thus imposed 
upon Level 3 a rule without Level 3 having the benefit of engaging in the required rulemaking 
proceedings of the Utah Administrative Rulemaking Act ("ARA"). Pursuant to the ARA a 
rulemaking is required by law "when agency action: (a) authorizes, requires, or prohibits an 
action; (b) provides or prohibits a material benefit^(c) applies to a class of persons . . . ; and (d) is 
explicitly or implicitly authorized by statute." Utah Code Ann. § 63-46a-3(2). "Rulemaking is 
also required when an agency issues a written interpretation of a state or federal legal mandate/' 
Id. § 63-461-3(3). A rule should generally be given prospective, not retroactive, application. 
See, generally, id, § 63-46a-4; 73 CJ.S. Pub. Admin. Law & Proc. § 179. See also Williams v. 
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Public Serv. Common of Utah, 720 P.2d 773, (Utah 1986) (noting that rulemaking is proper 
when an agency overrules its own decisions on which private parties have acted in reliance). 
Applying the requirements for rulemaking set forth in the ARA to the instant case: (a) 
the Commission's decision authorizes or requires an action because it requires Level 3 to pay 
Qwest based on a formula excluding ISP-bound traffic from the relative use calculation for the 
Dispute Period even though no such condition was provided in the controlling agreement; (b) the 
Commission's decision provides a material benefit in that the Commission's decision authorizes 
Qwest to collect from Level 3 the approximately $560,000 Qwest claims Level 3 owes to Qwest; 
see Tr. at p. 21, lines 9-13; (c) the conclusion of the Commission in this case applies to a class of 
persons as it is likely that the Commission would apply this new policy to any parties in similar 
positions with respect to payment obligations for DTT facilities; and (d) the Commission's 
decision is explicitly authorized by statute because the Commission based its decision on the 
Act. 
More importantly, rulemaking is required because the Commission's decision is a written 
interpretation of a federal mandate in that the Commission ruled that it has determined a change 
in policy of what is just and reasonable under the Act in light of the FCC ISP Remand Order. 
Report and Order, Findings and Conclusions of Law (Aug. 1S,2005). Despite the fact that Level 
3 relied on the Commission's ruling in its Original Order that the language of the Old 
Agreement, including Section 5.1.2.4 of Attachment 1, was just and reasonable as written, the 
Commission arbitrarily overruled this precedent and imposed a new interpretation of what is just 
and reasonable under the Act. Thus, pursuant to the ARA this action by^he Commission would 
require a rulemaking, and even then, the results would not apply retroactively to the Old 
Agreement. The Commission's Order in this case is discriminatory in that it has been applied 
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retroactively to Level 3, and to no other carrier. Accordingly, the Commission's decision cannot 
stand. 
WHEREFORE, based on the foregoing, Level 3 respectfully requests that the 
Commission (1) reverse the Report and Order issued August 18, 2005, in this matter; (2) 
determine that the Old Agreement does not require that ISP-bound traffic be excluded from the 
relative use charge; and (3) order that Level 3 is not obligated to pay the amounts billed by 
Qwest. 
DATED this / / day of September, 2005. 
William J. Evans (5276) 
VickiM. Baldwin (8532) 
PARSONS BEHLE & LATIMER 
One Utah Center 
201 South Main Street, Suite 1800 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Telephone: (801) 532-1234 
Facsimile: (801) 536-6111 
Attorneys for Level 3 Communications, LLC 
and 
Gregory L. Rogers 
LEVEL 3 COMMUNICATIONS, LLC 
1025 Eldorado Boulevard 
Broomfield, CO 80021 
(720) 888-2512 (Tel) 
(720) 888-5134 (Fax) 
Attorneys for Level 3 Communications, LLC 
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CERTD7ICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this of September, 2005,1 caused a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION AND REHEARING to be sent 
in the following manner: 
Via Hand Delivery 
Ted D.Smith 
Stoel Rives 
201 South Main Street, Suite 1100 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Via Hand Delivery 
Michael Ginsberg 
Assistant Attorney General 
500 Heber M. Wells Building 
160 East 300 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
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Gregory B. Monson (2294) 
David L. Elmont (9640) 
Stoel Rives LLP 
Attorneys for Defendant Qwest Corporation 
201 South Main Street, Suite 1100 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Telephone: (801) 328-3131 
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
FOR THE DISTRICT OF UTAH, CENTRAL DIVISION 
LEVEL 3 COMMUNICATIONS, LLC, 
Plaintiff, 
V. 
PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION OF 
UTAH, and QWEST CORPORATION, 
Defendants. 
OPPOSITION TO 
MOTION TO REMAND 
Case No. 2:06cv00132 DAK 
The Honorable Dale A. Kimball 
Pursuant to Fed R. Civ. P. 6 and DUCivR 7-1, defendant Qwest Corporation ("Qwest") 
hereby responds in opposition to the Motion to Remand and Memorandum in Support of Motion 
to Remand ("Motion'') filed by Level 3 Communications, LLC ("Level 3") in this matter on 
March 15, 2006. For the reasons set forth below, the Motion should be denied. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
As Level 3 acknowledges in the Motion,1 this matter comes before the Court as an appeal 
of a determination of the Public Service Commission of Utah ("Commission") interpreting and 
enforcing an interconnection agreement previously entered into by Qwest and Level 3 under the 
Telecommunications Act of 1996 ("Act").2 The only question now before the Court is whether it 
has subject-matter jurisdiction over Level 3's appeal. That question was largely resolved by the 
Supreme Court in Verizon Maryland, Inc. v. Public Service Comm 'n of Maryland, 535 U.S. 635 
(2002), where the Court found federal court jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 to review state 
commission determinations interpreting and enforcing interconnection agreements as long as 
"the right of the petitioners to recover under their complaint will be sustained if the Constitution 
and laws of the United States are given one construction and will be defeated if they are given 
another . . . ."3 Just as in Verizon,4 in this case the state commission interpreted and enforced an 
interconnection agreement previously entered into by the parties under the Act. Likewise, just as 
in Verizon,5 in this case the right of the dissatisfied appellant to reverse the commission 
determination hinges on the construction of federal law. 
The federal nature of Level 3's claim is readily apparent upon review of the August 18, 
2005 Report and Order ("Order") to which Level 3 seeks to ascribe error.6 Although the 
1
 See Motion at 7. 
2
 P.L. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56 (1996). Hereinafter^ections of Title 47 of the United States Code 
enacted by the Act will be referred to as sections of the Act using their section numbers codified in Title 
47. 
3
 535 U.S. at 643 (quotation omitted). 
4
 See id. at 640. 
5
 See id. at 642 -43. 
6
 See Report and Order, In the Matter of the Petition of Level 3 Communications, LLC for 
Enforcement of the Interconnection Agreement Between Qwest and Level 3, Docket No. 05-2266-01 
(Utah PSC Aug. 18, 2005), a true and correct copy of which is attached as Attachment 1. 
- 2 -
SaltLake-274320.6 0019995-00174 
Case 2:06-cv-00132-DAK Document 6 Filed 04/03/2006 Page 3 of 11 
Motion's single, brief characterization of the Order fails to state the basis upon which the 
Commission made its determination,7 a brief review of the Order leaves no doubt that the 
question of whether the Commission was correct or erroneous in its interpretation of the 
interconnection agreement (and therefore whether Level 3 has a legitimate claim on appeal) is 
first and foremost a question of federal law. As the Commission stated in the Order, the reason it 
found for Qwest in this matter was that: 
As we recognized in Docket No. 02-2266-02, any interpretation 
of Section 5.L2.4 of Attachment 1, whether in the New Agreement or in 
the Old Agreement, must accord with the Section 251(d)(1) 
requirement of the Act that rates for interconnection of facilities be 
just and reasonable. No one disputes that including ISP-bound traffic 
in the RUF calculation under the Old Agreement would result in 
Qwest bearing all of the cost of the DTT facilities. We cannot 
conclude that such a result would equate to just and reasonable 
compensation for Qwest. We therefore conclude that the only proper 
reading of Section 5.1.2.4 of Attachment 1 to the Old Agreement excludes 
ISP-bound traffic from the RUF calculation in determining the parties' 
respective payment obligations for DTT facilities provided during the 
Dispute Period.8 
This reasoning, manifestly based on federal law, buttressed by the Commission's 
accurate reading of the Federal Communications Commission's ISP Remand Order? is the only 
basis identified in the Order for the Commission's interpretation of the interconnection 
agreement. There was no separate state law analysis. Thus, whatever Level 3 thinks about what 
the Commission should have done under state contract law, to obtain a reversal Level 3 will 
7
 Notwithstanding the fact that Level 3 apparently found it necessary to fHe an over-length 
memorandum to present its argument, it only managed a single, misleading .characterization of the very 
Commission action it seeks to appeal. See Motion at 5 ("On August 18, 2005, the Commission issued its 
Report and Order ruling that regardless of the absence of language requiring it, Qwest should be allowed 
to exclude ISP-bound traffic from the relative use calculation in the pricing provision for shared trunks in 
the Old Agreement."). 
8
 Order at 10 (emphasis added). 
9
 See id. at-9 (citing Order on Remand and Report and Order, In the Matter of Implementation of 
the Local Competition Provisions in the Telecommunications Act of 1996, Intercarrier Compensation for 
ISP-Bound Traffic, 16 FCC Red 9151 (2001) ("ISP RemandOrdef). 
- 3 -
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have to demonstrate that what the Commission did was in error. And what the Commission did 
was based entirely on federal law—determining that "any interpretation of [the agreement]. . . 
must accord with . . . Section 251(d)(1) . . . of the Act " No matter how much it seeks to 
avoid the issue there is simply no way for Level 3 to obtain relief without establishing that the 
Commission's understanding of federal law was erroneous. Here, "the right of the petitioners to 
recover under their complaint will be sustained if the Constitution and laws of the United States 
are given one construction and will be defeated if they are given another." Accordingly, this 
Court has federal question jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331. The Motion lacks merit and 
should be denied. 
II. ARGUMENT 
A, THIS COURT HAS JURISDICTION UNDER 28 U.S.C. § 1331 AND SECTION 252 
OF THE ACT. 
In Verizon, the Supreme Court conclusively established that federal-question jurisdiction 
will lie for federal court review of state commission determinations interpreting and enforcing 
previously-approved interconnection agreements, as long as "the right of the petitioners to 
recover under their complaint will be sustained if the Constitution and laws of the United States 
are given one construction and will be defeated if they are given another."10 The Supreme Court 
did not decide the separate question of whether section 252 of the Act provides an additional 
basis for jurisdiction because "even if § 252(e)(6) does not confer jurisdiction, it at least does not 
divest the district courts of their authority under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 to review the Commission's 
order for compliance with federal law."11 
See supra note 3. 
11
 See 535 U.S. at 642 (emphasis in original). 
- 4 -
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The Tenth Circuit has considered the issue of jurisdiction specifically under section 252, 
however. The Tenth Circuit has found that federal court jurisdiction lies under section 252 to 
review state commission determinations interpreting and enforcing interconnection agreements 
because: 
We agree with the Fifth Circuit that § 252(e)(6) should not be construed so 
narrowly as to limit federal jurisdiction to only those decisions that either 
approve or reject interconnection agreements. Section 252(e)(6) grants 
federal courts jurisdiction in "any case" in which a state commission 
makes a "determination" under this section. When a state commission, 
after approving an agreement pursuant to the authority granted by 
the Act, subsequently issues another decision interpreting the terms of 
the agreement, this is also a "determination" pursuant to its authority 
under §252.12 
While Level 3 may be generally correct to state that federal jurisdiction is only 
appropriate when a complainant's right of relief "turns on the construction of a federal law,"13 
that standard is satisfied (again, per Verizon) as long as "the right of the petitioners to recover 
under their complaint will be sustained if the Constitution and laws of the United States are given 
one construction and will be defeated if they are given another."14 Moreover, the Tenth Circuit's 
language in Southwestern Bell quoted immediately above supports the view that any state 
commission determination interpreting and enforcing an agreement approved under the Act is 
12
 Southwestern Bell Tel Co. v. Brooks Fiber Comm. of Oklahoma, 235 F.3d 493,497 (10th Cir. 
2000) (citation omitted; emphasis added). 
13
 See Motion at 12 (quoting Morris v. City ofHobart, 39 F.3d 1105, 1111 (10th Cir. 1994}); but 
see Morris, 39 F.3d at 1111-12 (noting federal court jurisdiction where a state cause of action "turns on a 
substantial question of federal law" and that a "court examining whether a case turns on a question^ 
federal law should focus on whether Congress evidenced an intent to provide a federal forum.") (citations 
omitted). In the case of the Act, Congress not only provided a federal forum for review of state 
commission determinations under section 252, but also made that jurisdiction exclusive. See 41 U.S.C. § 
252(e)(4), (6). 
14
 See supra note 3. 
- 5 -
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itself a determination under the Act subject to federal court review.15 Thus, the Southwestern 
Bell Court went on to state: "having decided that the state commissions have the authority to 
interpret and enforce interconnection agreements and that the appropriate forum for review of 
these decisions is federal court, it would be a waste of judicial resources to limit the court's 
consideration to federal issues only."16 The Court found, therefore, that supplemental 
jurisdiction allowed federal court review of any state-law issues.17 
Whether or not every state commission determination interpreting or enforcing an 
interconnection agreement under the Act necessarily involves a determination of federal law, the 
Commission Order here was most certainly, indeed exclusively, a federal law determination. As 
noted in the introduction above, the Commission relied on an interpretation of the requirements 
of section 251, buttressed by its interpretation of the Federal Communications Commission's ISP 
Remand Order, to reach its determination.18 There was no separate state law analysis provided 
in support of the determination, but rather an express conclusion that the requirements of the Act 
dictated the outcome. Although Level 3 argues that the Commission should have further 
considered state contract law issues and accepted Level 3's analysis under state contract law (a 
contention Qwest disputes), Level 3 cannot demonstrate Commission error and show sufficient 
15
 See also, e.g., Illinois Bell Telephone Co. v. Worldcom Technologies, Inc., 179 F.3d 566, 574 
(7th Cir. 2000) (holding that in the Seventh Circuit federal courts are limited to the consideration of 
whether state commission determinations comply with the Act, but as a necessary corollary: "Thus every 
time a carrier complains about a^state agency's action concerning an agreement, it must start in federal 
court (to find out whether there has been a violation of federal law) and then may move to state court if 
the first suit yields the answer 'no.'"). 
l
*See 235 F.3d at 498 (emphasis added). 
17
 See id. (citing with approval the approach taken by the Fourth, Fifth, and Ninth Circuits: "We 
find [the approach of considering both federal and state issues] to be preferable. Although the circuits 
that have included the state law determinations in their review have not been explicit as to their reasons 
for doing so, we believe they were, at least implicitly, exercising supplemental jurisdiction over these 
issues under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a)."). 
18
 See Order at 10. 
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cause foi leversid nri'^nand H'IIO'A "I drnionsliiile:, that the ( ommission misinterpreted the Act. 
Level 3 must show that the Commission erred in finding section 251 and the ISP Remand Order 
to bo oouliolliii^ 
Level 3's appeal can be sustained only if its claims under the "laws of the United States 
are given one consti i iction" (i e , that the Coi i n nission en eel in findii lg section 251 and the 737 
Remand Order to be controlling) and will be defeated "if they are given another." Both under 28 
U.S.C. § MM (pet fiir 'oipiciiu i 'oiH'nno! mill' i MTtion "V l(»i • I>• • ('"ipi "I Appeals), federal 
courts have jurisdiction to review state commission determinations such as the Order, which 
interpret and enforce inter con i lection agre en lents ei iter ed i iiiciei the A ct. ' • ' • '" • .• "'• ' 
B. THE LACK OF A CLEAR FEDERAL CLAIM ON THE FACE OF LEVEI 3'S 
APPEAL IS NO BAR TO J ! JRISDICTION 
Finally, the absence of a clear federal claim on the face of Level 3's appeal does not act 
as a bai to jurisdiction i n this c asc: 1 his is so becai ise "[a] plaintiff may not defeat removal by-
failing to plead federal questions that are essential elements of the plaintiffs claim. Similarly, 
removal is penmtied w lion I he p la ml ill' i i ij»l»( lo rolirl i ctjuiics iosoiliifioii o! a substantial 
question of federal law."19 
RemoA al jurisdii lioii is l\pieally delei mmed h\ i in ' \ iovoi llie conti'iits o( a ^ell pled 
complaint, and the mere presence of a federal defense will not alone support jurisdiction. 
However, under the artful-pleading doctrine, a plaintiff i na;> not defeat remo v al "b> fi aming in 
terms of state law a complaint the real nature of [which] is federal, regardless of plaintiff s 
19
 See Schmeling v. NORDAM, 97 F.3d 1336, 1339 (10th Cir 1996) (citing Franchise Tax Bd. v. 
Construction Laborers Vacation Trust, 463 U.S. 1, 12 (1983)). 
20
 See, e.g^ Schmeling, 97 F.3d at 1339. 
SaltLake-274320.6 0019995-00174 
- 7 -
Case 2:06-cv-00132-DAK Document 6 Filed 04/03/2006 Page 8 of 11 
characterization, or by omitting to plead necessary federal questions in a complaint." The 
artful omission of a necessary federal question is precisely what Level 3 seeks to accomplish in 
this case. 
While the Motion fails to include an accurate description of the exclusively federal basis 
for the determination Level 3 seeks to appeal, and while it fails to claim the Commission erred in 
relying on section 251 and the ISP Remand Order, Level 3 will not be able to establish 
Commission error (even in state court) without demonstrating that the Commission 
misinterpreted or misapplied the Act. Level 3's complaint (its Petition for Review) implicitly 
acknowledges the need for review of the Commission's reliance on federal law, in stating that 
Level 3 "seeks review of the entire [Commission] decision"22 and in complaining that the 
Commission "imposed new terms to the contract."23 The "entire decision" at issue is the 
Commission determination that section 251 and the ISP Remand Order required the Commission 
to interpret the interconnection agreement as it did and the supposed "new terms" "imposed" 
were these same federal requirements. 
Thus, even assuming that Level 3 can properly assert state law claims in arguing 
Commission error, the true nature of the Order, the necessary resolution of substantial federal 
issues, and Level 3's request for a review of the "entire decision," supports "the commonsense 
notion that a federal court ought to be able to hear claims recognized under state law that 
nonetheless turn on substantial questions of Jederal law, and thus justify resort to the experience, 
21
 Marcus v. AT&T Corp., 138 F.3d 46, 55 (2nd Cir. 1998) (quoting Derrico v. Sheehan 
Emergency Hosp., 844 F.2d 22, 27 (2d Cir. 1988)) (emphasis added). 
22
 See Petition for Review (attached as Exhibit A to the Notice of Removal) at I, 
23
 See id. 
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solicitude, and hope of uniformity that a federal forum offers on Lv n issues."24 While Level 3 
may believe that "the federal statute, the FCC's orders, and the precedent established in the 
federal com ts ai e irrelevant to the legal i esolutic n of this matte i •. .' " : ' • ;:: 1: vioi lsb ' the ( "ommissioi i 
thought otherwise. For Level 3 to have any hope of convincing a court that the Commission 
erred, I e vel 3 n :t;i ist persuade the Coi u t that the Con n nission's ii ltei pi etation of fedei al la\ v vv as 
incorrect. 
I his is clear 1> a case w here the complainant's <:" t ight to i: elief i eqi lires resoh itioi i of a 
substantial question of federal law"26 and where the appeal "will be sustained if the Constitution 
and law? l -;* - s- . ' •«(-**•- • • ih -• •• .» . 
another."27 In such circumstances the Court has subject matter jurisdiction, removal was 
a] • - v : • * ed . 
HL CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, defendant Qwest respectfully requests that Level 3 's Motion 
be denied and that the Court retain jurisdiction over Level 3 '$ appeal. 
24
 See Grable & Sons Metal Products, Inc. v. Darue Engineering & Mfg., U.S. , 125 S.Ct. 
2363, 2367 (2005); see also, e.g., Finney v. Nokia, Inc., 402 F.3d 430, 442 (4th Cir. 2005H"Under the 
substantial federal question doctrine, a defendant seeking to remove a case in which state Jaw creates the 
plaintiffs cause of action must establish two elements: (1) that the plaintiffs right to relief necessarily 
depends on a question of federal law, and (2) that the question of federal law is substantial^... If a 
plaintiff can establish, without the resolution of an issue of federal law, all of the essential elements of his 
state law claim, then the claim does not necessarily depend on a question of federal law ") (citations and 
quotation omitted). 
25See Motion at 14. 
26
 See supra note 19. 
27
 See supra note 3. 
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RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED: April 3, 2006. 
Gregory B. Monson 
David L. Elmont 
Stoel Rives LLP 
Attorneys for Defendant Qwest Corporation 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this 3rd day of April, 20061 served the enclosed OPPOSITION 
TO MOTION TO REMAND by electronic filing to: 
William J. Evans 
Vicki M. Baldwin 
Parsons Behle & Latimer 
201 South Main Street, Suite 1800 
Post Office Box 45898 
Salt Lake City, UT 84145 
Sandy Mooy 
Public Service Commission of Utah 
400 Heber M. Wells Building 
160 East 300 South 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
SaltLake-274320 fi nOI<W<K.nni74 
EXHIBIT 1 
EXHIBIT 1 TO THE OPPOSITION TO MOTION TO REMAND 
APPEARS AS EXHIBIT G TO THTS ADDENDUM 
EXHIBIT K 
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Gregory L. Rogers William J. Evans (5276) 
(admittedpro hac vice) Vicki M. Baldwin (8532) 
LEVEL 3 COMMUNICATIONS, LLC PARSONS BEHLE & LATIMER 
1025 Eldorado Boulevard One Utah Center 
Broomfield, CO 80021 201 South Main Street, Suite 1800 
Telephone: (720) 888-2512 Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Facsimile: (720) 888-5134 Telephone: (801) 532-1234 
Facsimile: (801) 536-6111 
Attorneys for Level 3 Communications, LLC 
I M M I) I M I S M M I t H I l Ml' l l l 
FOR THE DISTRICT OF UTAH, CENTRAL DIVISION 
LEVEL 3 COMMUNICATIONS, LLC 
Plaintiff 
v. 
PIIW.IC SlWVICl''( I IMMIXSHIN l >l< III All, 
and 
QWI Si CORPORATION, 
Defendants. 
REPLY MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT 
OF MOTION TO REMAND 
(Oral Argument Requested) 
Hon. Dale A. Kimball 
2:06cv00132DAK 
Level 3 Communications, LI,C ("Level 3"), through its counsel, hereby submits this 
.Reply Memorandum ii 1 Support of its Motion to Remand this case to the Supreme 1 uim oi Utah. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Ii 11 epl> to Qv\ est' s Opposition tc • Motion to I If mand ( ''Opposition"), I evel 3 sets foi tin 
the following statement of additional facts: 
1. II MI ill in SrpU'mhu ' '1)00 Ii'M-1 \ ami t,hu"st ( 'uipnutinn (,ltOwe\f'| 
entered into an interconnection agreement ("Old Agreement") pursuant to the Communications 
846246.8 
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Act of 1934, as amended by the Telecommunications Act of 1996 (the "Telecommunications 
Act" or the "Act") and Utah Code Annotated § 54-8b-2.2. 
2. The Old Agreement provided among other things: 
If the Parties' elect to establish two-way direct trunks, the 
compensation for such jointly used 'shared' facilities shall be 
adjusted as follows: The nominal compensation shall be pursuant 
to the rates for direct trunk transport in Appendix A. The actual 
rate paid to the provider of the direct trunk facility shall be 
reduced to reflect the provider's use of that facility. The 
adjustment in the direct trunk transport rate shall be a percentage 
that reflects the provider's relative use (i.e. originating minutes of 
use) of the facility in the busy hour. 
Old Agreement, Attachment 1 § 5.1.2.4 (emphasis added) (hereinafter "Relative Use" clause). 
3. The Utah Public Service Commission ("PSC" or "Commission") approved the 
Old Agreement on January 10, 2001, finding that it "does not discriminate against any 
telecommunication carrier not a party to it" and that it "comports with the [Telecommunications 
Act] § 25ir Report and Order, Docket No. 00-049-88 (Jan. 10, 2001) (emphasis added). 
4. On April 27, 2001, the Federal Communications Commission ("FCC") issued its 
ISP Remand Order. See Implementation of the Local Competition Provisions in the 
Telecommunications Act of 1996; Intercarrier Compensation for ISP-Bound Traffic, Order ^n 
Remand and Report and Order, CC Docket No. 99-68 16 FCC Red. 9151 (rel. April 27, 2004) 
(ISP Remand Order). The ISP Remand Order determined that telecommunications traffic bound 
for an Internet Service Provider ("ISP") is interstate rather than local traffic and, for that reason, 
the reciprocal compensation requirements of Section 251(b)(5) do not apply to Internet-bound 
traffic. There is no dispute that the shared trunks in the present case are provided pursuant to 
846246.8 2 
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Qwest's obligation to interconnect with Level 3 uiulri Section lM"l(cirM' n I [MII'.ii.tiil U lie 
reciprocal compensation provision of Section 251(b)(5). 
The Old Agreement expired on June 26, 2001, yet continued in force IIIHICI il 
"evergreen clause" until a new agreement was approved by the Commission. 
Pursuant to a change in law provision of the Old Agreement, on .him }K 2002, 
Level J and lowest (collectively, the "Parties"') entered into a Single Point of Presence ("SPOP") 
Amendment to the Old Agreement, which added terms and conditions for SPOP in Utah. 
7. On November 14, 2002, pursuant to the change-in law provision of the Old 
Agreement, Level 3 and Qwest filed another amendment to the Old Agreement implementing the 
FXX11', ISP Remand Uulci. Vllliuiich they amended the Old Agreement with respect to 
reciprocal compensation for ISP-bound traffic, the Parties never amended the Relative Use 
i l i i u s e , ' • 
8. In 2001, the Parties began negotiations for a New Agreement. Because they were 
i n lable to agree on language foi *'"1 i<: f ,(:: ^ "Rl" elative I Ise clause, they petitioned the PSC for 
arbitration of that issue, On Decembr he :002, a hearing was held and testimony received in 
the Vrbiti at ion Proceeding foi the New \^iccinent ' . 
9. The Commission issued its Repoi t and Ordei in the Arbitration Proceeding; 
("'Arbiiniliun Order") jpif/inn IIH" the Ni w Aj'tivinenl n Ivbnuiy ,'() ?i)U\ I Report anil Order,. 
PSC Docket No. 02-2266-02). Thus, it was on this date that the New Agreement replaced the 
Old Agreement. The \ibifiafion Ouln itdnntnnnl ilni ih >\ . i -1.. 11 \ in language I hat 
excludes ISP-bound traffic from the Relative Use calculation would be applied on a prospective 
basis only. fhe Arbitration Order states: 
846246.8 $ 
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The contract provides for a relative use factor of 50% to be used 
until a new factor is agreed upon by the parties. Qwest proposes 
that when a new factor is established that bills should be 
retroactively adjusted for the initial billing quarter. Level 3 argues 
that any new relative use factor should be used prospectively only. 
We will adopt Level 3fs position and order that the contract 
language be modified so that no true up will be made and new 
relative use factors will apply prospectively only. 
Arbitration Order at 4 (emphasis added). 
II. THE FEDERAL COURT DOES NOT HAVE SUBJECT MATTER 
JURISDICTION. 
In Level 3's Memorandum in Support of this Motion to Remand, Level 3 explained that 
the federal court does not have subject matter jurisdiction because (1) Level 3's Petition for 
Relief did not raise a question of federal law; (2) Level 3's cause of action was not created by 
federal law; and (3) the resolution of the substantive issues in this case does not turn on a 
substantial question of federal law. Level 3's Memorandum in Support of Motion to Remand 
("Memo in Support"). 
Qwest's Opposition does not directly respond to the arguments that Level 3 discussed in 
its Memo in Support. Instead, Qwest offers three broad arguments: (1) the Court must take 
jurisdiction to determine whether the PSC misapplied federal law; (2) the case law supports a 
finding that the Court has jurisdiction; and (3) Level 3 has used artful pleading4o frame its claim 
in terms of state law. Level 3 responds as follows: 
A. The Resolution of this Case Does Not Turn on a Question oGFederal Law, 
In its Opposition, Qwest argues that the Commission's decision relied on the Act and the 
FCC's Remand Order. It contends Level 3, therefore, cannot demonstrate error unless it 
demonstrates the Commission misinterpreted the Act. Opposition at 6-7. Thus, Qwest 
846246.8 4 
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concludes that the issue in this case turns on a question of federal lav ' Id Owes!'s argument 
misses the point. The Commission's error was that it applied federal law at all instead of simply 
enforcing the plain, unambiguous terms of the contract. 
Qwest's argument fails to recognize the distinction between the court's review of federal 
law for the purpose of determining jurisdiction, and its review of federal law for the pi lipos 3 of 
determining the merits of the case. As discussed in I ,evel 3's Memo in Support, not every term. 
in an interconnection agreement is subject to federal law, and not every case interpreting an 
interconnection agreement raises a question of federal law that can serve as a basis for federal 
jurisdiction. See Nuvox Commc'ns, Inc. v. North Carolina Utils. Comm'n, 409 F. Siipp. 2d 660, 
664 65 (E D.N..C 2006) (no federal jurisdiction under § ; 11 ^ r interpretation of audit provision 
in federal interconnection agreement). Yet, every determination of whether jurisdiction lies 
niiidt"! Set lion Mil iKrcssaiily requires a review of the applicability w! udcidllau to the case. 
Federal courts are thus routinely required to assess the applicability of federal law in determining 
wliefhei ^uhjeet matin jut isdirlion exists See e.g., Superior Oil Co. v. Merritt ( - M*PP 26 
(D. Utah 1985) (reviewing federal law to determine that federal question jurisdiction ui »ot 
exist) Aiial)/Jiig tcdcinl law Hoi (In pin|u>s<' o! determining jurisdiction does not itsel: <-.•- Or 
federal jurisdiction. 
lowest arii.uc*' dni Itn\nj«.v (In- r'ni»iinr;,:imi K'l'ird up "in iimi "S ' "tnif Mir I'^ IP Remand 
Order to reach its determination, "Level 3 will not be able to establish Commission error 
without demonstrating that the Coi amission misintei pi eted oi misapplied the k t " Opposition 
at 6-7. Thus, it argues, Level Vs "i ndu io relief requires a resolution of federal law" (citations 
1
 Even though the Commission's Order cites Section 251, a check of the cited provision shows that the Commission 
obviously meant Section 252, 
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omitted). This is incorrect. Level 3's right to relief does not turn on a question of federal law, 
because the Commission's decision to invoke Section 252 was an error of state law. 
Under Utah law, a contract must be interpreted in light of the law that was in effect at the 
time the contract was signed. Cache County v. Property Tax Div. of Utah State Tax Comm'n. 
922 P.2d at 765-67 (Utah 1996). State principles of contract interpretation also require that the 
meaning of contractual terms must be determined consistent with the intent of the parties at the 
time they entered into the agreement. Uintah Basin Med. Ctr. v. Hardy, 110 P.3d 168, 172 (Utah 
Ct. App. 2005) (citing Central Fla. Invs.. Inc. v. Parkwest Assocs.. 40 P.3d 599 (Utah 2002)). 
The Old Agreement was "adopted" by Level 3 pursuant to Section 252(i) of the Act. It 
was the same agreement that Qwest had entered into with AT&T, and it contained the Relative 
Use clause at issue in the present case.2 The Commission arbitrated and approved the Old 
Agreement, as between both Qwest and AT&T, and Qwest and Level 3, finding that it complied 
with Section 251 of the Act. (Report and Order, Docket No. 00-049-88 (Jan. 10, 2001)). Thus, 
the Commission deemed the Relative Use clause to have met the Act's requirement that rates for 
interconnection must be just, reasonable and non-discriminatory. Id. 
At the time that Qwest and Level 3 entered into the Commission-approved Old 
Agreement, the ISP Remand Order had not yet issued. As discussed in Level 3's Memo in 
Support, the ISP Remand Order deals with reciprocal compensation, not with sharing the^costs of 
direct4runks. Even if it did address such shared costs (which it did not), the ISP Remand Order 
would not have been automatically applicable to the Old Agreement. The Old Agreement 
2
 The text of the Relative Use clause is found at Attachment 1 § 5.1.2.4 of the Old Agreement. It is reproduced in 
Level 3's Memorandum in Support of Motion to Remand at 2, and in this Reply Memorandum at Paragraph 2 of the 
Statement of Facts. 
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included a provision governing the procedures to be followed .in the event of a change of law". 
Along with the rest of the Old Agreement, this change-in-law j n ovisioi I > \ as ft n lr ,< i I: * the 
Commission to comply with the Act. 
After the FCC Issued the ISI " R emand Ordei the Pai ties in \ oked tl le change-in law 
provision <<•> reform \h>> recipiutal Compensation clause, amending it in response to ilk ; r 
Remand i -•
 : .-.«,.- • **•- • 
clause of the Old Agreement. The Relative Use clause remained in effect for the duration of the 
Old Agi eei nent, whicl i vv as i mtil the Commission issi led its order appro\ ing tl le Ne\:\< Agreement 
on February 20, 2004. (Report and Order, Docket No. 02-2266-02, February 20. 2004). 
I e v el 3 filed its petition \ ( ith the Commission in th 3 present case • -:* '5, 
seeking an interpretation of the language of the Relative Use clause of the Old Agreemen 
R*M , • . - )i inter connection facihi os. 
It sought an interpretation from the Commission according i<* Uie intention of the parties, and 
a« *"*-.*.: - * . :'u -Mient. Instead, even 
though the Commission had previously found the Old Agreement in compliance with the Act, 
and even though the Parties never an lended the Relative Use clause, the Commission invoked 
Section 252 and found that the Relative I Jse clause of the Old Agreement now did not comply 
with the Act. In reaching this decision, the Commission ignored the change-in law provision and 
relied instead on the ISP Remand Order and its own decision in the Arbitration of the New 
Agreement. Report and Order at 9-10 (Aug. 18, 2005). 
The Commission erred-by ignoring its original approval of the Old Agreement, by 
ignoring its Arbitration Order that stated the new relative use calculation would be applied 
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prospectively only, and in interpreting the Relative Use clause of the Old Agreement in context 
of the law that was in effect in 2005, rather than the law in effect at the time the contract was 
signed. Cache County, 922 P.2d at 765-67. The Commission also should have inteipreted the 
Relative Use clause consistent with the intent of the parties at the time it was executed. Uintah 
Basin Med. Ctr., 110 P.3d at 172. There was nothing in the Act, the ISP Remand Order or the 
Commission's recent Arbitration Order that would allow the Commission to abrogate the 
change-in-law provision that it had previously approved or that would support the Commission's 
application of federal law. Whether the Commission erred in failing to give effect to the 
language in the contract does not depend on federal law, but upon state law principles of contract 
interpretation. Illinois Bell Telephone Co. v. Worldcom Technologies, Inc., 179 F.3d 566, 574 
(7th Cir. 2000). 
B. The Case Law Cited by Qwest Does Not Provide Precedent for Finding that 
Federal Jurisdiction Exists under Section 1331. 
The cases relied on by Qwest in its Opposition, are inapplicable because, without 
exception, these cases involved disputes about the obligation to pay reciprocal compensation 
under Section 251(b)(5). 
Like Level 3, Qwest has cited Verizon Maryland.3 However, Qwest uses excerpts from 
the case to support an assertion for which the case does not stand. Qwest states, "just as in 
Verizon," a determination of a state commission interpreting or enforcing an interconnection 
agreement "hinges on the construction o^ f federal law." Opposition at 2. In fact, the Court in 
Verizon Maryland explicitly declined lo hold that the interpretation or enforcement of 
3
 Verizon Maryland, Inc. v. Public Service Commission of Maryland, 535 U.S. 635 (2002). 
846246.8 8 
Case 2:06-cv-00132-DAK Document 9 Filed 04/17/2006 Page 9 of 14 
interconnection agreements was a determination under Section 252.4 Qwest's 
mischaracterization of the holding in Verizon Maryland is likely due to the fact that, unlike the 
present case, the question before the Court involved the interpretation of a reciprocal 
compensation provision subject to Section 251(b)(5). See id- 535 U.S. at 643 ("Here, the 
resolution of Verizon's claim turns on whether the Act, or an FCC ruling issued thereunder, 
precludes the Commission from ordering payment of reciprocal compensation"). The Relative 
Use clause in the Old Agreement, which allocated Qwest and Level 3's costs for direct truck 
transport arrangements, is not required under the Act and does not implicate Section 251(b)(5). 
Qwest also ignores that the plaintiffs in Verizon Maryland specifically alleged a violation of the 
Act. 535 U.S. 642. For those reasons, Verizon Maryland is not precedent, as Qwest urges, for 
the proposition that the issues in the present case turn on the construction of federal law. 
Qwest also cites Southwestern Bell Tel. Co. v. Brooks Fiber Comm. Of Oklahoma, 235 
F.3d 493, 497 (10th Cir. 2000), taking out of context the court's statement that "any state 
commission determination interpreting and enforcing an agreement approved under that Act is 
itself a determination under the Act, subject to federal court review." Opposition at 5-6. As in 
Verizon Maryland, the court in Southwestern Bell was considering reciprocal compensation 
under Section 251(b)(5), not shared cost of trunks. 235 F.3d at 496. Moreover^the Tenth Circuit 
4
 The Court stated: 
[Petitioners] argue ... that a state commission's authority under § 252 implicitly encompasses the 
authority to interpret and enforce an interconnection agreement that the commission4ias approved, 
and that an interpretation enforcement decision is therefore a "determination under § 252" subject 
- to federal review. Whether the text of § 252(e)(6) can be so construed is a question we need not 
decide. For we agree with the parties' alternative contention, that even if § 252(eX6) does not 
confer jurisdiction, it at least does not divest the district court's of their authority under 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1331 to review the commission's order for compliance with federal law. 
535 U.S. at 641-42 (emphasis added). 
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Court's opinion in Southwestern Bell should be narrowly applied to avoid extending federal 
jurisdiction farther than the United States Supreme Court was willing to do in Verizon Maryland. 
In Southwestern Bell neither party contended that the federal courts lacked subject matter 
jurisdiction to hear the appeal from the Oklahoma Commission. Id. at 496. Indeed, 
Southwestern Bell appealed the commission's decision specifically on the grounds that the 
decision conflicted with not only the plain language of the agreement, but also with state and 
federal precedent, and "the reciprocal compensation provisions of the Act." Id. Under those 
circumstances, the Tenth Circuit Court found that federal jurisdiction was conferred pursuant to 
Section 252. Two years later, however, the United States Supreme Court in Verizon Maryland, 
faced with virtually the same issue, declined to hold that Section 252 conferred jurisdiction to 
review decisions of state commissions interpreting or enforcing interconnection agreements. 
Instead, because the parties in the Verizon Maryland case had also alleged a violation of the Act, 
the Court relied on Section 1331 to find that subject matter jurisdiction existed. 535 U.S. at 641-
42. Because the present case is not a dispute involving reciprocal compensation, and because 
Level 3 has not alleged a violation of the Act, Qwest's reliance on Southwestern Bell is 
misplaced. 
Qwest also cited Illinois Bell 179 F.3d 566 (dispute about reciprocal compensation) to 
support Qwest's general contention that every dispute about an interconnection agreement arises 
under federal law. Opposition at 5-6, n.15. Yet, the court in that case-expressly stated otherwise: 
Lest there be any misunderstanding ... we add that any issues of 
state law remain open for determination in the proper forum. 
Section 252(c)(6) authorizes a federal court to determine whether 
the agency's decision departs from federal law. A decision 
"interpreting" an agreement contrary to its Jerms creates a 
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different kind of problem—one under the law of contracts, and 
therefore one for which a state forum can supply a remedy. 
Illinois Bell 179 F.3d at 574 (emphasis added). The Court's statement in Illinois Bell, rather 
than serving as precedent for a finding of federal subject matter jurisdiction, supports an order 
remanding this case to the Utah Supreme Court. 
The authority cited by Qwest does not support a conclusion that Section 252 provides an 
independent basis for federal jurisdiction to review a state commission decision interpreting or 
enforcing a provision in an interconnection agreement. Likewise, the authority cited by Qwest 
does not suggest that jurisdiction exists under Section 1331. The present case is not a dispute 
about reciprocal compensation. Level 3 did not allege a violation of the Act. It did not appeal 
the Commission's decision to federal court. Thus, none of the cases cited by Qwest provides any 
precedent for a conclusion that federal subject matter jurisdiction exists in this case. 
C. Level 3's Complaint Alleging State Law Causes of Action Satisfies the Well-
Pleaded Complaint Rule. 
In order for a court to find jurisdiction under Section 1331, the plaintiffs complaint must 
raise a question of federal law. Nicodemus v. Union Pac. Corp., 318 F.3d 1231, 1235 (10th Cir. 
2003). A pleading of a defendant that raises a federal question "is inadequate to confer federal 
jurisdiction." Merrell Dow Pharms. Inc. v. Thompson, 478 U.S. 804, 808 (1986). Although this 
case comes to the court as an appeal from the Commission's decision, the Court should still look 
to the plaintiffs complaint rather than the Commission's Order to see whether plaintiff has 
raised a question of federal law. A review of the background of this case and of the issues 
presented shows that the Commission's error was that it incorrectly relied upon federal law 
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rather than applying Utah law. For that reason, Level 3's Petition for Review is soundly 
grounded in state law. 
In its Memo in Support, Level 3 explained that its initial petition to the Commission 
sought an order enjoining Qwest from disconnecting service to Level 3, and a declaration under 
the Old Agreement. There was no claim that Qwest had violated federal law, that any provision 
of federal law applied, that the Commission's jurisdiction to hear the Petition derived from 
federal law, or that Level 3 was entitled to any remedy under federal law. Likewise, in Level 3's 
Request for Reconsideration of the Commission's Order, Level 3 argued that the Commission 
had failed to correctly apply state law, and failed to give effect to the intention of the parties as 
expressed in the Old Agreement. Level 3 does not, and has never viewed this dispute as 
anything more than a question of common law interpretation of the words of the Old Agreement. 
In its Opposition, Qwest points out that a plaintiff may not defeat jurisdiction of the 
federal courts by "artful pleading," framing a federal cause of action in terms of a state law, or 
omitting to plead essential federal questions. Opposition at 7-8 (citations omitted). Level 3 does 
not suggest that the Court should ignore substantial questions of federal law when a plaintiffs 
right to relief requires resolution of a federal question. Qwest, however, bears the burden to 
demonstrate that a substantial federal question exists. Laughlin v. K-Mart Corp., 50 F.3d 871, 
873 (10th Cir. 1995). 
Other than general references to the Commission's reliance on both Section 252 and the 
ISP Remand Order, Qwest has not identified any federal statute, rule or order that it claims is 
essential to determining the issues raised in either Level 3's petition to the Commission, or its 
appeal of the Commission's decision. While it insists that "the right of petitioners to recover 
846246.8 12 
Case 2:06-cv-00132-DAK Document 9 Filed 04/17/2006 Page 13 of 14 
under their complaint will be sustained if the Constitution and laws of the United States are given 
one construction and will be defeated if they are given another," it never identifies or discusses 
the law upon which this case might turn. Opposition at 4. Qwest also asserts that Level 3 seeks 
to accomplish "the artful omission of a necessary federal question," yet fails to identify what that 
federal question might be. Instead, it simply asserts that "Level 3 will not be able to establish 
Commission error . . . without demonstrating that the Commission misinterpreted or misapplied 
the Act." Opposition at 8. 
Whether the Commission incorrectly relied on federal law turns upon state contract law. 
The only federal questions in this case are those that the Court must ask before it determines 
whether it has jurisdiction under Section 1331. There is no other question of federal law that 
Qwest has identified upon which this case would turn. For that reason, Level 3 submits that 
based on state law, the Commission erred in applying federal law, and that the Court, therefore, 
does not have subject matter jurisdiction. 
IIL CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, and the reasons discussed in Verizon Maryland, Section 252 
does not provide a basis for finding federal subject matter jurisdiction in the present case. 
Moreover, because this case involves the interpretation and enforcement of a provision in an 
interconnection agreement that, unlike reciprocal compensation, is not required under Section 
251, there is no federal question involved at all. The sole issue in this case is the interpretation 
of the Relative Use clause. That issue must be examined under the law existing, and according 
to the parties' intentions expressed, at the time the contract was formed. The Commission erred 
in failing to do so and in misapplying inapplicable federal law governing reciprocal 
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compensation. For those reasons, Level 3 respectfully requests this Court find that it does not 
have subject matter jurisdiction and remand this case to the Utah Supreme Court. 
DATED this 17th day of April, 2006. 
/s/ William J. Evans 
William J. Evans (5276) 
Vicki M. Baldwin (8532) 
PARSONS BEHLE & LATIMER 
One Utah Center 
201 South Main Street, Suite 1800 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Telephone: (801) 532-1234 
Facsimile: (801) 536-6111 
Attorneys for Level 3 Communications, LLC 
Gregory L. Rogers, admitted pro hac vice 
Level 3 Communications, LLC 
1025 Eldorado Boulevard 
Broomfield, CO 80021 
Telephone: (720) 888-2512 
Facsimile: (720) 888-5134 
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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF UTAH 
CENTRAL DIVISION 
LEVEL 3 COMMUNICATIONS, LLC I 
Plaintiff, 
ORDER REMANDING ACTION TO 
vs. UTAH SUPREME COURT 
PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION OF 
UTAH and QWEST CORPORATION Case No. 2:06CV132K 
Defendants. | 
This matter is before the court on Level 3 Communications, LLC's ("Level 3") Motion to 
Remand. A hearing on the motion was held on May 17, 2006. At the hearing, Level 3 was 
represented by Gregory L. Rogers and William J. Evans. Defendant Qwest Corporation 
("Qwest") was represented by David L. Elmont. Before the hearing, the court considered 
carefully the memoranda and other materials submitted by the parties. Since taking the motion 
under advisement, the court has further considered the law and facts relating to this motion. 
Now being fully advised, the court renders the following Order. 
Level 3 has requested that this court remand this case back to the Utah Supreme Court. 
Level 3 had previously appealed to the Utah Supreme Court the Public Service Commission's 
decision regarding an agreement Level 3 had with Qwest. Qwest removed that appeal to this 
court. Level 3 argues that this court does not have subject matter jurisdiction over this appeal 
from the Commission's Report and Order because Level 3's Petition before the Commission did 
not raise a question of federal law, its causes of action were not created by federal law, and there 
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is no issue in this case that turns on a substantial question of federal law. Instead, Level 3 
argues, the resolution of this matter requires only the application of state law principles of 
contract interpretation. Qwest, on the other hand, claims that this court has jurisdiction because 
the appeal involves the interpretation of federal law. 
District courts have "original jurisdiction of all civil actions arising under the 
Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States." 28 U.S.C. § 1331. "A case arises under 
federal law if its well-pleaded complaint establishes either that federal law creates the cause of 
action or that the plaintiffs right to relief necessarily depends on resolution of a substantial 
question of federal law. Nicodemus v. Union Pacific Corp., 440 F.3d 1227, 1232 (10th Cir. 2006) 
(internal quotations and citations omitted). Thus, ueven though a plaintiff asserts only claims 
under state law, federal-question jurisdiction may be appropriate if the state-law claims implicate 
significant federal issues." Id. 
The court finds that there is no federal question on the face of Level 3fs Petition, its 
claims were not created by federal law, and also that Level 3rs right to relief does not depend on 
resolution of a substantial question of federal law. Rather, the resolution of this dispute depends 
upon state contract law. For the reasons stated in Level 3's memorandum in support and in its 
reply memorandum, the court agrees that it does not have subject matter jurisdiction over this 
action. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, and good cause appearing, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that 
Level 3's Motions to Remand [Docket No. 4] is GRANTED. The Clerk of the Court is directed 
2 
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to remand this action back to the Utah Supreme Court. 
DATED this 26th day of May, 2006. 
BY THE COURT: 
DALE A. KIMBALI 
United States District Judge 
3 
